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PREFACE 
During the last half century there has been revolutionary progress in logic 
and in logic-related areas such as linguistics. HistoricaI knowledge of the 
origins of these subjects has also increased significantly. Thus, it would 
seem that the problem of determining the extent to which ancient logical 
and linguistic theories admit of accurate interpretation in modern terms 
is now ripe for investigation. 
The purpose of the symposium was to gather logicians, philosophers, 
linguists, mathematicians and philologists to present research results 
bearing on the above problem with emphasis on logic. Presentations and 
discussions at the symposium focused themselves into five areas: ancient 
semantics, modern research in ancient logic, Aristotle's logic, Stoic logic, 
and directions for future research in ancient logic and logic-related areas. 
Seven of the papers which appear below were originally presented at the 
symposium. In every case, discussion at the symposium led to revisions, 
in some cases to extensive revisions. The editor suggested still further 
revisions, but in every case the author was the finaljudge of the work that 
appears under his name. 
In addition to the seven presented papers, there are four other items 
included here. Two of them are papers which originated in discussions 
folIowing presentations. Zirin's contribution is based on comments he 
made folIowing Kretzmann's presentation. My 'Remarks on Stoic De-
duction' is based on the discussion whieh followed Gould's paper. A 
third item contains remarks that I prepared in advance and read at the 
opening of the panel discussion which was held at the end of the sympo-
sium. The panel discussion was tape-recorded and the transcript proved 
of sufficient quality to merit inclusion in these proceedings with a mini-
mum of editing. 
Funds for the symposium were provided by a grant to the Philosophy 
Department of the State University of New York at Buffalo from the 
University's Institutional Funds Committee. Departments of Mathe-
maties, Clas sies and Linguistics cooperated in the planning and in the 
x PREFACE 
symposium itself. Professors Richard Vesley (Mathematics), Ronald 
Zirin (Classies), Madeleine Mathiot (Linguistics) and Wolfgang Wolck 
(Linguistics ) deserve thanks, as do the folIowing Professors ofPhilosophy: 
William Parry, John Kearns, and John GlanviIIe. Special thanks goes to 
Professor Peter Hare who conceived of the idea for the symposium, aided 
in obtaining funds for it, and gave help in many other ways as well. 
David Levin, Terry Nutter, Keith Ickes, William Yoder, Susan Wood, 
Sule Elkatip, and Alan Soble, all students in Philosophy, aided in various 
ways. Levin was especiaIly conscientious and generous with his time. 
JOHN CORCORAN 
Buffalo, N. Y., November 1972 
PART ONE 
ANCIENT SEMANTICS 
NORMAN KRETZMANN 
ARISTOTLE ON SPOKEN SOUND SIGNIFICANT 
BY CONVENTION 
A few sentences near the beginning of De interpretatione (I6a3-8) con-
stitute the most influential text in the history of semantics. The text is 
highly compressed, and many translations, including the Latin translation 
in which it had its greatest influence, have obscured at least one interesting 
feature of it. In this paper I develop an interpretation that depends on 
taking seriously some details that have been negleeted in the countless 
discussions of this text. 
The sentence with which De interpretatione begins, and which imme-
diately precedes the text I want to examine, provides (as Ackrill remarks 1) 
the program for Chapters 2-6 . 
... we must settle what a name is [Chapter 2] and what a verb is [Chapter 3], and then 
what a negation [Chapters 5 and 6], an affirmation [Chapters 5 and 6], a statement 
[Chapten, 4 and 5] and asentence [Chapters 4 and 5] are. (16al-2)2 
But Aristotle says "First we must settle what a name is ... ", and that is 
what he does in Chapter 2. The remainder of Chapter I, then, may be 
thought of as preparatory to the main business of those chapters. And 
since their main business is to establish definitions, it is only natural to 
preface them with a discussion of the defining terms. At the beginning of 
Chapter 2, for instance, Aristotle defines 'name' in these terms: 'spoken 
sound', 'significant by convention', 'time', and 'parts significant in sepa-
ration'. These terms continue to serve as defining terms beyond Chapter 
2, and the remainder of Chapter 1 (I 6a3-18) is devoted to clarifying them. 
The special task of the text I am primarily concerned with is the clari-
fication of the proximate genus for the definitions in Chapters 2-6: 
"spoken sound significant by convention".3 
"Emt ~i;v ouv .li EV Tij q>rovfj .mv 
EV .fj 'l'Uxfj 1tu8rll.Ul"trov m)~~oA.u, 
Now spoken sounds are symbols 
of affections in the soul, and writ-
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Kai. 'til 'Ypaep6J.lEVa 'trov sv 'ttl eprovtl. 
Kai. 6l<rnep 0088 'YpuJ.lJ.la'ta 7tiim. 'til 
ao'tu, 0088 ep rova! ai ail'tai' rov 
j.låV'tOl 'ta()'ta O11J.lEia 7tpo)'tro~, 4 
'tao'tll 7tiim. 7ta9iJJ.la'ta die; 'Vuxi'ie;, 
Kai. rov 'ta()'ta 6J.101IDJ.l'ta 7tpu'YJ.la'ta 
fj811 'tao'tu. 
ten marks symbols of spoken 
sounds. And just as written marks 
are not the same for all men, neither 
are spoken sounds. But what these 
are in the first place signs of - af-
fections of the soul - are the same 
for all; and what these affections 
are likenesses of - actual tbings-
are also the same. (16a3-8) 
Ignoring the claims about sameness or difference to begin with, we can 
pick out four elements and three relations. (I am going to use 'mental 
impression' only because it is handier than Ackrill's 'affection in [or of] 
thesoul'.) 
Elements 
actual thing 
mental impression 
spoken sound 
written mark 
Relations 
is a likeness of 
is a sign of 
is a symbol of 
Aristotle makes four claims in wbich these elements and relations are 
combined. 
(1) Written marks are symbols of spoken sounds. 
(2) Spoken sounds are symbols of mental impressions. 
(3) Spoken sounds are (in the first place) signs of mental 
impressions. 
(4) Mental impressions are likenesses af actual things. 
I shaH begin by pointing out some obvious features of these claims. 
(In the long history of this text even what is obvious has aften been 
overlooked.) 
There is nothing explicit in these four claims relating spoken sounds 
or written marks to actual things, nor is there any apparent implicit c1aim 
about such a relationship. 5 When we are told that spoken sounds are 
symbols and signs of mental impressions and that mental impressions are 
likenesses of actual tbings, we are given no license to infer anythlng at all 
about a relations hip between spoken sounds and actual tbings. Yet tbis is 
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just what commentators on this text have regularly done, usually remark-
ing (as if it were obvious) that Aristotle maintains that words stand di-
rectly for thoughts and indireetly for things. l think they have been led to 
do so beeause they have approaehed this text in the belief that it contains 
Aristotle's general theory ofmeaning. But, as we shaH see, this text makes 
better sense and fits its context better if it is interpreted as playing a more 
modest role. If it contains no claim at all, explicit or implicit, about a re-
lationship of spoken sounds to aetual things, then it is not even a sketch of 
a general theory of meaning. 
In claims (2) and (3) a spoken sound is said to be a symbol and to be a 
sign, to bear two apparently different relations to a mental impression. 
Boethius, however, translated both 'cr6J.1~OAa' and 'O"1lJ.1sia' as 'notae', 
thereby hiding this difference from the view of Western philosophers for 
seven eenturies or more, the eenturies during which his translation of De 
interpretatione was one of the few books which every philosopher 
discussed.6 I am going to proceed on the hypothesis that this termino-
logical difference reflects a real difference Aristotle recognized. 
Claim (1) uses one of the two relational terms of claims (2) and (3) in a 
context in which we ean provide a definite, clear interpretation for it, one 
that must have been evident to Aristotle as well. In one of the relations a 
spoken sound bears to a mental impression, a spoken sound is to a mental 
impression as a written mark is to a spoken sound; and we know how a 
written mark is to a spoken sound. Consider the written mark 'd-v-9-p-
ro-1t-O-C;'. It is, folIowing claim (1), a "symbol" ofthe spoken sound ofthe 
Greek word for man. Now that mark is not a name of that sound or a 
likeness ofit. Nor is that mark a symbolic representation ofthat sound as 
the owl is of Athena. It is neither a symptom nor a nonsymptomatic 
index of that sound on the basis of a regular natural association of occur-
renee.7 (It occurs on this page, for instanee, in the absence of any associat-
ed occurrenee ofthe spoken sound.) To be a symbol, then, is not the same 
as to be a name, or alikeness, or a symbolic representation, or an index. 
For x to be a symbol of y is for x to be a notation for y, to be a rule-
governed embodiment of y in a medium different from that in whieh y 
occurs. Thus the Roman alphabet and the dots and dashes of Morse eode 
are two notations, or symbolizations, for spoken English. The symboli-
zation of spoken sounds in written marks is independent of any semantie 
role the sounds may be assigned. We write 'w-o-m-a-n' as the symbol of a 
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spoken sound which happens to be the sound of an English word, but we 
ean equally well write 'n-a-m-o-w', the symbol of a sound with no seman-
tic role. Aristotle in claim (1) was of course concerned only with phono-
grams, but the ideograms of a sign-language are also rule-governed em-
bodiments in another medium, with the interesting difference that the 
original medium is not vocal but mental. 
These observations about the objectively assessable claim (1) ean be 
used in interpreting (2): Spoken sounds are symbols ofmentalimpressions. 
It should now be clear that this is not a claim that spoken sounds are 
names, or likenesses, or symbolic representations, or indices of mental 
impressions. They are to mental impressions as written marks are to them; 
that is, they are rule-governed embodiments of mental impressions in 
another medium, "ideophones". One way in which a spoken sound plays a 
semantic role is in symbolizing a mental impression. When Smith asks 
Jones 'What's a pentacle?' and Jones says 'A five-pointed star', he may be 
described (at least sometimes) as rendering audible what was only mental, 
just as Smith, if he then writes down what Jones said, renders visible what 
was only audible. Spoken sounds, those that constitute words, are rule-
governed embodiments of mental impressions in a vocal medium just as 
written marks, those that constitute pronounceable sets, are rule-governed 
embodiments of spoken sounds in a visual medium. 
The symbol-relation as described so far is symmetric. As written marks 
are rule-governed embodiments of spoken sounds in another medium, so 
spoken sounds are rule-governed embodiments of written marks in 
another medium; and the same applies to the symbol-relation as it ob-
tains between spoken sounds and mental impressions. But written marks 
are devised as symbols of spoken sounds and not vice versa. I will take 
account of this asymmetry by distinguishing encoding and decoding sym-
bolization. If Smith writes down what Jones has said and Robinson 
reads aloud what Smith has written, Smith encodes and Robinson decodes. 
Claims (l) and (2) could, then, be revised and supplemented in this 
way: 
(1 ') Written marks are encoding symbols of spoken sounds. 
(1") Spoken sounds are decoding symbols ofwritten marks. 
(2') Spoken sound s are encoding symbols of mental impressions. 
(2") Mental impressions are decoding symbols of spoken sounds. 
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The symbol-relation is clearly irreflexive, because of the stipulation of 
a different medium if for no other reason. What about transitivity? What, 
if anything, ean be inferred from claims (l) and (2) regarding a symbol-
relation between written marks and mental impressions? If the relation is 
considered in the broad sense, without the encoding/decoding distinction, 
it is both irreflexive and symmetric and so cannot be transitive. If the 
encoding or the decoding relation as described so far is considered separa-
tely, it may appear to be transitive. But the rules governing the encoding 
of mental impressions in spoken sounds are obviously different from the 
rules governing the encoding of spoken sounds in written marks. For that 
reason we could infer from (1 ') and (2/) only that written marks encode 
mental impressions indirectly, or at one remove. The fact that these 
characteristics of the symbol-relation are what we should expect is some 
confirmation for this interpretation. 
From the immediately accessibIe claim (1) I have derived an inter-
pretation of claim (2). Now I want to look at claim (3) in the light of this 
interpretation of (2). There are two obvious questions of interpretation, 
even of translation. (A) Are the words 'signs' (crTlI.l&iu) and 'symbols' 
(O"\)!l~OAU) synonymous here? Bonitz says they are,s and many transla-
tors have evidently been so sure of it that they have not bothered to give 
their readers a chance to raise the question. (B) Is 'in the first place' 
(npro't"rot;) connected (i) with the primacy of the sign-relation over the sym-
bol-relation or (ii) with the primacy of any semantic relation of spoken 
sounds to mental impressions over any semantic relation they may bear 
to actual things? Most interpreters have adopted the second of these alter-
natives.9 And since an affirmative answer to question (A) precludes re-
cognition of the first alternative, most have adopted (Bii) with no sense of 
having rejected a competing interpretation. 
I have aIready adopted a negative answer to (A) as a working hypothesis. 
This is not the point at which to decide how well the hypothesis works, 
but I can offer some explanation and support for it. Aristotle's general 
verb for semantic relations is 'O"1wuiv&W', on a par with our verbs 'mean' 
and 'signify', and he sometimes uses the closely related noun 'crll!l&iov' 
for general purposes too,10 somewhat as we sometimes use 'sign'. But the 
juxtaposition of 'crll!l&iov' with 'cr6!l~OAOV' in these few lines suggests a 
stricter interpretation, one borne out by the facts of the language. EIse-
where in Aristotle and in other authors before and after him the words 
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'crTII.lf:tov' and 'crull~oAoV' differ in being associated broadly with natural 
and with artificial indications, respectively.A medical symptom may be 
considered the paradigm of a C}"lWEtOV, and an identity token (especially 
one of two irregular broken halves of a potsherd or a seal on a document) 
may be considered the paradigm of a crull~OAOV. This naturaljartificial 
division is the philological basis of my hypothesis. 
If'crrlllEiov' is interpreted as 'symptom', then claim (3) may be rewritten 
in this way: 
(3') Spoken sounds are (in the first place) effects indicative oftheir 
concurrent causes, mental impressions. 
I am going to adopt this reading of claim (3) in the further development 
of my interpretation of this text.ll As (3') suggests, the symptom-relation 
is logically prior to the symbol-relation between spoken sounds and im-
pressions in the mind of the speaker. (That is my reading of 'in the first 
place'.) A parrot may produce spoken sounds of which impressions in 
your mind may be the (decoding) symbols, but because they are not symp-
toms of the occurrence of such mental impressions in the parrot they are 
not produced by the parrot as (encoding) symbols. 
Written marks are symptoms neither of spoken sounds nor of mental 
impressions although, as we have seen, they are symbols of spoken sounds 
and perhaps indirectly als o of mental impressions. They are not symp-
toms of spoken sounds because they are regularly produced in the ab-
sence of spoken sounds; and they are not symptoms of mental impressions 
because they persist past the time of their production as spoken sounds do 
not. 
Claim (4) presents difficulties of another sort. Ackrill complains about 
its vagueness. 
What precisely are 'affections in the sou!'? Later they are called thoughts.12 Do they 
include sense-impressions? Are they, or do they involve, images? AristotIe probably 
calls them likenesses of things because he is thinking of images and it is natural to think 
of the (visuaI) image of a cat as a picture or likeness of a cat. But the inadequacy of this 
as an account or explanation of thought is notoriOl.ls.13 
One respect in which it is notoriously inadequate is its failure to make 
sense of the notion of true and false thoughts - most obviously of the 
notion of a true or false existential thought, such as the thought that there 
is a goat-stag. And since this is the very example of thought which Aris-
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stotle uses in the latter half of Chapter 1, where he speaks of VOTU1U tv 
'til ",uxil rather than of ltu9ill.lU'tU tv 'til ",uxil, there are good prima jade 
grounds in the context ofthis text for distinguishing between thoughts and 
affections in the soul (which I have been calling mental impressions). In 
the best-known passages elsewhere in which Aristotle speaks of affections 
of the soul (m19TJ more often than ltu9ilJ.1u'tu) he is typically speaking of 
emotions and personality traits - e.g., shame, irascibility, anger, gentleness 
fear, pit y, courage, joy, loving, and hating.14 There is no reason to sup-
pose that Aristotle or anyone else would describe such affections of the 
soul as likenesses of actual things. But in the fint chapter of De anima 
Aristotle includes "sensing generally" (OA.O)~ uicr9avBcr9m) among affec-
tions of the soul, and that must be where the likenesses come in. It seems 
clear to me that claim (4) is concerned not with thoughts or with emotions 
and personality traits but with sense-impressions and perhaps with mental 
images generally, including those of imagination and memory. 
In De an ima, Book III, Chapter 8 (432a7-14), Aristotle apparently 
claims that no mental activity can occur without ({iVIm) mental images. I 
am not sure whether this means that mental images are a necessary con-
comitant of all mental activity or merelya necessary precondition of all 
mental activity. But in either case AristotIe clearly distinguishes in those 
passages between the images on the one hand, and thoughts, mental 
acts, and other mental entities on the other. Claim (4) is obviously inade-
quate as "an account or explanation of thought", but the reference to De 
an ima in 16a8-9 is evidence that Aristotle is not alluding to mental enti-
ties or mental acts in general here: "These matters have been discussed in 
the work on the soul and do not belong to the present subject". 
Taking 16a3-8 seriously requires us to begin, at least, by interpreting 
claim (4) in such a way as to give it a chance ofbeing true, and that means 
considering it as applying only to mental images of actual things. As I 
have tried to show, there is strong support in AristotIe for such an inter-
pretation. Once the narrow scope of claim (4) has been revealed, it is 
harder to suppose that this text was intended as a general theory of 
meaning. The difficulty is enhanced by the fact that Chapters 2-6 address 
themselves to detailed questions regarding meaning and come up with 
answers that bear no clear resemblance to the account in 16a3-8. But if it 
is not Aristotle's theory of meaning, as it has almost always been taken 
to be, what is it? 
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II 
If the text is read as a unit, the emphasis falls on the claims I have so far 
left out of consideration, the claims regarding the interpersonal sameness 
and difference of the four elements: 15 actual things, mental impressions, 
spoken sounds, and written marks. There are four such claims. 
(S) Written marks are not the same for all. 
(6) Spoken sounds are not the same for all. 
(7) Mental impressions are the same for all. 
(8) Actual things are the same for all. 
These claims, I believe, constitute the grounds for Aristotle's subsequent 
claims (at 16a19, 16a27, and 17a2) that one ar another linguistic entity is 
significant "by convention" (KU'!U crUV8iJKTJV).16 The point of l6a3-8 is the 
presentation not of a general theory of meaning but of grounds for the 
claim that linguistic signification is conventional, a claim that still needed 
to be made, ar at least made unambiguously, in the generation af ter 
Plato.17 From the strength of the conventionalist claims and the breadth 
oftheir application 18 we might have expected Aristotle to have provided a 
full-fledged argument in their support, but the only support we are given 
for them is in 16a3-8. Such semantic theoryas is in that text is there, I 
think, only to the extent to which it contributes to the support for con-
ventionalism. 
An example will fairly illustrate the int~rpersonal samenesses and differ-
ences and Aristotle's intentions in this text generally. Two experimental 
subjects, Smith and Schmidt, are seated in a darkened room facing a 
screen. Smith knows only English and Schmidt knows only German. On 
the screen is projected this shape: 6 . Each subject is then told to 
dase his eyes and is asked whether he perceives a likeness of the actual 
thing he saw, and each says that he does. Each is then asked to draw what 
he perceived in his mind's eye, and each produces a drawing that looks 
just like this: 6 . Each is then asked to write down under his drawing 
what that thing IS. Smith writes 't-r-i-a-n-g-I-e' and Schmidt writes 
'D-r-e-i-e-c-k'. Each is then asked to read what he has written. Smith says 
'triangle' and Schmidt say~ 'Dreieck'. 
Of course the example is thin and artificial as an instance af linguistic 
meaning, but if I am right ab out Aristotle's intentions in 16a3-8 he has 
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no need af an.ything richer ar more realistic. As I intend to show, some-
thing as skimpy as this will serve to elucidate "significant by convention". 
All the interpersonal samenesses and differences in claims (5)-(8) are 
illustrated in my example. Dnly those concerning the actual thing and the 
mental impressions need even a word of explanation. The actual thing -
the projected figure - is numerically the same for Smith and for Schmidt. 
The mental impression Smith has of it is numerically distinct from 
Schmidt's mental impression of the figure, but the two impressions are 
interpersonally the same in that they have a single Aristotelian form (or 
are two tokens of a single type). This can be confirmed, if not proved, in 
the drawings made by the two subjects. 
Ackrill suggests that what I am calling claim (7) is meant to follow 
from the considerations I expressed in (4) and (8): "different people (or 
peoples) confront the same things and situations, and have the same 
impressions of them and thoughts about them (likeness is a natural rela-
tion)".19 Inmy article an the history afsemantics I make such a suggestion 
even more explicitly: "The mental modifications arising from that con-
frontation are likenesses (6~otrol.l(l't(l) af the things, and they are thus the 
same for all men toO".20 If Aristotle intended to argue as I there suggested 
he did, his argument would clearly be unacceptable. Con sider this original 
- ~ - and these two likenesses: 6 /$". . Df course neither of the 
likenesses is perfect, but imperfection is a regular characteristic of like-
nesses, more obviously of mental images than of some other sorts. 
Nevertheless, although the two are not even decent likenesses of each 
other, ml:lch less the same, each af them is a likeness ofthe original. 
This line of criticism, suggested in different ways by Ackrill's account 
and mine, can be directed agatnst Aristotle effectively only if we suppose 
that he is out to make general claims here regarding mental impressions. 
If we adopt instead the hypothesis that his purpose is not to do psycho-
logy ar epistemology but rather to provide grounds for the conventiona-
lism he is going to proclaim, then we ean see that all he needs here is an 
illustration - a single case like my imaginary experiment. 21 Claim (7) do es 
not follow from claims (4) and (8); it is not true in general that if A' and 
A" are two likenesses af A, then A' and A" are alike. But of course there 
are cases, even when A' and A" are mental impressions (as in my experi-
ment), in which A' and A" are alike while the symbolizing spoken sounds 
and written marks are not alike, and that is all Aristotle needs here. That 
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is, I am claiming, all he needs here is a single instance in which claims 
(5), (6), (7), and (8) are true together. 
Before examining my claim further I want to consider claims (5) and 
(6). In Aristotle's words the two claims are put this way: "just as written 
marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds". The 
'just as' (manBp) suggests that what is intended in (6) is brought out more 
clearly in (5). What is clearer about written marks than about spoken 
sounds, even in the context of a single language and especiaIly from an 
unsophisticated point of view, is the conventionality of their relation to 
what they immediately symbolize. Thomas Aquinas puts this clearly 
and correctly in his commentary on this passage: 
No one has ever raised any question about this as regards letters. It is not only that the 
principle of their signifying is by imposition, but also that the formation of them is a 
produetion of art. Spoken sounds, on the other hand, are forrned naturaIly, and so some 
men have raised the question as to whether they signify naturally.22 
It is of course easy to iIlustrate the lack of universal sameness in written 
marks, as in the case of 't-r-i-a-n-g-I-e' and 'D-r-e-i-e-c-k'. But the illu-
stration is more to the point if we choose cases in which different marks 
symbolize one and the same spoken sound-e.g., 'ii' in Greek and 'h-a-y' 
in English - and cases in which one and the same written mark symbolizes 
different sounds - e.g., 'P-H': 'ray' in Greek and 'f' in English. 
III 
If I am right in my view that in 16a3-8 Aristotle is providing the grounds 
for his attribution of conventional signification to linguistic entities, then 
why does he approach the topic obliquely by way of considering inter-
personal sameness and difference rather than pointing out the various 
principles governing natural and conventional signification? I think there 
are three reasons for the oblique approach. 
In the first place, if he did simply point out the principles governing 
signification - resemblance, causal connection, regular association, 
custom, agreement, imposition - he would not be providing any grounds 
for his subsequent claim that spoken sounds (and written marks) are 
significant by convention in their capacity as symbols. Saying that they 
are significant by custom, agreement, or imposition is just a fancier way 
of saying that they are significant by convention. 
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In the second place, Aristotle is stating his conventionalism against the 
background of Plato's Cratylus. The fact that he has the Cratylus in mind 
in these opening chapters of De Interpretatione is indicated by his state-
ment of conventionalism in 17al-2: "Every sentence is significant (not as 
a to ol ~ut, as we said, by convention)". The phrase 'not as a tool' (06X 
cl>~ opyavov os) alludes to nothing in De Interpretatione and makes sense 
only as a reference to the doctrine of the Cratylus. 23 Moreover, at the 
beginning of the Cratylus the criterion of linguistic naturalness is sameness 
for all men,24 and one of the important problems of the dialogue is the 
difficulty of determining exactly what semantic element Plato thinks is the 
same for all men, regardless of linguistic differences among them. Plato 
was concerned to distinguish between natural and conventional correctness 
of names, while Aristotle is concerned with conventional signification. 
But interpersonal sameness and difference are criteria of naturalness and 
conventionality generally, and Aristotie's claims (5)-(8) regarding com-
paratively commonplace semantic elements are clear on points that 
Plato left mysterious. 
In the third place, and most important, considerations of sameness and 
difference do constitute criteria for distinguishing between natural and 
non-natural signs, and for present purposes we ean simply identify non-
natural and conventional signs. Temporarily ignoring Aristotle's own 
use ofthese notions, I ean offer this definition (and complementary defini-
tion). 
A natural sign is a sign the correct interpretation(s) of which 
is (are) necessarily the same for all men. 
(A non-natural sign is a sign the correct interpretation(s) of 
which is (are) not necessarily the same for all men.) 
A few explanatory remarks. I say 'correct' because, of course, there is no 
assignable limit to incorrect interpretations. An eclipse is not and has 
never been a natural sign of God's displeasure, no matter what anyone 
may think or have thought ab out it. Ileave open the possibility of more 
than one correct interpretation to cover cases of correctness at more than 
one levelof interpretation. A red sunset is correctly interpreted as a sign 
of good weather the next day and also, on another level, as a sign of con-
siderable dust in the atmosphere. I say 'necessarily' because it could hap-
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pen that all men adopted a single convention - e.g., 'Mayday' as a signal 
of distress - and that adoption would certify a single interpretation as 
correct for all men. But no such decision has any efficacy in establishing 
the correct interpretation of a natural sign. 
Although the definition and its complement make no reference to the 
principles of signification, they do distinguish effectively between natural 
and non-natural signification. How c10sely do they match Aristotie's 
remarks ? The most striking dissimilarity may seem to be the shift from 
Aristotie's consideration of sameness and difference of signs to a conside-
ration of sameness and difference of interpretations. My illustrations of 
sameness and difference with regard to written marks help to show that this 
dissimilarity is only apparent. When Aristotle says that "written marks are 
not the same for all men" he may mean to remind us that one and the 
same spoken sound - 'ray' - is symbolized in Greek letters as 'P-H' and 
in English letters as 'R-A-Y'; and that is a difference of signs. But he may 
also be taken to mean that the written mark 'P-H' is not the same for all 
men in that Greek speakers read it as 'ray' and English speakers as 'f'; 
and that is a difference of interpretations. (Analogous illustrations can be 
devised of sameness and difference of spoken sounds as symbols of mental 
impressions.) As for 'correct', which appears in my formulation but not 
in Aristotle's, it surely is to be understood in his for just the reasons I gave 
for inc1uding it in mine. 
The one real difference between what Aristotle says and what I say may 
be his omission of 'necessarily'; but, given his purposes, I do not think 
that omission is in any way damaging. As I see it, all he really wants or 
needs to do here is to establish on the basis of considerations of same-
ness and difference that spoken sounds and written marks are non-natur-
al, or conventional, signs. Observing that they are not in fact the same 
for all men does that very well; a fortiori they are not necessarily the 
same. 
From the stand point of my interpretation of this text the most mis-
leading feature of it is c1aim (8): Actual things are the same for all. It is 
innocuous in itself, and it does not get in the way of my interpretation, 
but it ean work together with the reference to De anima to give the first 
half of Chapter 1 the look of a summary statement of the foundations of 
knowledge and communication, and it is that look which has deceived so 
many. 
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IV 
In Chapter 1 AristotIe supplies some content for the notion of a spoken 
sound significant by convention, a notion he first makes use of in Chapter 
2. 
~OVOIlIX Il&V o(iv sen:t <pffiVTJ o"'llIlav-
nKTJ Kata O"UV8ijKT]V ... tO 0& Kata 
O"UV8ijK11V, an <pUO"Et tæv ' ovo-
,.UltffiV OUOBV sO"nv, aA')..! atav 
'YBVT]tat O"UIl~oAov' Sltd oT]AouO"i 
yi; n Kat oi åypa!1!1atot '1'6 q> 01 , 
OlOV 8T]piffiv, <bv OUOBV iiO"nv 
ovolla. 
(l6a19; 26-29) 
A name is a spoken sound signifi-
cant by convention ... I say 'by 
convention' because no name is a 
name naturally but only when it has 
become a symbol. Even inarticulate 
noises (of beasts, for instance) do 
indeed reveal something, yet none 
of them is a name. 
How are these passages to be read in the light of my interpretation? 
A name is said to be a spoken sound and not also a written mark be-
cause a written mark is simply an encoding symbol for a spoken sound, 
which is, in turn, (at least sometimes)25 an encoding symbol for a mental 
impression. But writing, like speech, is a linguistic medium, as mind is 
not; and so the primary linguistic element is the spoken sound.26 
In his note on the phrase 'spoken sound significant by convention' 
Ackrill says 
The linguistic items he wishes to consider are marked oif from sounds not spoken, from 
spoken sounds that are not significant, and from spoken sounds that are natural 
signs,27 
which seems clearly right. But if my interpretation is correct, there is 
something misleading about the way in which the third category of exclud-
ed entities is described, since on my interpretation conventionally signi-
ficant spoken sounds are (at least sometimes) primarily natural signs -
O"tl!1Eia, symptoms - of mental impressions. My description of the third 
category would have to be not 'spoken sounds that are natural signs' but 
'spoken sounds considered as natural signs' - i.e., all those that are signi-
ficant only as natural signs and those that are also significant by conven-
tion considered in their role as natural signs. 
I want to try to clarify this point before going on. If in ordinary cir-
cumstances Smith asks Jones 'What's in the bottle?' and Jones, af ter 
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examining the contents ofthe bottle, says 'Water', the sound Jones utters 
is considered mainly (and perhaps exclusively) in its role as a conventional 
sign. But Smith may be Jones's doctor. He may know that there is water in 
the bottle but be interested in determining the nature and extent of brain 
damage in Jones. In this case when Jones says 'Water' the sound he utters 
is considered mainly (but not exclusively) in its role as a natural sign, as a 
symptom of his just then forming the mental impression of water or 
managing to come up with the spoken sound which symbolizes that im-
pression. In this case it would be equally valuable to the questioner if the 
respondent uttered a nonsense-syllable or a completely inappropriate 
word. His attention in this case is directed not to the respondent's mes-
sage but to the respondent; he wants information not about what the 
respondent has information ab out, but about the respondent. 
In 16a26-28 Aristotle explains his use of the phrase 'by convention' 
(KU'tcl cruv9fjKl1V): "because no name is a name naturally but only when 
it has become a symbol". Of course a narne does not becorne a symbol, 
but a spoken sound (or a name considered simply as a spoken sound) may 
be said to do so. The point is that no name considered as a narne exists by 
nature; a name comes into existence only when a spoken sound becomes a 
symbol. The notion that a spoken sound becornes a symbol is well suited 
to the view that it is prirnarily a symptom. A spoken sound becomes a 
symbol by acquiring the same sort of relation to a mental impression as 
a written mark bears to a spoken sound - rule-governed embodiment 
in another medium. And it acquires that relation, it seems, by being used 
in certain ways - that is, to call attention to, refer to, narne the actual 
things of which the symbolized impression is alikeness. The relation of 
the spoken sound 'water' to the actual stuff is that of narne to bearer, 
which is of course distinct from that of symbol to symbolized (or of 
symptom to symptomized). But the establishment of the symbolizing 
relation between the spoken sound and the impression is a necessary con-
dition ofthe establishment ofthe name-to-bearer relation. Necessary, but 
not sufficient; for 'goat-stag' satisfies the necessary condition (in virtue of 
which it might, somewhat misleadingly, be called a narne), but in the 
absence of any actual thing of which the goat-stag image can be the like-
ness, the establishment of the name-to-bearer relation is impossible. 
As Ackrill remarks, 28 the first sentence of the passage in which AristotIe 
explains his use of 'by convention' is meant to be supported by the second 
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sentence : "Even inarticulate noises (of beasts, for instance ) do indeed 
reveal something, yet none of them is a name". But the support, I think, is 
in the form of elucidation rather than argument. All spoken sounds are 
symptoms of some state of the speaker, or reveal (OTJAOUO"t) something 
about him. Inartieulate noises (aypa~~a'tot 'l'6<pot) are those for which 
there is no rule-governed embodiment in another medium; they are 
unwritable (aypa~~a'tot). 29 
Why is no inarticulate but symptomatic (or revelatory) noise a name? 
Not simply because it is unwritable. Smith and Jones could agree to play 
a silly game: "From now on we'll never use the word 'water' but will 
cough whenever it would be appropriate to use the word". This would 
count as symbolization, although at least to begin with it would be symbo-
lization not of an impression but of the spoken sound 'water', the enco-
ding medium being inarticulate noise. But if Smith and Jones continued 
to play their game, the new convention might become so deeply ingrained 
in them that they would no longer have to "translate" ; and if that could 
happen, why couldn't their coughing become a name? Names do require 
establishing, and it would be extremely difficult to establish these various 
coughing noises as a name. But the crucial consideration is that such 
establishment could take place only within the context of an aIready 
established language. The amorphous, unruly character of inarticulate 
noises would make it impossible to establish the conventions if inarticu-
late noises were all we had to work with. And, af ter all, what AristotIe 
says is not that none of them ean be a name but that none of them is a 
name. And the reason they are not names is that they are intractable to 
the demands of convention. 30 
Ackrill criticizes the sentence I am discussing, 
AristotIe only weakens the force ofhis remark by mentioning inarticulate noises, that is, 
such as do not consist of cIearly distinguishable sounds which could be represented in 
writing. For someone could suggest that what prevents such noises from counting as 
names is not that they are natural rather than conventional signs, but precisely because 
they are inarticulate.31 
I have been trying to show that what prevents them from counting as 
names is that they are not conventional signs, and that they are not 
conventional signs "precisely because they are inarticulate". 
If I am right about AristotIe's account of conventional signification, 
then one important feature of it is that it inc1udes one kind of natural 
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signification in an essential capacity. To complicate things further, the 
semantic element that has the natural signification is a linguistic entity 
and thus a standard example of a conventional sign. Of course linguistic 
entities, like anything else, may sometimes occur as natural signs, but 
Aristotle's account presents their occurring in this capacity as one aspect 
of their regular occurrence as conventionaI signs. This combination of 
what seem to be complementary opposite types of signification strikes me 
as one of the strengths in the Aristotelian account of conventional signi-
fication. Language is not a sign-system sui generis, it is just the most 
complex, most flexible, richest combination of modes of signification; 
and the more artificai modes are, Aristotle reminds us, constructed on the 
basis of the less artificial. 32 
Cornell University 
NOTES 
l In the notes to his translation (J. L. Aekrill, AristotIe's Categories and De Inter-
pretatione, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963; reprinted with eorreetions, 1966), p. 113. 
2 I am using AekrilI's translation, the only one in English that shows an understanding 
of the text. 
3 cr. AekriII, op. cit., Notes, p. 115: '''A spoken sound signifieant by eonvention' gives 
the genus under which fall not only names but also verbs (Chapter 3) and phrases and 
sentenees (Chapter 4)". 
4 Bekker has '1tpart'wc;'. Minio-Paluello (Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber De Interpreta-
tione, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1949; reprinted with eorreetions, 1956) has '1tpal't'wv' 
although his sourees have either '1tpo)'t'WC;' or '1tpiil't'Ov'. Evidently he thinks that the two 
readings are best accounted for by an original that has the omega of the one and the 
nu of the other. AekriIl's translation is based on Minio-PalueIlo's text, but he translates 
this passage as if it eontained '1tpa)'t'wc;' rather than '1tpal't'wv' with no indication that 
he has adopted a variant. The ItaIian translation of Ezio Riondato (in his La teoria 
Aristotelica dell'enunciazione; Editrice Antenore, Padova, 1957) is the only one I know 
that foIlows Minio-Paluello's text at this point: "mentre le affezioni deII'anima, di eui 
questi sone segni come dei (termini) primi (a cui essi si riportano) ... " (p. 131). Since 
the manuscript testimony is overwhelrningly in favor of the adverbial form here, the 
only reason for adopting theadjectival form to be found in Minio-PalueIIo's edition 
is that the adverb makes no sense. Sinee it seems to me to make good sense, and better 
sense than the adjective, I foIIow Bekker's edition (and AckrilI's translation). 
5 The only coneeivable textual basis for a cIaim of this kind is the phrase 'in the first 
plaee' (1tpal1;wc;) at 16a6, but it supports no doctrine that makes sense. I shaII discuss 
this phrase Jater. 
6 The ninth-century Arabic translation of Is]:liiq ibn l;Iunayn (ed. by A. Badawi; Cairo, 
1948) renders both '(l'61l~0A.a' and '01lIlEia' as the active participle 'dall' in the phrase 
'dallun (aIa' - 'is indieative of', 'refers to', or 'is an indication of'. AIthough Is]:liiq 
knew Greek, he translated from the Syriac. (I am grateful to Professor Alfred Ivry for 
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this information.) William of Moerbeke's Latin translation of 1268 has 'symbola' and 
'signa' (Ammonius: Commentaire sur le Peri Hermeneias d'Aristote. Traduction de 
Guillaume de Moerbeke (ed. by G. Verbeke) [Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in 
Aristotelem Graecorum II; Louvain and Paris, 1961], p. 32; cf. Verbeke's note on 
'cr6J.l~oJ..a', p. LXXXIX; cf. also J. Isaac, Le Peri Hermeneias en occident de Boi}ce a 
Saint Thomas, J. Vrin, Paris, 1953, p. 160). But Moerbeke's correct translation had no 
discernibIe influence. Even Thomas Aquinas, for whom the translation of Ammonius 
was made (incorporating the new translation of AristotIe), follows Boethius's transla-
tion in his commentary on this passage. (Jean T. Oesterle has thereby been misled into 
writing, in a note on this passage, "The Greek word o6J.l~0J..ov means 'token' and the 
Latin word nota used by William of Moerbeke is an exact translation of this" [in her 
Aristotle: On Interpretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan, Marquette Univ. 
Press, Milwaukee, 1962; p. 23].) Later medieval commentaries I have seen all follow 
the Boethius translation of this passage. With the sole exception of J. L. Ackrill EngIish 
translators of AristotIe have done no better than Boethius. H. P. Cook in the Loeb 
AristotIe has 'symbols or signs' for the first occurrence of 'ouJ.l~oJ..a', 'signs' for the 
second, and 'primarily signs' for 'oT)J.lda npol'tco<;'; E. M. Edghill in the Oxford 
AristotIe has 'symbols' (for both) and 'directly symbolize'; J. T. Oesterle (op. cit.) has 
'signs' (for both) and 'first signs' . 
7 I am using 'index' as the genel'ic term for an effect as indicative of its cause. A symp-
tom is an effect indieative of a concurrent eause - e.g., a fever taken as indicative of an 
infection. A nonsymptomatic index is an effect indicative of a cause no longer current -
e.g., a sear taken as indicative of a wound. 
8 H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, Konigliche Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
Berlin, 1870; art. 'ouJ.l~o).ov', Part 3. This is also the view of, for example, H. Steinthal 
(Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Romern, Berlin 1890, 2nd ed., 
p. 186) and K. Oehler (Die Lehre vom noetischen und dianoetischen Denken bei Platon 
und Aristoteles, Miinchen 1962, p. 149). Steinthal's view was developed in opposition 
to the distinction drawn between the two terms by T. Waitz in his edition Aristotelis 
Organon graece (Leipzig 1844-46). Recent writers who have distinguished the meanings 
of'OT)J.lEia' and 'uuJ.l~oJ..a' in this passage include P. Aubenque (Le probleme de l"etre 
chez Aristote, Paris 1962, pp. 106-112) and R. Brandt (Die aristotelische Urteilslehre, 
Marburg 1965, pp. 33-35). (Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans kindly called my attention 
to Brandt's book and thereby to much of the information contained in this note.) 
9 As far as I know, I am the only exception. See my article 'History of Semantics', 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Macmillan & Free Press, New York, 1967; Vol. 7, pp. 
358-406), p. 362. There may well be others among the Greek commentators, who did 
not have to rely on Boethius's translation. Ammonius, however, takes 'oT)IlEiov' and 
'o6J.l~0).ov' to be two names for artificial representations. See Ammonii in libro De 
interpretatione (ed. by Busse), Berlin 1897, p. 20, lines 1-12. (I owe this observation to 
Professor Gabriel Nuche1mans.) 
10 For example, in De interpretatione, Chapter 3, 16b10, where he says of a verb that 
"it is always a sign (oT)!lEiov) of what holds, that is, holds of a subject"; and 16b23: 
"not even 'to be' or 'not to be' is a sign of the actual thing (nor if you say simply 'that 
which is') ... ". 
11 From here on I will use 'sign' as a generic term and 'symptom' as the term specificaIly 
corresponding to what I take to be AristotIe's use of 'oT)!lEiov' here. It is worth noting 
that the references to Chapter l in Chapter 14 of De interpretatione contain passages 
that seem to reflect the distinction I am drawing between symptom ("spoken sounds 
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follow (ch:ol..ouget) things in the mind" - 23a32) and symbol ("spoken affirmations and 
negations are symbols of things in the soul" - 24b1). 
12 16a9-11: "Just as some thoughts (v6rU.1a) in the soul are neither true nor false while 
some are necessarily one or the other, so also with spoken sounds." The context and 
the association with spoken sounds certainly suggest that these "thoughts" are to be 
identified with the "affections in [or of] the soul" mentioned in 16a3 and 6-7. But there 
are considerations against such an identification too, some of which I will bring out. 
In any case it is enough for my purposes to show, as I shaH try to do, that AristotIe 
does not need a general claim about thoughts in 16a3-8. 
13 Op. cit., Notes, p. 113. 
14 See Categories Chapter 8 and De Anima, Book I, Chapter 1. 
15 The sort of interpersonal sameness and difference that is important to Aristotle here 
is plainly not just individually interpersonal but intercommunal or interlinguistic. 
16 The commentary of Giulio Pacio (recommended by Ackrill, op. cif., p. 156) views 
these claims in this way and makes some sensible remarks about them (Julius Pacius, 
In Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Organum commentarius, Frankfurt 1597; reproduced 
photographically, Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1966, p. 61). 
17 On Plato's views on the contributions of nature and convention to language see my 
article 'Plato on the Correctness of Names', American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971), 
126-138. 
18 16a26--29: "I say 'by convention' because no name is a name naturally but only 
when it has become a symbol". I 7al-2: "Every sentence is significant (not as a tool but, 
as we said, by convention)". 
19 Op. cit., Notes, p. 113; italics added. Ackrill's main aim in this passage is to contrast 
the naturalness of likeness with the conventionality of the symbol-relation. 
20 Encyclopedia o/ Philosophy 7, p. 362. 
21 I am not maintaining that Aristotle's intentions are plainly disclosed in the language 
of 16a3-8. On the contrary, I think that it is hard to tell from that text what he intends 
there and that it is only by reading back into it what we can learn about his purposes 
in Chapters 2-6 that we ean see what must be going on here. 
22 In libros Peri hermeneias expositio, Liber I, Lectio II, 8 (Leonine ed., Vol. I, p. 13): 
"Sed hoc quidem apud nullos unquam dubitatum fuit quantum ad litteras : quarum non 
solum ratio significandi est ex impositione, sed etiam ipsarum formatio fit per artem. 
Voces autem naturaliter formantur; unde et apud quosdam dubitatum fuit, utrum 
naturaliter significent" . 
23 See Crafylus 385E-390A, especially 387D and 388A, and my article, 'Plato on the 
Correctness of Names', pp. 128-129. In his second commentary on De interpretatione 
Boethius expressly linked 17al-2 to the Cratylus and developed the connection between 
semantic naturalism and the tools doetrine (ed. by Meiser, Vol. 2, pp. 93-94). 
24 Cratylus 383B. 
25 Physics, Book II, Chapter 1 (193a7) is interesting in this connection: "a man born 
blind may form sylIogisms concerning colors, but such a man must be arguing about 
names without having any corresponding thoughts" (voetv 0& l!T]oev). I think it is 
significant that the blind man is said to be able to form syllogisms concerning colors 
- e.g., 'Whatever is white is colored, and Socrates is white; so Socrates is colored'. It 
is in their occurrence as syllogistic terms that color-words ean most clearly be detached 
from the sort of mental imagery they might be thought to be associated with in de-
scriptive statements. 
26 This seemingly commonplace view may have been developed, Iike other views in 
ARISTOTLE ON SPOKEN SOUND 21 
these opening chapters, in conscious opposition to the Cratylus, in which Plato recog-
nizes a trans-linguistic name "naturally fitted for each thing" (389D-390A). Elsewhere, 
where he may not have had the Cratylus in mind, AristotIe speaks casually of discourse 
in the mind (Posterior Ana/y tics Book I, Chapter IO, 76b24). And Boethius reports that 
"the Peripatetics" developed a doctrine of three discourses: written, spoken, and mental 
(in his second commentary on De interpretatione, ed. by Meiser, Vol. 2, pp. 29, 30, 36, 
and 42). On this doctrine see Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories ofthe Proposition: Ancient 
and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity (Mouton, The Hague 
1973), Chapter 8, Section 1.3. 
27 Op. eit., Notes, p. 115. 
28 Op. eit., Notes, p. 117. 
29 Like Plato (Philebus 18C), AristotIe sometimes uses the word 'letters' (YPullllu'tu) to 
refer to units ofspoken sound rather than to written marks: "Spoken language is made 
up of letters. If the tongue were not as it is and the lips were not flexible, most of the 
letters could not be pronounced; for some are impacts of the tongue, others c10sings 
of the lips" (Parts of Animais, Book II, Chapter 16, 660a3-7). The inarticulate, un-
writable (liter ally , unlettered) noises are probably most precisely described as those that 
cannot be analyzed into these standard units of spoken sound. (I owe this observation 
to Professor Ronald Zirin, who states it more fully e1sewhere in this volume.) 
80 The demands of convention are more stringent for names than for larger units of 
communication. Language had to begin with inarticulate noises (recognized as, for 
example, cries for help) playing communicative roles like those now played by certain 
sentences, but it could not have begun with names. 
81 Op. eit., Notes, p. 117. 
82 I am very grateful to Sally Ginet, Gabriel Nuchelmans, Eleonore Stump, Nicholas 
Sturgeon, the members of the Cornell Ancient Philosophy Discussion Club, and the 
participants in the Symposium on Ancient Logic at the State University of New York 
at Buffalo for their criticisms of earlier versions of this paper. 
RONALD ZIRIN 
INARTICULATE NOl SES 
Aristotle's definition of a name (noun?) as 'a sound significant by con-
vention' (De Interpretatione, Chapter 2) is interestingly discussed in 
Professor Kretzmann's paper in this volume. The definition is followed by 
an elucidating reference to 'inarticulate noises (of beasts, for instance)' 
which, though they reveal (OT)AoGmv) something, are not names. The 
Greek word &'ypuJ,lJ,lUtot which is here translated as 'inarticulate' needs 
further discussion. The metaphor that intelligibie speech is 'articulate', 
i.e. 'provided with joints' occurs in Aristotle in Historia Animalium, 4.9: 
OtUA81CtO~ o' ft tii~ <provii~ satt "Cij YAam't\ dltlp()pW(JIC;. 
Speech is the articulation of the voice by the tongue. 
The word OtupOpromt; is based on dpOpov 'joint', a word which is also 
used by Plato (?) in a definition of the syllable, cf. Definitiones, 414 D: 
~OAAUP" &'vOpro7tiVT)~ <provii~ lipOpov syypuJ,lJ,lu"Cov. 
The syllable is a 'joint' of human voice consisting of letters. 
The metaphor of articulation, however, is not apt in translating 
&'YPUJ,lJ,lu"COt; which refers not to syllables but to the letters of which they 
consist. The plain meaning of &'YPuJ,lJ,lUto~ is 'not having letters' either in 
the sense 'not consisting of letters' or in the sense 'not knowing letters, 
illiterate' .1 
The term, therefore, does not mean inarticulate in the literal sense, and 
I do not think that it means 'unwritable'. First of all, the sounds of ani-
maIs are writable. Greek used onomatopoetic written representations of 
the sounds of animals (comparable to 'meow' and 'bow-wow') in precisely 
the way English does. But more important, the word YPUJ,lJ,lU which 
literally means 'letter' is often employed by Aristotle in an extended sense. 
For example, in De Partibus Animalium (660a) there is a discussion ofthe 
function of the lips and tongue in pronunciation which cleady uses the 
term YPUJ,lJ,lU in the sense of 'minimal unit of speech-sound': 
J. Corcoran (ed.). A.ndent Log/c and lts Modern lnterpretatwns. 23-25. A.ll Rlghts Reserved 
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o JlEV A6yoe; O <hu 't'ile; cprovile; SK 't'rov ypapp,G.7:rov cr6YKet't'at, 
't'ile; OE YAW't"t'T]e; Jl"; 't'ota6t1')<; oucr1')e; Jl1')OE 't'&V xetA-rov oyprov 
OUK liv fjv cp9syyecr9at 't'u 1tAeicr't'a 't'rov ypaJlJl(l't'rov 't'u JlEV yup 
't'ile; YA-WHl'je; sim 1tpocrØoA-ai, 't'u oE crUJlØOA,Ut 't'rov XetA-rov. 
For vocallanguage is composed of letters. If the tongue were 
not such as it is, and if the lips were not piiant, it would not be 
possibie to pronounce most of the letters; for some of them 
are applications of the tongue and some closings of the lips. 
The word ypaJ..lJla, then, may be used in reference to language, as the 
equivalent of cr't'Otxeiov 'minimal unit (of speech-sound)' 2 and the word 
åypaJlJla't'Oe; could be used to mean 'not resolvable into discrete units 
of speech-sound'. The phrase åypaJlJla't'Ot 'l'ocpm, then, refers to noises 
which are not analyzable into discrete units of speech-sound, noises which 
do not consist of phonemes. 
The phrase OlOV 91')pirov 'ofbeasts, for example', provides one example 
of åypaJlJlatot 'l'ocpm. A bit more detail about the sounds of animais is 
given in Historia Animalium, 488a 33: 
Kai 't'u [~roa] 'l'ocpT]'t'tKa, 't'u oE acprova, 't'u OE aypaJ..lJla't'a. 
Some [creatures] emit noise, some are voice1ess, some letter-
less .. , 
At a later date, in [Pseudo-] AristotIe, Problems (895a) 'letterless' speech 
is imputed to both beasts and young children: 
0Jlo{roe; oE ol 't'e naioee; Kai tU 9T]pia oT]A-oucrtv: ou yap nro 
ouoe 't'u natoia cp9syyov't'<lt 't'u ypaJlJla't'a. 
Children and beasts express themselves in the same way, for 
children do not yet utter letters. 
In conclusion, the term ypaJlJla was used to refer to minimal units of 
speech-sound. Rence theterms åypaJlJ..la't'oe; and syypaJlJ..la't'Oe; when applied 
to vocalization should be taken to mean 'not resolvable into discreteunits of 
speech-sound' and 'resolvable into discrete units of speech-sound' respec-
tive1y. It follows that the characteristic of human language that AristotIe 
refers to in the passage under discussion is that the sound of human 
speech is resolvable into phonemes. 
State University of New York at Bujfalo 
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NOTES 
l The opposite of dYPu/l/lu't'~ is åYYPu/l/lutoC;, which is used in the definitions of lan-
guage (MyoC;) given in Plato (?) Definitiones 414 D: MyoC; <pOlV1) åYYPu/l/lu't'oC; ... , 
"language is voice consisting or (resolvable into) letters ... ". 
2 This is the term which Plato generally uses to refer to speech sounds in the Cratylus, 
and is also used in this sense by Aristotle in the Poetics. 
NEWTON GAR VER 
NOTES FOR A LINGUlSTIC READING 
OF TRE CATEGORIES 
1. If AristotIe's Categories provide a classification of things and not of 
sayings, as is traditionally insisted, the things classified are at any rate 
'things that ean be said'. It is interesting, therefore, to inquire whether 
the Categories may be regarded as eontaining, in rudimentary form, results 
that might be more appropriately and more eompletely presented in 
terms of eurrent methods of linguistie analysis, applied to a levelof 
language or discourse that linguists usually ignore. 
2. Both the name 'eategories', whieh signifies predications or sayings, and 
the position ofthe work at the beginning ofthe Organon, which deals with 
maUers of logic and language, reinforee the temptation to interpret the 
Categories linguistically. Although neither the title nor the position of 
the work in the eorpus is directly due to Aristotle, they do show that the 
inclination to treat the Categories as at least partially linguistic goe sback 
to the very earliest tradition of Aristotelian scholarship. 
3. The determination that the eategories ean be given a linguistic inter-
pretation - even the eonclusion that they are linguistic, AekriIl 1 and 
Benveniste 2 notwithstanding - would not suffice to show that they are not 
also (in some sense) metaphysical, nor that they are not universal. 
4. The most usefullinguistic method to employ in this inquiry is distinct-
ive feature analysis, 3 whieh has been used in several kinds of linguistic 
analysis. Passages in the Categories ean be interpreted as employing a 
related method, if not an early version of the method itself. 
5. This method is based on a eomplex presupposition: that nothing is 
linguistieally significant (or real) unless it eontrasts with something else, 
that what it eontrasts with is an alternative possibility within a systematie 
array of possibilities, and that the possibie alternatives are determined 
by binary (sometimes ternary, positive/negative/neutral; or at any rate 
J. Corcoran (ed.), Andent Logic and Its Modern Interpretations, 27-32. All Rights Reserved 
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finitary) alternation along a finite number of dimensions, called features. 
6. It is unlikely that all types of phenomena admit of a fruitful distinctive 
feature analysis. The method does not, for example, seem fruitfully appli-
cable either to mechanics or to formallogie. Admitting of a distinctive 
feature analysis may be a distinctive feature of some types of linguistic 
phenomena. 
7. In phonology there are, theoretically, a finite number of articulatory 
and acoustic dimensions along which spoken sound ean vary. In the 
phonemic analysis of a given language, each phonological dimension is 
either relevant or irrelevant for the identification of given phonemes, and 
the relevant dimensions, or features, are either positive or negative. 
Phonemes ean then be regarded as bundles (that is, simultaneous colloca-
tions) of distinctive features. The English phoneme Ipl, for example, ean 
be described as the simultaneous presence of one set of phonetic features 
(the positive ones) and absence of another set (the negative ones), with the 
remaining phonetic features (e.g. aspiration) being nondistinctive or 
irrelevant. 
8. In semantic theory lexicaI meanings ean analogously, though some-
what more precariously, be regarded as bundles of abstract semantic 
markers.4 
9. AristotIe does not define the categories, but he is careful to say what is 
distinctive about each. Some features, such as whether something in the 
category ean be said to be more or less so, are specified either positively 
or negatively for each category. 
10. Katz 5 has suggested that AristotIe's categories ean be interpreted as 
abstract semantic markers which (a) are entailed by other semantic mar-
kers and (b) do not themselves entail other semantic markers. Even 
leaving aside epistemological questions that arise about the entailments, 
Katz' suggestion is implausible. His account does not fit what AristotIe 
listed as categories, it gives no place to the features that Aristotle singled 
out as distinctive, and it presupposes a full-blown logical apparatus in-
stead of providing a basis for it. 
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11. Aristotle's categories are not semantic categories. 
12. Aristotle's categories are deri ved from predication: theyare the kinds 
or species of the values of the variables in the form X is predicated of some 
a. This is not to say that every member of each category ean be predicated 
of something, but only that it must be distinctively involved in such 
predication and that it is what it is because of this distinct sort of involve-
ment. A 'this', for example, cannot be predicated of anything, but it may 
be the subject of a predication, either as a substance or as something in-
hering in a substance. 
13. Predication, or making truth-claims, is a genus of speech acts (langu-
age-games). Aristotle assumes it ean be distinguished from other sorts, 
such as inferring, praying, commanding, imploring, promising, reciting 
poetry, and so on. Viewed linguistically, therefore, Aristotle's Categories 
form a small subsection in the general theory of speech acts. 
14. It is certain that predication is more basic than some other sorts of 
language acts (such as inferring, which clearly presupposes predication), 
and there are considerations from generative grammars and from common 
sense which suggest that it may be the most basic sort of speech aet. This 
suggestion is to be regarded as contentious; 6 but even if it were to be 
granted, its significance would depend on predication having been recog-
nized or identified initially as one kind of speech aet among many. 
15. Speech acts are distinguished, one kind from another, by two sorts of 
criteria, the circumstances in which they are appropriate and the sort of 
questions and comments that ean be made in response to them. 7 The 
features that Aristotle cites to distinguish the categories belong mainly to 
the second group. 
16. Ackrill points out (p. 79) that "one way in which he [Aristotle] 
reached categoricai classification was by observing that different types of 
answer are appropriate to different questions". This is true, and useful for 
seeing the overall design of the Categories. But the distinctive features that 
AristotIe cites are based on the reverse insight, that different questions 
are appropriate to different sorts of predication. 
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17. Some examples: (a) 'Substance, it seerns, does not admit of a more 
and a less' (3b33). Suppose X is predicated of some a (someone says, 'a is 
X'); It goes hand-in-hand with X being in the category of substance that 
no question ean be raised whether a is more X than b or less X than a was 
yesterday. Ifthe question ean be raised, the predicate must belong to some 
other category, where this feature is positive or neutral rather than nega-
tive. If someone says, 'a is more a man than b', the presence of the word 
'more' shows the predication to be qualitative rather than substantial, 
even though 'man' normally signifies a substance. (b) A substantial predi-
cation involves not only predicating X of a but als o saying X of a. The 
latter (but not the former) carries with it a commitment to predicate the 
definition of X of a; that is, both the genus of X and the differentia of X 
are also implicitly predicated of a, when X is said of a. This obviously 
shapes the subsequent discourse possibilities: for example, I ean attack a 
substantial predication by contending that the definition of the predicate 
do es not apply to the subject; but I could not attack a quantitative predi-
cation in this manner. 
18. Each feature governs a specific range of possibie discourse: they are 
discourse jeatures. When a feature is positive, a certain set of responses 
(questions, challenges, comments, etc.) is open or permitted to predica-
tions in that category. When a feature is negative, another set ofresponses 
is open or permitted. 
19. From this point ol' view, therefore, categories are (or are equivalent 
to) distinct clusters of discourse possibilities. 
20. This account has been sketchy and programmatie, and is not intended 
to establish a definitive reading ofthe Categories. 
21. One advantage of such a linguistic reading is that it brings the discus-
sion of categories into a field of active scholarly research. It thereby makes 
possibie a rational and potentially useful criticism of Aristotle's work. 
Within his category of substance, for example, discourse features can 
certainly be found to distinguish substances in the modern sense (gold, 
coal, mud, water, etc.) both from individuals and from natural kinds 
(species and genera) - perhaps making use of the distiction between mass 
nouns and count nouns. 8 
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22. There are nonetheless serious reservations to be kept in mind. AI-
though predication is a universal speech aet, and probably necessarily so, 
it is not at all clear that the discourse features which distinguish the 
categories are universal; nor is it clear what the import would be of their 
not being universal. Another ground for caution is that discourse features 
seem to belong to the domain of rhetoric whereas the categories have al-
ways seemed to belong to the domain of logic. A third concern is that the 
theory of speech acts (which has the potential for revitalizing rhetoric in 
the way that the theory of quantification revitalized logic), within which 
this reading of the Categories is to be developed, is itself in a primitive 
state, and its precise relation to other branches of linguistics remains 
uncertain. 
23. These issues must be kept in mind as further research is done on this 
linguistic reading of the Categories. The reading proposed must be taken 
as tentative and exploratory. In the long run it may prove to shape our 
understanding of the theory of speech acts and the science of rhetoric as 
well as our understanding of Aristotle. 
Slate University of New York of Buffalo 
NOTES 
1 J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle' s 'Categories' and 'De Interpretatione', Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1963, p. 71. I have used Ackrill's translation. His notes, to which I refer here, are both 
helpful and stimulating. 
2 E. Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, Univ. of Miami Press, Coral Gabies; 
1971, Chapter 6. 
3 This method of analysis is due to Roman Jakobson more than to anyone else. See 
R. Jakobson, C. G. M. Fant, and M. HalIe, Preliminaries to Speech Analysis, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1952; N. Chomsky and M. HalIe, Sound Pattern of English, 
Harper and Row, New York, 1968; and Fred W. Householder, Linguistic Speculations 
Cambridge Univ. Press, London, 1971. Most recent linguistic textbooks have a discus-
sion of features. 
4 The best presentation of semantic theory from this perspective is J. J. Katz, Philos-
ophy of Language, Harper and Row, New York, 1966. 
5 Op. cit., pp. 224-239. 
6 I take it to have been contested, for example, by Malinowski, with his emphasis on 
phatic communion, in the appendix to Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, 
10th ed. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1949; by Husseri, with his insistence on 
the primacy of prepredicative judgment in Formal and Transcendental Logic, Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969; by Wittgenstein in the early sections of Philosophical Investi-
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gations, BIaekweII, Oxford, 1953; and by Derrida in Speeeh and Phenomena, North-
western Univ. Press, Evanston, 1973. 
7 See J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1962; J. R. Searle, Speeeh Aets, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1969; and 
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophieallnvestigations, Basi! BIaekweII, Oxford, 1953, esp. pp. 
1-25,304. 
8 This sort of development was suggested to me by John Corcoran, to whom I am also 
indebted for suggestions incorporated at several places. 
PART TWO 
MODERN RESEARCH IN ANCIENT LOGIC 
IAN MUELLER 
GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 
1. INTRODUCTION 
By 'logic' I mean 'the analysis of argument or proof in terms of form'. 
The two main examples of Greek logic are, then, Aristotle's syHogistic 
developed in the fint twenty-two chapters of the Prior Analytics and Stoic 
propositionallogic as reconstructed in the twentieth century. The topic I 
shaH consider in this paper is the relation between Greek logic in this 
sense and Greek mathematics. I have resolved the topic into two questions: 
(1) To what extent do the principles of Greek logic derive from the forms 
of proof characteristic of Greek mathematics? and (2) To what extent do 
the Greek mathematicians show an awareness of Greek logic? 
Before answering these questions it is necessary to clear up two prelim-
inaries. The first is chronological. The Prior Analytics probably predates 
any surviving Greek mathematical text. There is, therefore, no possibility 
of checking Aristotle's syHogistic against the actual mathematics which he 
knew. On the other hand, there is no reason to suppose that the mathe-
maties which he knew differs in any essential way, at least with respect 
to proof techniques, from the mathematics which has come down to 
us. 
The major works of Greek mathematics date from the third century 
B.C. For determining the role of logic in Greek mathematics it seems 
sufficient to consider only Euclid's Elements. It is the closest thing to a 
foundational work in the subject. The surviving works of the other great 
mathematicians of the period, Archimedes and Apollonius, are more ad-
vanced and therefore more compressed in their proofs. The absence of 
signs ofthe influence oflogic in them is not surprising. The evidence is too 
obscure to assign a date to the development of Stoic propositionallogic, 
but I shall take as a date the floruit of its major creator, Chrysippus 
(280-207). Doing so means denying any influence of Stoic logic on the 
Elements and, tacitly, on Greek mathematics in general. I hope that the 
over-all plausibility of my reconstruction in this paper will provide a 
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sufficient justification for the denial. But now I wish to discuss, as the 
second preliminary, a question relevant to the issue: How does one decide 
whether a given mathematical argument or work is influenced by a given 
logic? 
In Elements 1,19 Euclid proves that, given two unequal angles of a 
triangle, the side opposite the greater angle is greater than the side oppo-
site the lesser. He proceeds as follows: l 
(1) Let ABC be a triangle having the angle ABC greater than the angle 
BCA; I say that the side AC is also greater than the side AB. (2) For, if 
not, AC is either equal to AB or less. Now AC is not equal to AB; (3) for 
then the angle ABC would also have been equal to the angle ACB; (4) 
but it is not; therefore (5) AC is not equal to AB. Neither is AC less than 
AB; (6) for then the angle ABC would also have been less than the angle 
ACB; (7) but it is not; therefore (8) AC is not less than AB. And it was 
proved that it is not equal either. Therefore (9) AC is greater than AB. 
Therefore in any triangle the greater angle is subtended by the greater 
side. Q.E.D. 
Much of the argument here can be analyzed in terms of Chrysippus's 
anapodeiktoi logoi. Thus (5) follows from (3) (an instance of a previously 
proved proposi tion, I. 5) and (4) (a 'trivial consequence' of (l» by the second 
anapodeiktos. And (8) is related similarly to (6) and (7). If (2) is taken as 
an expression of trichotomy, then (9) follows from (2), (5), and (8) by two 
applications of the fifth anapodeiktos.2 
There are many other cases in the Elements which could be analyzed 
simiIarly. But since reasoning in accordance with the ruIes of a Iogic does 
not in itseIf impIy knowIedge of the Iogic, the possibiIity of anaIyzing a 
Euclidean proof in terms of Stoic propositional Iogic does not justify 
attributing to Euclid a knowledge of Stoic logic. Justification of such an 
attribution requires, at the very least, clear terminological parallels. 
However, there are none. 
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The paper which follows has three main sections. In the fint I discuss 
the character of Euclidean reasoning and its relation to Aristotle's syllo-
gistic. In the second I consider the passages in the Prior Analytics in which 
Aristotle refers to mathematics ; my purpose here is to determine whether 
reflection on mathematics influenced his formulation of syllogistic. In 
both sections my conclusions are mainly negative. Euclid shows no 
awareness of syllogistic or even of the basic idea of logic, that validity of 
an argument depends on its form. And Aristotle's references to mathe-
maties seem to be either supportive of general points about deductive 
reasoning or, when they relate specifically to syllogistic, false because 
based on syllogistic itself rather than on an independent analysis of 
mathematical proof. 
In the third main section of the paper I consider the influence of mathe-
matics on Stoic logic. As far as Chrysippean propositionallogic is con-
cerned, my conclusions are again negative. However, it is clear that at 
some time logicians, probably Stoic, began to consider mathematical 
proof on its own terms. Although they never developed what I would call 
a logic to cover mathematical proof, they at least realized the difference 
between it and the logicaJ rules formulated in antiquity. Much of the 
third section is devoted to an attempt to reconstruct in outline the history 
of logical reflections on mathematics in the last two centuries B.C. In 
conclusion I recapitulate briefly my conclusions about the relation 
between Greek mathematics and logic. 
2. EUCLID'S Elements AND LOGIC 
One still reads that Euclid's logic is Aristotelian syllogistic.3 But one need 
only try to carry out a single proof in the Elements by means of categoricai 
syllogisms to see that this claim is false. If Euclid has any logic at all, it is 
some variant of the first order predicate calculus. In order to bring out the 
specific character of Euclidean reasoning, I reproduce the first proposition 
of the Elements together with an indication of the customary Greek divi-
sions of a proposition.4 
protasis 
ekthesis 
On a given finite straight line to construct an equilateral 
triangle. 
Let AB be the given finite straight line. 
38 
diorismos 
kataskeue 
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Thus it is required to construct an equilateral triangle on 
the straight line AB. 
With center A and distance AB let the circ1e BCD be 
described; again, with center B and distance BA let the 
circ1e ACE be described; and from the point C, in which 
the circ1es cut one another, to the points A, B let the 
straight lines CA, CB be joined. 
apodeixis Now, since the point A is the center of the circ1e CDB, 
AC is equal to AB. Again, since the point B is the center 
of the circle CAE, BC is equal to BA. But CA was also 
proved equal to AB; therefore each of the straight lines 
CA, CB is equal to AB. And things which are equal to 
the same thing are also equal to one another; therefore 
CA is also equal to CB. Therefore the three straight lines 
CA, AB, BC are equal to one another. 
sumperasma Therefore the triangle ABC is equilateral; and it has been 
constructed on the given finite straight line AB. Quod erat 
faciendum. 
In modern terms all of this proposition except the protasis and diorismos 
would be considered proof. But, as the terminology suggests, only the 
apodeixis was considered proof by the Greeks. I shall here analyze propo-
sition 1 primarily in terms of Gentzen's system of natural deduction for 
the predicate calculus.5 This analysis presupposes a somewhat artificial 
reformulation of portions of the text. For example, the protasis is not an 
assertion at all and hence can not be proved in the strict sense. I shall 
discuss the character ofthe protasis briefly below. Here I shall take it as a 
general statement: On any straight line an equilateral triangle can be 
constructed. 
The ekthesis is, then, a particular assumption ('AB is a straight line') 
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from which a conc1usion ('An equilateral triangle ean be constructed on 
AB') will be derived. In the kataskeue the drawing of the two circ1es and of 
the lines CA and CB is justified by the postulates l and 3: 
Let it be postulated to draw a straight line from any point to 
any point; 
and to describe a circle with any center and distance. 
I know of no logic which accounts for this inference in its Euclidean for-
mulation. One 'postulates' that a certain action is permissibIe and 'infers' 
the doing of it, Le., does it. An obvious analogue of the procedure here is 
provided by the relation between rules of inference and a deduction. Rules 
of inference perrnit certain moves described in a general way, e.g., the 
inferring of a formula of the form A v B from a formula of the form A. 
And in a deduction one may in fact carry out such amove, e.g., write 
'(P & Q) v R' after writing 'P & Q'. The carrying out of a deductive step 
on the basis of a rule of inference is certainly not itself an inference. For 
neither the rule nor the step is a statement capable of truth and falsehood. 
And if the analogy is correct, Euclid's constructions are not inferences 
from his constructional postulates ; they are actions done in accord with 
them. 
There is a further correspondence between constructions and inferences 
which lends support to the analogy. If one wants to study inference with 
mathematical precision, one treats deductions as fixed objects, sequences 
of formulas satisfying conditions specified on the basis of the rules of 
inference. In other words, when inference is studied mathematicaIly, acts 
of inference are dropped from consideration and replaced by objects 
which could have been created by a series of inferences but for which the 
question of creation is irrelevant; objects satisfying the conditions are 
simply assumed to exist. The analogy with geometry should be clear. In 
the modern formulation ofEuclid's geometry 6 there are no constructions 
of straight lines or circ1es. The axioms are stated in such a way as to 
guarantee the existence of these objects. Rather than construct the circ1e 
with center A and distance AB, the modern geometer simply derives the 
theorem asserting the existence of such a circ1e. 
The analogy proposed here is easily extended to explain the character 
of the protasis of proposition 1. The Greeks called proposition 1 a problem, 
construction to be carried out, and opposed problems to theorems, 
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assertions to be proved. 7 The analogy suggests that proposition 1 be like-
ned to a short-cut rule of inference justified by showing that application 
of it is tantamount to a series of applications of the original rules. And, of 
course, Euclid does use the construction of an equilateral triangle on a 
given line directly in subsequent proofs (e.g., in 1,2). 
The apodeixis is on the surface very simple, very easy to understand, 
but logicaIly it is fairly complex. The inferences to the equality of A e with 
AB and of Be with BA are based on definitions 15 and 16 of book I: 
A circle is a plane figure contained by one line such that all the 
straight lines falling upon it from one point among those lying 
within the figure are equal to one another; 
and the point is called the center ofthe circle. 
It is clear Euclid is making some kind of deductive argument at the be-
ginning of the apodeixis. But it is not at all clear that he thinks of it as a 
formal argument, an argument based on formal logical laws. In modern 
notation the definition of 'circle' may be represented as follows: 
(1) x is a circle+-+(i) x is a plane figure & 
(ii) (E!y) [y is a line containing x & 
(iii) (E!z) (z is a point within x & 
(u) (v) (u is a straight line from z to y & 
v is a straight line from z to y -t U equals v))]. 
From (l) and 'eDB is a circle' one can infer the definiens of (l) with 
'eDB' substituted for 'x'. Such an inference could be referred to Aristotle's 
syllogistic if one were willing to allow singular terms in syllogisms 8 and 
to treat the complex term corresponding to the definiens as a term in a 
categoricaI proposition. But doing these two things will not suffice to 
recover the whole argument. As a next step we need to apply a proposi-
tional rule, &-elimination, to get 
(2) (E!y)[y is a line containing eDB & 
(E!z) (z is a point within eDB & 
(u) (v) (u is a straight line fromztoy & 
v is a straight line from z to y-tu equals v»)]. 
Reconstructing the next piece of Euclid's argument seems to be im-
possible. For in proposition l Euclid makes no reference to the distinction 
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between the circ1e and its circumference, a distinction which is expressed 
in the definition of circle. I shaH pass over the difficulty here by dropping 
cause (ii) and identifying the circ1e with its circumference. As aresult we 
hlave 
(3) (E!z) (z is a point within CDB & 
(u) (v) (u is a straight line from z to CDB & 
v is a straight line from z to CDB-+ 
u equals v». 
We wish to infer from (3) and 'A is the center of CDB' 
(4) A is a point within CDB & 
(u) (v) (u is a straight line from A to CDB & 
v is a straight line from A to CD B-+ 
uequals v). 
Obviously the definition of 'center' is heing invoked for this step, and the 
move is 10gicaHy sound. However, the apparatus involved in justifying 
the step goes beyond any Greek logical theory known. Since Euc1id seems 
to treat his geometric definitions as concrete specifications ofintuitive ob-
jects rather than as abstract characterizations,9 he would probably not 
recognize that any step of inference at all is involved here. 
From (4) by &-elimination we obtain that any two straight lines from 
A to CDB are equal. The inference from this assertion and 'AB and AC 
are straight lines from A to CDB' to 'AB equals AC' is an example ofthe 
most common form of explicit inference in the Elements. The form recurs 
in the apodeixis ofI,1 when Euc1id establishes the equality of CA and CB 
using the first common notion, 'Things equal to the same thing are also 
equal to one another'. In modern notation this argument runs 
(S) (u)(v) (w) (u equals w & v equals w-+ u equals v); 
(6) CA equals AB; 
(7) CB equals AB; 
(8) therefore CA equals CB. 
In later antiquity this argument became the paradigm of a mathematical 
argument. IO The Peripatetics, intent upon defending Aristotle, claimed 
tha t the argument is reallya categoricai syllo gism : 
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Things equal to the same thing are also equal to one another; 
CA and CB are things equal to the same thing; 
therefore CA and CB are equal to each other.H 
What is the minor term of this 'syllogism'? Presumably 'CA and CB', 
i.e., the pair (CA, CB). The modem analysis, according to which the 
the minor premiss and the conclusion each assert that a certain relation 
holds between two subjects CA and CB, seems more natural than one 
according to which the premiss and the conclusion each assert a propert y 
of a pair taken as a single thing. But so long as the inference from (S), (6) 
and (7) to (8) is treated in isolation, there is no way to refute the Peripa-
tetic analysis. Yet the context of the inference makes clear why the Peri-
patetics were wrong. The following represent plausible renderings of the 
proofs of (6) and (7) as categoricai syllo gisms: 
(B) Straight lines from A to CD B are equal to each other; 
CA and AB are straight lines from A to CD B; 
therefore CA and AB are equal to each other. 
(C) Straight lines from B to ACE are equal to each other; 
CB and AB are straight lines from B to ACE; 
therefore CB and AB are equal to each other. 
The minor premiss of (A) is presumably to be inferred directly from the 
conclusions of (B) and (C). Clearly it cannot be inferred by a categoricai 
syllogism since such a syllogism will require five terms, 'CA and AB', 
'CB and AB', 'CA and CB', 'equal to each other', and 'equal to the same 
thing'. Thus although (A), (B), and (C) can be construed as categoricai 
syllogisms, they cannot be combined to yield asyllogistic reconstruction 
of Euclid's apodeixis. For it depends on the relations among the three 
straight lines and not on properties ofthem taken as pairs. 
In ancient logic the sumperasma is the conclusion inferred from the 
premisses of an argument. In the Elements, however, the sumperasma 
is not so much aresult of inference as a summing up of what has been 
established. This summarizing character is made clearer in the case of 
theorems for which the sumperasma consists of the word 'therefore', 
followed by a repetition of the protasis, followed by 'Q.E.D.' (See the 
proof of I, 19 quoted above.) From the modem point of view the apodeixis 
ends with a particular conclusion reached from particular assumptions; 
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tacit in the sumperasma are steps of conditionalization to get rid of the 
assumptions and of quantifier introduction or generalization. Throughout 
antiquity, indeed down into the nineteenth century, the latter step was 
not seen as a matter of logic.12 The inference was brought into the domain 
of logic only with the invention of the quantifier and the discovery of the 
rules governing it. 
I have analyzed Elements 1,1 in order to show that Euclid's tacit logic 
is at least the first order predicate calculus, nothing less. His logic may 
even be more than that, since representing his reasoning in the first order 
predicate calculus would seem to require reformulations foreign to the 
spirit of the Elements. I hope I have als o sufficiently emphasized that in 
antiquity only the apodeixis would have been thought of as possibly 
subject to logical rules, and it is often a very small portion of a Euclidean 
proposition. I would now like to argue that Euclid does not show an 
awareness of one ofthe most basic ideas oflogic, logical form. Character-
istically logicians make clear the importance of form for determining the 
validity of an argument by obvious artificial devices. When AristotIe 
writes, "If A is predicated of all B and B of all C, necessarily A is predi-
cated of all C", he uses the letters 'A', 'B', 'C' to indicate the truth of the 
assertion (or correctness of the inference), no matter what terms are put 
in their place. The Stoics make a similar claim when they call "If the 
first then the second; but the first; therefore the second" valid: any sub-
stitution of sentences for ordinal number words produces a correct 
inference. 
Of course, artificial indications of form are not likely to occur in appli-
cations of logic, but a series of correct deductive arguments cannot be 
said to show a sense of logic unless it shows a sense of form. But Greek 
mathematics does not show this sense. In it one finds parallel proofs of 
separate cases which could be treated simultaneously with only slight 
generalization. In the Elements there are separate proofs of properties of 
tangent and cutting circles when only the points of contact are relevant.l3 
Better known in Euclid's separate treatment of one and the other num-
bers 14 and of square and cube numbers when all that is relevant is one 
number's being multiplied by itself some number of times.l5 Similar 
examples can be found in Archimedes and Apollonius. The usual explana-
tion of this proliferation of cases invokes the concreteness of Greek 
mathematics. What is insufficiently stressed is how a sense of derivation 
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according to logical rules, had it existed, would have undercut this 
concreteness. Greek geometers obviously trusted their geometric intuition 
much more strongly than any set of logical principles with which they 
may have been familiar. 
The proof ofI,19 presented above is logically very elementary. One has 
a set of alternatives all but one of which imply an absurdity, and so one 
infers the remaining alternative. A person with a sense of logic probably 
would not bother to carry out such a proofwith Euclid's detail even once. 
But he certainly would not repeat the same proof with different subject 
matter several times. Euclid repeats the proof exactly in deriving 1,25 from 
1,4 and 24, and V,1O from V,8 and 7. Another example is perhaps even 
more surprising. Euclid repeatedly moves from a proof of a proposition 
of the form (x)(Fx-+Gx) to an explicit proof of (x)(-Gx-+ -Fx): 
assume -Ga and Fa; then, since all F are G, Ga, contradicting -Ga. I 
have noticed five cases in which such an argument is carried out and two 
others in which the stylized argument is avoided. 16 
One of the main themes of nineteenth-century mathematics was the 
demand for complete axiomatization, and one ofthe main charge s levelled 
against Euclid was his failure to make explicit all of the assumptions on 
which his proofs relied - in particular, assumptions about continuity or 
betweenness,17 The absence from the Elements of first principles covering 
these assumptions is another indication of the intuitive character oftheir 
work, but it does not seem to me to throw light on the question whether 
Euclid wished to axiomatize his subject completely. I do not know what 
Euclid would have said if challenged to establish the existence of the point 
C in which the two circles of the proof of proposition I cut each other. 
But I do believe that he intended to make explicit in the postulates of book 
I all geometric assumptions to be used in hook J. I stress 'in book I' be-
cause there is no reason to suppose that Euclid intended his postulates 
to suffice for the whole of the Elements, since they do not in fact suffice, 
since they are stated within book I, and since the Elements include the 
theory of ratios, arithmetic, and solid geometry. I stress 'geometric' be-
cause Euclid's proofs depend on other more general assumptions, some 
of which are stated in the common notions but most of which are not. 
Discussion of the common notions is complicated by the issue of inter-
polation. I shall here simply state my view that only the first three are due 
to Euclid,18 At the end of the paper I shall suggest why the other com-
GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 45 
mon notions were added. In any case even the most extensive list of 
common notions in the manuscripts is inadequate to cover all of Euclid's 
inferences. I illustrate this point by reproducing in outline a segment of 
the apodeixis (a reductio) of 1,7. 
(i) angle ACD equals angle ADC; 
(ii) therefore angle ADC is greater than angle DCB; 
(iii) therefore angle CDB is 'much' greater than angle DCB. 
C 
A ~----+--')D 
8 
In this argument, (i) is properly derived from earlier assumptions. (ii) 
would seem to be derived from (i) plus 
(iv) angle ACD is greater than angle DCB, 
and the general principle 
(v) (u)(v)(w) (uequals v & visgreaterthan w-+uisgreaterthan w). 
(iv) may be justified by reference to the common notion numbered 8 
by Heiberg,19 which asserts that the whole is greater than the part; more 
probably it is simply a truth made obvious by the diagram. The principle 
(v) is nowhere stated explicitly by Euclid, although it would seem to be 
neither more nor less obvious than the first common notion. Approxi-
mately the same thing ean be said about the inference to (iii), which 
follows from (ii) plus 
(vi) angle CDB is greater than angle ADC, 
and the principle of transitivity for 'greater than', again a principle 
equally as obvious as the first common notion. I mention these tacit prin-
ciples to show that the deductive gaps in the Elements occur at a much 
more rudimentary level than the levelof continuity or betweenness. But 
more important, this example, which could be buttressed with many 
others, seems to me to shift the burden of proof to those who claim that 
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Euclid intended to produce a complete axiomatization of even bo ok I. 
I have so far concentrated primarily on book I ofthe Elements because 
I believe that, at least as far as logic is concerned, it is Greek mathema-
tics par excellence and because it se ems to be the main contact point 
between later Greek logic and mathematics. However, I would like now 
to con sider book V of the Elements, which has been described by some 
scholars as (more or less) formal in the logical sense. 20 There is no question 
that the theory of proportion of book V is in a way abstract; but, as I 
hope to make clear, the abstraction involved does not yield a theory based 
on logic. Rather it yields a theory only slightly less concrete than Greek 
geometry or arithmetic. 
The theory of book V represents Eudoxus's solution to the problem of 
dealing mathematicaIly with the relation of one quantity to another when 
the relation cannot be represented as a ratio between two integers. 
Aristotle apparently refers to this theory and praises it for a kind of 
abstraction. 
Another case is the theorem about proportion, that you can take the terms alternately; 
this theorem used at one time to be proved separately for numbers, for lines, for solids, 
and for times, though it admitted of proof by one demonstration. But because there 
was no name comprehending all these things as one - I mean numbers, lengths, times, 
and solids, which differ in species from one another - they were treated separately. Now 
however, the proposition is proved universally; for the propert y did not belong to the 
subjects qua lines or qua numbers, but qua having a particular character which they are 
assumed to possess universally. 
(Posterior Analytics, 1.5.74a17-25, trans!. by T. Heath) 
Aristotle here writes as if the whole matter were terminological, as if 
separate proofs ofthe law 
A~~BuC~~D-A~~CuB~~D 
were given for different kinds of objects simply because no one term 
covered them all. But it is generally agreed that Eudoxus did not just 
supply a new term, 'magnitude' (megethos), in the Elements; he provided 
a new foundation for the theory of proportion. This foundation survives 
in Definitions 5 and 7 ofbook V. 
DEFINITION 5. Magnitudes are said to be in the same ratio, the first to the second and 
the third to the fourth, when, if any equimuItiples whatever be taken of the first and the 
third and any equimultiples whatever of the second and the fourth, the former equimul-
tiples alike exceed, are alike equal to, or alike fall short of, the latter equimuItiples 
respectively, taken in corresponding order. 
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DEFINITION 7. When of equimultiples the multiple of the first magnitude exceeds the 
multiple of the second but the multiple of the third does not exceed the multiple of the 
fourth, then the first is said to have a greater ratio to the second than the third has to 
the fourth. 
In modem notation: 21 
(S) (A, B)=(C, D)~ 
(m)(n)[(m·A>n-B--+m·C>n-D) & 
(m·A=n-B--+m·C=n·D) & (m·A<n-B--+m·C<n· D)J. 
(7) (A, B»(C, D)~(Em)(En)(m·A>n·B & -(m·C>n· D». 
In these definitions comparisons of size between ratios are reduced to 
comparison of size between multipIes of magnitudes. To see what the 
definitions mean, one need only think of A, B, C, D as real numbers, 
(X, Y) as XI Y, 'm' and 'n' as ranging over integers, and give' .', '>', '<', 
and' = ' their standard meanings. Definition S is then equivalent to 
(S') ~ = C ~(m)(n)[(~> ~ --+ ~ >~) & (~= -"- --+ C =~) & 
BD BmDm BmDm 
(~ < ~ --+ C < ~)J. B m D m 
But AIB and CfD may be thought of as arbitrary real numbers, since any 
real can be represented as a ratio of two reals and any such ratio repre-
sents a real. Thus, Definition S can be thought of as saying that two reals 
are equal if they make the same cut in the system of rationals - Dede-
kind's account of equality for reals. 22 If the same interpretation is applied 
to Definition 7, it becomes 
(7') - >-~(Em)(En) - > - & - -- >- , A C (A n (C n)) 
B D B m D m 
i.e., a first real is greater than a second if and only if there is a rational 
nim separating them. 
In terms of Greek mathematics one remarkable feature of Definitions 
S and 7 is that they attach relatively abstract explanations to the relatively 
intuitive notions of equality and inequality of ratio. And the explanations 
are the basis for proving some intuitively obvious facts, e.g., 
(V.7) 
(V. Il) 
A=B--+(A, C) = (B, C); 
(A, B)=(C, D) & (E, F)=(C, D)--+(A, B) = (E, F). 
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Intuitions concerning ratios are undoubtedly intended to play no role in 
the derivations ofbook V. However, the derivations are not purely logical. 
Euclid makes constant use of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and 
division of magnitudes - operations which are characterized nowhere in 
Greek mathematics. He also assumes laws governing the performance of 
these operations and laws governing comparisons of size. 23 
The tacit assumptions in book V should probably not be attributed to 
intuitions about magnitudes and operations on them. For Aristotle's 
remarks show that 'magnitude' is intended in a general sense. And there 
is no single intuitive notion of, say, addition for all the different kinds of 
objects to which the word is supposed to apply. Moreover, in other parts 
of Greek mathematics which are either Eudoxus's work or stem from it, 
the operations in question are performed on geometric objects (e.g., 
cirdes in Elements XII,2; parabolic segments in Archimedes's Quadrature 
o/ the Parabola) for which the operations could not be given a precise 
intuitive (i.e., constructive) sense. This deviation from the generally 
constructive tendency of Greek mathematics is probably not an oversight. 
Rather, the deviation represents the only available means of solving cer-
tain problems. So too in the theory of proportion Eudoxus deviates from 
the generally intuitive character of Greek mathematics, reducing the 
theory to generalized notions of magnitude, addition, multiplication, etc. 
But these notions remain informal. No attempt is made to characterize 
them by means of first principles. Hence the underpinning of the theory 
of proportion is the theory of magnitudes rather than logic. 
3. MATREMATICS IN TRE Prior Analytics 
In his systematic presentation of the categorical syllogism in the first 
twenty-two chapters ofthe Prior Analytics, Aristotle never invokes mathe-
matics. His examples are always ofthe 'white'-'man'-'animal' variety, and 
they suggest a dose connection between Aristotle's logic and the some-
what mysterious dialectical activities associated with Plato's Academy.24 
The difficulty of fitting mathematical argument into syllogistic form may 
explain the absence ofmathematical references in these chapters. But even 
in later chapters where Aristotle does invoke mathematics to support 
some points, a substantial majority ofhis considerations are either directly 
pointed at dialectical argument or more obviously relevant to it than to 
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anything else. It seems clear to me that mathematics could not have played 
in the development of Aristotle's syllogistic anything like the role it played 
in the development of modem quantification theory. However, it is 
perhaps worthwhile to examine the mathematical references in the Prior 
Analytics to determine what role mathematics did pay. I fint describe 
references which have no special relevance to the categoricai syllogism. 
(A) 1.30.46a19-22. Aristotie illustrates the empirical basis of our know-
ledge of the first principles of a deductive science by reference to astrono-
my, presumably of the kind found in Euclid's Phenomena and Autolycus's 
On the Moving Sphere and On Risings and Settings. 
(B) I.31.46b26-3S. Aristotle invokes the incommensurability of the 
side of a square with its diagonal to illustrate the impossibility of estab-
lishing an unknown fact by means ofPlatonic division. 
(C) I.41.49b33-S0a4 is a difficuIt passage to interpret. Aristotle com-
pares his use of ekthesis to the geometer's calling 'this line a foot long and 
that line straight and breadthless when it is not.' 25 Apparently Aristotle 
is thinking of the ekthesis of a geometric proposition and pointing out that 
the diagram to which the geometer seems to be referring may not satisfy 
the description he gives and yet does not affect the correctness of his 
argument. Ross 26 points out the different ways in which Aristotle uses the 
word ekthesis: None of them provide a satisfactory basis for interpreting 
Aristotle's remark here. Yet, whatever Aristotle means, he is clearly only 
making an analogy between his use of ekthesis and geometric ekthesis. 
His point would applyequally well whatever logical principles are taken 
to be involved in mathematical argument. 
(D) II.l6.6Sa4-7. Aristotle illustrates 'begging the question' with a 
brief reference to "those who think they draw parallel lines". A satis-
factory explanation of this passage would throw light on the history of 
mathematics but not on syllogistic. For the illustration occurs in a 
general description of 'begging the question' and would be compatibie 
with any deductive logic. 
(E) II.17.6Sbl6-21 and 66all-15 are equally general. In the former 
Aristotle gives a presumably fictitious example of a reductio ad absurdum 
in which the absurdity is not attributable to the hypothesis refuted, name-
ly, an attempt to derive a Zenonian paradox from the hypothesis of the 
commensurability of the side of a square with its diagonal. In the second 
he illustrates that a falsehood may follow from more than one set of 
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premisses by means of another mathematically fascinating example: 
'Parallels meet' follows from 'The interior [angle] is greater than the 
external' and from 'The angles of a triangle are greater than two right 
angles'. Since what Aristotle says does not depend in either case on the 
form of derivation involved, there is no reason to connect these passages 
with the categoricaI syllogism. 
The remaining references to mathematics in the Prior Analytics have 
a much more obvious connection with syllogistic. The first is perhaps the 
most important. Having run through the various figures of the various 
forms of syllogism, Aristotle turns in 1.23 to establishing a very general 
claim: every syllogism in the general sense (i.e., every deductive proof) is a 
syllogism in the technicaI sense (i.e., a categoricaI syllogisrn). He repeats 
this claim more than once in the Prior Analytics, and there ean be no 
doubt that Aristotle includes mathematical proofs among syllogisms in 
the general sense. His first step in establishing the claim is to assert, 
without justification, that the conclusion of every proof is a categoricaI 
proposition. 
Necessarily every proof and every syllogism proves that something belongs [to some-
thing] or does not belong, and either universally or in part. (40b23-2S) 
It is easy enough from our standpoint to produce counterinstances to 
this assertion, but from Aristotie's it is not. Consider an example he uses 
commonly, the proposition which Euclid states as "the three interior 
angles of any triangle are equal to two right angles" (Elements 1,32, 
second part). Aristotle renders this proposition rather sueeinetly as 
'Every triangle has two right angles'. 27 A more precise rendering would be 
'Every triangle has its interior angles equal to two right angles'. The im-
precision is indicative of Aristotie's casual attitude toward translation 
into categoricaI form. Even more significant is his casual attitude toward 
the analysis of categoricaI propositions into terms. According to him, the 
terms in 'Every triangle has two right angles' are 'triangle' and 'two right 
angles'. It seems clear, however, that the verb 'have' must be included in 
the predicate of the proposition, since what is predicated of every triangle 
in 1,32 is having two right angles, not being two right angles. Aristotle 
apparently considers such distinctions irrelevant as far as deduction is 
concerned. In Prior Ana/y ties 1.38 he considers a number of valid argu-
ments which, according to him, differ from categorical syllogisms only 
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because of the grammatical case of one of the terms, e.g., "If wisdom is 
knowledge and wisdom is of the good, the conclusion is that knowledge is 
of the go od" and "Opportunity is not the right time because opportunity 
is god's, but the right time is not". For Aristotle these arguments are 
syllogisms with the terms 'wisdom', 'knowledge', 'go od' and 'opportunity', 
'right time', 'god' respectively. 
We say generaIJy about all instances that the terms are aIways to be set out in the 
nominative case, e.g., 'man' or 'good' or 'opposites', not 'of man' or 'of good' or 'of 
opposites', but the premisses are to be taken with the appropriate case, e.g., 'equal' 
with the dative, 'double' with the genitive, 'striking' or 'seeing' with the accusative, or 
in the nominative, e.g., 'man' or 'animal', or if the noun occurs in the premiss in some 
other way. (I.36.48b39-49a5) 
As Lukasiewicz has pointed out, "Aristotelian logic is formal without 
being formalistic. "28 That is to say, Aristotleis throughly aware that the 
validity of an argument depends on its form, but he is not very strict in his 
determination of the form of a statement in an argument. The freedom of 
paraphrase which he allows himself in representing statements may well 
have been a major factor in his conclusion that a proof is always of a 
categoricai statement. Certainly, given Aristotle's liberal standards, all 
the theorems in Euclid could be transformed into categoricai statements. 
When Aristotle wrote the Prior Analytics probably no one was aware of 
the possibility of a formalistic logic. But the Stoics apparently did move 
toward one.29 Unfortunately the idea does not seem to have spread out-
side Stoic circles. Alexander of Aphrodisias, commenting on Aristotle's 
remark that words and phrases with the same meaning may be inter-
changed in arguments, asserts: "The syllogism does not have its being in 
the words but in what they signify" . 30 Even if one believes this assertion, 
one cannot deny that the insistence on strict formalization characteristic 
of modem logic has made clear a number of things which reliance on 
meaning obscures. As we shall see, later Peripatetics were able to defend 
Aristotle's claim of universality for the categoricai syllogism because they 
were content with rather loose formulations of arguments. 
It would be impossible to refute Aristotle's liberal attitude toward 
translation into categoricai form, aIthough the succes s of modem logic 
surely shows the attitude to be unfortunate. However, one might even 
concede that only categoricai propositions are proved in mathematics 
without admitting the syllogistic character of mathematical proof. The 
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analysis of Elements 1,1 was intended to show how far from the categori-
cal syllogism EucIidean reasoning is. Aristotle, however, produces in 
Prior Analytics l,23 a general argument for the universality of the cate-
gorical syllogism. The main point of the argument is the need for amiddle 
term to establish a categoricai proposition. There is no reason to examine 
the argument in detail, since it presupposes the universality of reasoning 
based on the predicational relation of terms. The important point is that 
no thorough investigation of mathematical proof would support Aristo-
tie's claim. 
Aristotle's own mathematical examples are consistently vague. In 1.35 
he writes as though the proof that the angles of a triangle are equal to two 
right angles requires only the proper specification of a middle term. Al-
most certainly the proof he has in mind involves the drawing of a parallel 
line, as in the fint or second diagram, and arguingthat angle B=angle B', 
angle C = angle C', and angle A + angle B + angle C = two right angles. In 
such a proofthe terms 'triangle' and 'two right angles' cannot function as 
categoricaI terms because the proof involves breaking the triangle and the 
two right angles into parts, and the spatial relations of the parts are crucial. 
EIsewhere Aristotle simply asserts that categoricai syllogisms are used in 
the derivation of a contradiction from the assumption of the commen-
surability of side and diagonal (l,23,41a21-37 and l,44.50a29-38). And, 
to take the most extreme case of all, he is content to describe a very ela-
borate attempt of Hippocrates to square the circle 31 with the folIowing 
cryptic remark : 
If D is 'to be squared', E 'rectilinear', F 'circ1e', if there be only one rniddle for the 
[proposition] EF, the circle with lunes becoming equal to a rectilineal [figure l, we should 
be close to knowledge. (II.25.69a30-34) 
Here AristotIe apparently thinks of Hippocrates's quadrature of a circIe 
plus a lune as the insertion of a middle term between 'rectilinear' and 
'circle'. In itself this interpretation of the quadrature is dubious, but the 
crucial point is that no concern is shown for the details of Hippocrates's 
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reasoning. Aristotle is contented with a vague statement of the general 
result. 
The closest Aristotie comes in the Prior Analytics to considering a 
mathematical proof in detail is in 1.24 where he wishes to show that at 
least one premiss of a valid syllogism must be universal. This wish is 
somewhat strange, since a simple survey of the detailed presentation in 
the first twenty-two chapters would suffice to establish the point. Aristotle 
uses examples to make it plausible. The first is non-mathematical. 
For let it be put forward that musical pleasure is worthwhiIe. If pleasure is assumed to 
be worthwhiIe but 'all' is not added, there won't be a syllogism. And if it is taken to be 
some pleasure, then, if it is a different pleasure [than musical pleasurel, it does not help 
for the thesis, and if it is the same, the question is begged. (41b9-13) 
Here Aristotle seems to lose sight completely of the notion of formal vali-
dit y which is so crucial in his original presentation. Re could have simply 
pointed out that the argument with 'some' is invalid because it is of a 
form aiready shown to be invalid, or, more directly, because there are 
interpretations which make the premisses true and the conclusion false. 
In any case, Aristotle continues: 
This is made clearer in geometrical propositions, e.g., that the angles at the base of an 
isosceles triangle are equal. Let the straight lines A and B be drawn to the center. Then if 
one takes (l) the angle AC to be equal to the angle BD without assuming (Al) the 
angles of a semicircle to be equal in general, and again that (2) C is equal to D without 
adding that (A2) all angles of the segment are equal, and further that since the whole 
angles are equal and the subtracted angles are equal, (3) the remainders E, Fare equal 
without assuming that (A3) if equals are subtracted from equals the resuIts are equal, 
he wiII beg the question. (41b13-22) 
Aristotle's presentation here is somewhat obscure and hardly rigorous 
by Euclidean standards. But the drift of the proof which he describes is 
clear. In the diagram, bede/is a circle with center a. According to Aristotle, 
the following argument involves petitio principii: 
(1) mixed angle ade = mixed angle a/e ; 
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(2) mixed anglefde=mixed angle dfe; 
(3) therefore, rectilineal angle adf=rectilineal angle afd. 
The addition of three general premisses is required to correct the reason-
ing: 
(Al) The angles made by diameters and circumferences of circles 
are always equal. 
(A2) The two angles made by a chord and the circumference of a 
circle and on the same side ofthe chord are equal. 
(A3) If equals are subtracted from equals, the results are equal. 
Quite clearly the proof which AristotIe has in mind here is logically 
very similar to the apodeixis of Elements 1,1. This proof is slightly more 
complicated (and less syllogistic) because there is a subtraction involved 
between steps (2) and (3). Exactly how AristotIe would have tried to 
syllogize the proof is anybody's guess. There is no evidence that he ever 
did try, and I suspect that he never considered the problem of reducing 
mathematical proofto syllogistic form in a systematic way. In the present 
passage he is simply using a mathematicai example as inductive evidence 
for his claim that a valid syllogism requires a universal premiss. And per-
haps Aristotle is here using the word 'syllogism' in the broader rather than 
the narrower sense. His failure to refer to the earlier chapters of the Prior 
Analyties for a clear substantiation of his claim, his inconclusive treat-
ment ofthe argument yielding 'Musical enjoyment is worthwhile', and the 
vagueness of his discussion of the mathematical proof incline me to think 
so. I would be certain except for Aristotle's references to the modes and 
figures ofthe syllogism at the end of1.24. 
It looks, then, as though Aristotle did not study mathematical proof 
carefully or make any detailed attempt to vindicate his claims for the 
universality of syllogistic. A general argument based on a rather super-
ficial analysis of mathematical theorems was sufficient for his purposes. 
This point of view is confirmed by the semi-mathematical arguments in 
other Aristotelian and pseudo-Aristotelian works. None of them show 
any closer relation to syllogistic than the main texts of Greek mathe-
matics do. Further evidence is provided by Eudemus's presentation of 
Hippocrates's quadratures of lunes and circles plus lunes.32 Eudemus was 
a pupil of AristotIe with at least some interest in logic, 33 but nothing in his 
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presentation suggests an interest in connecting mathematics with syllo-
gistic. Alexander of Aphrodisias is too late a figure to serve as a direct 
indicator of Aristotle's own ideas, but the surviving parts of his commen-
taries on the Organon are our best source of information on what became 
of those ideas among the later Peripatetics. Alexander makes clear in many 
passages that, for him, the doetrine of the universality of the categoricai 
syIlogism has the status of a dogma. In one such passage he discusses 
Aristotle's claim that the derivation of a contradiction from the assump-
tion of the commensurabiIity of the side of a square with its diagonal is 
syIlogistic.34 Alexander reproduces a protracted but essentiaIly correct 
derivation that is no more syIlogistic in style than any proof in the Ele-
ments. He simply asserts that the derivation is syllogistic. For him any 
interesting conclusive argument must be a categoricai syllogism. 
Thus far I have argued as if Aristotle acknowledged no form of conclu-
sive argument other than the categoricai syllogism. In faet he does 
acknowIedge a general class of non-syIlogistic argument which he calls 
argument from a hypothesis. 35 An especiaIly important member of the 
class is the reductio ad absurdum. However, Aristotle always treats the 
general class and its most important member separately, and I shall 
follow him in my discussion. Argument from a hypothesis is for Aristotle 
basically modus ponendo ponens. Wishing to prove Q, one adds P-" Q as a 
hypothesis and proves P. Aristotle represents argument from a hypothesis 
as a form of dialectical reasoning. The hypothesis P -" Q is a matter of 
agreement between two opponents. The opponent who denies P but con-
cedes P -" Q is declaring a proof of Q unnecessary once a proof of P has 
been found; he is not providing a premiss which might be used in a proof 
of Q. Thus Aristotle does not conceive of modus ponens as a rule oflogical 
inference. As far as he is concerned, the proof in an argument from a 
hypothesis is the proof of P. Since he assumes that P will be categorical, 
he assumes that the proof of P will be a series of categoricai syllogisms. 
Lukasiewicz argued that Aristotle was oblivious to the use of ruIes of 
propositionallogic in his own deveIopment ofsyIlogistic.36 His oblivious-
ness to their use in mathematics seems at least as clear. 
On the other hand, reductio arguments are an obvious feature ofmathe-
maties. And Aristotle's standard example of a reductio proof is the indi-
reet derivation of the incommensurability of the side of a square and its 
diagonal. Aristotle's analysis of reductio is obviously intended to be like 
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his analysis of argument from a hypothesis, but the detail s of the analysis 
of reductio are less clear. Primafacie, one would expect the hypothesis of 
a reductio to be the assumption refuted; but, if it is, the analogy with 
argument from a hypothesis breaks down. Unfortunately AristotIe con-
tents himself with saying that the hypothesis in a reductio is not agreed to 
in advance "because the falsehood is obvious" (I.44.S0a3S-38). The ob· 
vious falsehood would seem to be the contradiction derived from the 
assumption refuted. In saying that no advance agreement is made, Aris-
totle is apparentIy again envisaging a dialectical situation: one person 
claims P; the other derives a contradiction from P; the falsehood is so 
blatant that no explicit agreement is needed to get the first person to 
abandon P. One might then consider the hypothesis of a reductio to be 
the law of proposition al logic '(P --+ (Q & - Q» --+ - P', but there is no 
evidence that Aristotle even tried to reformulate it. For him the crucial 
points are (1) the reductio part of an indirect proof is syllogistic, and (2) 
the nonsyllogistic part is a matter of tacit agreement rather than logic. 
Rowever, reductio is a part ofmathematics and is recognized as such by 
Aristotle. Was he then forced to recognize a non-syllogistic feature of 
mathematics ? ApparentIy not, for AristotIe also realized that "everything 
which can be inferred directly (deiktikos) can be inferred by reductio and 
vice versa, and by the same terms" (II.14.62b38-40). In other words, 
(A & B)--+ C is a valid categoricai syllogism if and only if (A & - C) --+ - B 
is (with negated statements properly formulated). Thus any theory whose 
logic is syllogistic has no need of reductio proof. It is unfortunate that no 
one ever tried to illustrate this truth about the categoricai syllogism by 
recasting indirect proofs from mathematics into direct ones. An attempt 
to do so would have made the limitations to the categoricai syllogism 
obvious. 
AristotIe seerns, then, to have had a largelyapriori conception of the 
relation between his logic and mathematical proof. Re may have taken the 
formulation of mathematical theorems into account in trying to justify 
his estimation of the significance of the categoricai proposition in demon-
strative science, but his notion ofthe categoricai proposition was so broad 
that virtuaIly any general statement would satisfy it. On the other hand, 
AristotIe does not seem to have looked at mathematical proof in any 
detail, at least as far as its logic is concerned. Re recognizes some com-
mon features of mathematica! proof, e.g., the use of reductio ad absurdum 
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and the reliance on universal assumptions, but he is apparently content 
to rely on the abstract argument of 1.23 to establish the adequacy of syllo-
gistic for mathematics. His Peripatetic successors do not seem to have 
gone much beyond him either in logic or in the logical analysis of mathe-
matical proof. 
4. STOIC LOGIC AND GREEK MATHEMATICS 
Some of the Stoics do seem to have shown an awareness of the complexity 
of mathematical proof. Unfortunately the scatteredness and scantiness 
of the evidence makes it diflicult to determine the details of Stoic logical 
theory and, in particular, to assign a chronology to its development. 
Recent interpreters of Stoic logic have disagreed sharply with their prede-
cessors on questions of analysis and evaluation, but both have forsworn 
the attempt to provide a chronology. And certainly there is littie hope of 
reconstructing a preciseand detailed chronology, since probably the major-
it Y of SOUfces describe only "what the Stoics (or dogmatists or recent 
philosophers) say" about some question. On the other hand, some SOUf-
ces attribute particular doctrines to particular people. The material 
quoted by Diogenes Laertius from Diocles Magnes is especiaIly rich in 
these attributions, and they are almost certainly reliable. Of course, when 
a doctrine is assi gned to a person we cannot be sure that he was the first 
person to espouse it, but it seems to me we should assume he was in the 
absence of other negative evidence or of countervailing systematic consi-
derations. Almost equal strength, I think, should be assigned to associa-
tions of doctrines with students or followers of a person, usually referred 
to as "those about" (hoi peri) him. Normally there are no grounds for 
distinguishing the views of "those about a person" from the views of the 
person himself. 
What I have said so far about scholarly methodology is uncontrover-
sial. The crucial issue arises with respect to ascriptions to "the more 
recent philosophers" (hoi neoteroi). The more recent philosophers are 
almost always Stoics, but it is difficult to determine the chronological 
boundary between more recent philosophers and others. In some authors 
the neoteroi seem to be Stoics in general or at least to include Chrysippus. 
Iamblichus 37 speaks generally of the original philosophers and more 
recent ones and goes on to discuss the views ofPlato, AristotIe, and Chry-
58 IAN MUELLER 
sippus. Galen associates with the more recent philosophers two terms 
(diezeugmenon axioma, sunemmenon axioma 38) which are certainly 
Chrysippean, as Galen himself says elsewhere in the case of one of them. 39 
Rowever, the important source to be evaluated is Alexander of Aphrodi-
sias, who uses the phrase hoi neoteroi more often than anyone else. As far 
as I have been able to determine, the following characterization holds for 
his usage. On occasion Alexander does contrast the neoteroi with the 
older Peripatetics (rather than the older StoiCS).40 Re also sometimes uses 
the word neoteroi interchangeably with 'Stoics'41 and sometimes asso-
ciates with neoteroi doctrines or practices common in the Stoic school. 42 
But he never ascribes to the neoteroi terminology or doctrine elsewhere 
attributed explicitly to Chrysippus. And in some cases terminology or 
doctrine associated with the neoteroi by Alexander can be determined 
with reasonable plausibility to be post-Chrysippean. 
The most certain case is the idea of the argument with one premiss, e.g., 
'You breathe; therefore you are alive',43 which Sextus Empiricus expli-
citly dissociates from Chrysippus and attributes to Antipater (flor. 2nd 
cent. B.C.).44 Another aImost equally certain case is the use of the word 
proslambamenon or proslepsis 45 for the 'minor premiss' of a hypothetical 
syllogism. At leas t Diocles Magnes ascribes to those about Crinis, a con-
temporary of Antipater, the description of an argument as consisting of 
/emma, proslepsis, and epiphora.46 In his commentary on the Topics 
Alexander says that the neoteroi caU a certain kind of question a pusma, 
a word used for questions requiring more than a 'yes' or 'no' answer.47 
There is some reason to regard this word as post-Chrysippean, since from 
the book titles in Diogenes Laertius it appears that Chrysippus used the 
word peusis with the same meaning. 48 The ground, however, is not very 
firm because peusis and pusma seem to have been used interchangeably in 
later antiquity. 
In the matter of arguments, what can be attached most firmly to Chry-
sippus are the five anapodeiktoi. 49 None ofthe obscure four themata are 
ever ascribed explicitly to him, nor does the word thema occur in the list 
of his works given by Diogenes Laertius. Alexander attributes a second 
and a third thema to the neoteroi. 50 Per haps Chrysippus did put forward 
some themata for reducing arguments to his five anapodeiktoi. But 
Alexander's ascription of the second and third themata to the neoteroi, 
combined with the absence of any clear presentation ofthe themata in survi-
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ving discussions of Stoic logic, suggests at least that the themata never 
became fixed in the way in which the anapodeiktoi more or less were. The 
other arguments which Alexander attributes to the neoteroi are, according 
to him, useless. They are the diphoroumenoi (e.g., 'If it is day, it is day; 
but it is day; therefore it is day'), the adiaphoros perainontes ('Either it is 
day or it is night; but it is day; therefore it is day'), the so-called infinite 
matter, 51 arguments semantically but not formally equivalent to catego-
rical syllogisms and called hyposyllogisms,52 and correct arguments which 
are not formally valid - called amethodos perainontes, unsystematically 
conclusive ('The first is greater than the second; the second is greater than 
the third; therefore the first is greater than the third').53 None of these 
arguments is ever associated with a specific person. To dissociate them 
from Chrysippus there is only Alexander's apparently consistent use ofthe 
word neoteroi and the absence of any titles containing the words dipho-
roumenoi, adiaphoros perainontes, 'infinite matter', 'hyposyllogism,' or 
'unsystematically conclusive' in Diogenes Laertius's long list ofthe works 
of Chrysippus. If the arguments are dissociated from Chrysippus, a rather 
clear picture of one aspect of the development of Stoic 10gic emerges. 
In the mid-third century Re. Chrysippus developed or codified the propo-
sitional 10gic which became the core of Stoic logic. After him, in the 
period of transition from the old to the middle Stoa, other Stoics intro-
duced into consideration certain curious propositional arguments and 
other apparently valid arguments not satisfying either Stoic or Peripatetic 
accounts ofvalidity. 
With this rough chronological framework it is possibie to investigate 
the relation between Stoic 10gic and Greek mathematics somewhat more 
precisely. I shall consider propositionallogic first. I have aiready given an 
example of a propositional argument in the Elements. Familiarity with 
modem logic makes it easy to find many more, both explicit and implicit. 
However, the evidence indicates rather strongly that no Stoic ever con-
ceived of propositionallogic as a basic tool of mathematics. Mathematical 
illustrations of propositional arguments are practically non-existent. 
There are none in Sextus Empiricus or Diogenes Laertius or Alexander, 
for example. Indeed, the only extended illustrations are given in the sixth 
century A.D. by John Philoponus in his discussion of Aristotle's treat-
ment of argument from a hypothesis. 54 The most interesting part of the 
discussion for my purposes is Philoponus's c1aim that reductio ad absur-
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dum involves application of two Stoic anapodeiktoi, the second and the 
fif th. Re illustrates his claim in terms of Aristotle's example, the proof 
that the side and the diagonal of a square are incommensurable. 
Fifth anapodeiktos: 
(l) The diagonal is either commensurate or incommensurate with 
the side; 
(2) But it is not commensurate (as I will show); 
(3) Therefore it is incommensurate. 
Second anapodeiktos: 
(4) Ifthe diagonal is commensurate with the side, the same num-
ber will be even and odd; 
(5) But the same number is not even and odd; 
(6) Therefore the diagonal is not commensurate with the side. 
Philoponus presumably thinks of (I) and (5) as immediate truths, and, like 
Aristotle and Alexander, he insists that (4) requires a proof by categoricai 
syllogism. Thus, although Philoponus grants Stoic propositional logic 
more status than Alexander does, he still main tai ns the false Peripatetic 
view ofthe dominance ofthe categoricai syllogism. 
It is, of course, possibie that the propositional part of Philoponus's 
analysis ultimately deri ves from an early Stoic source. But such a deriva-
tion seems unlikely. For Philoponus does not formulate arguments in the 
Stoic manner. Re does not place the word 'not' at the front of the sentence 
in (2), (5), and (6); he does not formulate (1) as adisjunction but as a simple 
sentence with a disjunctive predicate; and he formulates (4) artificially, 
perhaps to make it seem more categoricaI. (Literally (4) runs: The dia-
meter with the side, if it is commensurate, the same number will be even 
and odd.') There are similar features of Philoponus's whole discussion of 
hypothetical syllogisms which indicate that its origin is in later eclectic 
thinking. Rowever, the exact origin is not known to me. I have traced it 
back as far as Proclus who, in commenting on proposition 6 of book I 
of the Elements, refers to the role of the second anapodeiktos in indirect 
proofs: 
In reductions to impossibility the construction corresponds to the second of the hypo-
theticals. For example, if in triangles having equal angles the sides subtending the equal 
angles are not equal, the whole is equal to the part; but this is impossible; therefore, 
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in triangles having equal angles the sides subtending the equal angles are themseIves 
equal.55 
Proclus, of course, taught Ammonius on whose lectures Philoponus's 
commentary on the Prior Analytics seems to have been based. 
Thus, Chrysippean propositional logic would not seem to have been 
developed out of reflection on mathematics. Any connection between 
Stoic logic and Greek mathematics must be sought in the later refine-
ments aiready mentioned. And among these there is one obvious candi-
date for consideration, the unsystematically conclusive argument. The 
example given above is c1early mathematical. So is another, also due to 
Alexander, the inference to the equality of CA and CB in Elements I, 1.56 
But the following fairly common example shows that the domain of 
unsystematically conclusive argument extends beyond mathematics: 'It 
is day; but you say that it is day; therefore you speak the truth' 57 
The first question I wish to consider is how the conception of these 
arguments arose. After discussing categoricai and hypothetical syllo-
gisms, Galen introduces in chapter xvi of his Institutio Logica a third form 
of syllogism, namely, the relational (kata to pros ti genesthai). Re gives 
examples analogous to the unsystematically conclusive arguments above 
and mentions the frequency of relational syllogisms in mathematics. 
Galen apparently takes credit for the name 'relational' and for recognizing 
that relational syllogisms depend for their validity on some axiom, by 
which he means a self-evident proposition. There is no reason to deny 
Galen's origination of the term 'relational', since it is used in this way 
only in the Institutio. Rowever, it is important not to read too many mod-
em connotations into the term. For there is no evidence that Galen made 
any attempt to explain the validity of a relational syllogism by reference 
to what are now called the logical properties of a relation, such as 
transitivity or asymmetry, or to classify relations in terms of such proper-
ties. Indeed, there is no general treatment of relations at all. Each rela-
tional argument is to be examined in isolation to determine if there is an 
axiom which makes it valid. 58 Moreover, many of Galen's examples do 
not depend on logical properties of relations but on mathematical or 
semantic truths, e.g., '(a=2b & b=2c) ---+ a=4c' or "'son' is the converse 
of 'father"'. It seems fair to say that Galen calls the arguments he is 
considering relational because they contain a relation word. Re does not 
conceive of the idea of a logic of relations. And his account of the validity 
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of relational syllogisms as deriving from an axiom would apply to any 
argument turning on the meaning of some of its terms, even if the terms 
were not relation words. 
In the last chapter of the Institutio Galen dis misses from consideration 
several kinds of argument as being redundant in his presentation of logic. 
One is "called unsystematic, with which one must syllogize when there is 
no systematic argument at all".59 There is no reason to doubt that Galen 
is referring to unsystematically conclusive arguments and classing them 
with his own relational arguments. It is not clear, however, in what way 
relational syllogisms constitute a bro ad er class than unsystematically 
conclusive arguments. Perhaps all Galen did was to produce a few new 
examples of such arguments and provide a new label for them. A more 
important question concerns Galen's claim to originality in his account 
of the validity of relational syllogisms. At the end of his discussion of the 
relational syllogism 60 he admits that the Stoic Posidonius (ca. 135-ca. 
50 B.C.) called such arguments "valid on the strength of an axiom". It 
looks, then, as though the fundamental idea of Galen's account was put 
forward more than two centuries before him. 
Moreover, it looks as though the Peripatetics held the same view of 
unsystematically conclusive arguments as Galen, but in a more specific 
form. Galen eriticizes the Aristotelians for trying by force to eount rela-
tional syllogisms as categorica1.61 The subsequent discussion in the Insti-
tutio, supplemented with Alexander's logical eommentaries, makes it 
virtuaIly certain that the Peripatetic way of treating Galen's relational 
syllogisms was to add a universal premiss corresponding to Galen's axiom 
and to reformulate the argument as a 'categorieal syllogism'. To give one 
example, Alexander transforms the unsystematically conclusive argument 
'A is greater than B; B is greater than C; therefore A is greater than C' 
into Everything greater than a greater is greater than what is less 
than the latter; 
A is greater than B which is greater than C; 
Therefore A is greater than C.62 
Galen's criticism of sueh transformations as foreed is mild, to say the 
least. The transformations make no logical sense. Alexander makes them 
only beeause he is bent on defending Aristotle's general claims about the 
universality of the eategorical syllogism. 
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Galen's own attitude toward the added axiom and the resulting argu-
ment is harder to figure out. Mter criticizing the Aristotelians for forcing 
relational syllogisms into an arbitrary mold, he goes on to propose re-
ducing the syllogisms to categoricai form. 63 But shortly thereafter, he 
con siders a 'reduction' apparently as ridiculous as the one just given and 
clearly prefers a 'reduction' to a propositional argument by adding a 
conditional premiss.64 Galen is so antiformalistic that it is impossible 
to tell how serious he is about reduction to categoricai form. His main 
stress is on the tacit assumption in relational syllogisms of an axiom, 
which he usually describes as universal. But one cannot ten whether for 
him the result of adding the axiom is always a categoricai syllogism, 
always either a categoricai or hypothetical syllogism, or sometimes neither. 
I am inclined to accept the last alternative, but with inconclusive reasons. 
Galen introduces the relational syllogism as a third form or species of 
syllogism, and if he believed it was really an enthymemic form of the first 
two, he could eas ily have said so. Alexander accepts the first alternative 
for unsystematically conclusive arguments and is very explicit about it. 
In any case, Galen and probably every other logician in antiquity showed 
no interest in developing a speciallogic to account for relational arguments. 
In describing what Galen calls relational syllogisms as valid on the 
strength of an axiom, Posidonius was probably offering an explanation 
of the conclusiveness of unsystematically conclusive arguments, which, 
as Galen's description ofunsystematic arguments suggests, were regarded 
as simply unsystematic - i.e., incapable of analysis. It is uncertain when 
the amethodos perainomes arguments were first introduced, or in what 
connection. But the evidence I have given suggests dating their introduc-
tion in the second century B.C., that is, between Chrysippus and Posi-
donius. Probably the connection between these arguments and mathe-
matical proof was not at first recognized or, at least, emphasized. I have 
aiready pointed out that some of the acknowledged unsystematically 
conclusive arguments were not mathematical. However, even the mathe-
matical argument 'A is equal to B; C is equal to B; therefore A is equal 
to C' cannot have originally been considered in a context like Elements I, l. 
For there the role of the axiom (common notion) 'Things equal to the 
same thing are equal to each other' is clear. But apparently amethodos 
perainontes arguments were thought of as containing no general premisses 
of tbis kind.65 Perhaps, then, Posidonius used mathematical examples 
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like the proof of I, 1 to explain the unsystematicaIly concIusive arguments 
as valid on the strength of an axiom.66 Subsequently the Peripatetics 
cIaimed that the axiom was always a universal statement which, when 
added to the argument, turned it into a categorical syllogism. 
Posidonius's use ofthe word 'axiom' (axioma) is curious. For the Stoics 
any proposition is an axiom.67 Galen's use of 'axiom' to mean 'self-evident 
proposition' is derived ultimately from Aristotle.68 Posidonius could, of 
course, have been using 'axiom' in the standard Stoic sense. He could 
have been pointing out the possibility of turning any amethodos perainon 
argument into a valid propositional argument by adding as an additional 
premiss the so-called corresponding conditional: the conditional with the 
conjunetion of the original premisses as antecedent and the concIusion as 
consequent. But to suppose he did this is to accuse Galen of misrepresen-
tation or misunderstanding. Moreover, Posidonius is known to have been 
a philosophicai ecIectic. There is no great surprise in his using a Stoic 
word with a Peripatetic sense. 
ProcIus's commentary on bo ok I of the Elements contains enough 
references to Posidonius and to his pupil Geminus to confirm Posidonius's 
interest in the fundamentals of Greek mathematics. Particularly interes-
ting in connection with logic are ProcIus's references to Posidonius's 
replies to an attack on geometry by the Epicurean Zeno of Sidon. Zeno's 
motivation was probably destructive skepticism,69 although VIastos has 
tried to represent Zeno as a 'not unfriendly' and 'constructive' critic of 
EucIid's Elements.7o I shaIl not pursue the question of motivation here 
because the crucial thing for my purposes is the form of Zeno's criticism. 
He is cIassed by ProcIus as one who concedes the truth of geometric 
first principles but insists on the need for further assumptions in order to 
complete the proofs.71 
According to ProcIus, Posidonius wrote a 'whole book' refuting Zeno's 
attack on geometry.72 Unfortunately Proclus refers to this controversy 
in an explicit way only in connection with Elements I, 1. 73 He reproduces 
only two replies by Posidonius to Zeno. In both Posidonius denies the 
need for the additional assumption which Zeno cIaims is required. Never-
theless it seems quite possibie that the controversy with Zeno is the source 
of Posidonius's account of relational arguments as valid on the strength 
of an axiom. The evidence which I have given for this possibility is sparse 
and basically circumstantial. To this evidence I would like to add one 
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more consideration. In discussing Elements I, 10, the bisection of a straight 
line,74 Proclus refers to 'some' who say that "this appears to be an agreed 
principle in geometry, that a magnitude consists of parts infinitely 
divisible". In reply Proclus invokes Geminus's statement that the geo-
meters do assume, "in accordance with a common notion", that the 
continuous is divisible. Later Proclus refers to this assumption as an 
axiom. Cronert has identified Zen o with the 'some' referred to by Proclus. 75 
Perhaps Cronert is right, but in any case replies like the one ascribed to 
Geminus in the passage under consideration would have to be attributed 
to Posidonius if a connection is to be made between his controversy with 
Zeno and his analysis of Galen's re1ational arguments. The hypothesis 
I propose is the foUowing: Posidonius may have been unable to fiU some 
of Zeno's aUeged gaps in mathematical proofs and may have noticed the 
correspondence between Stoic unsystematically conclusive arguments and 
the proofs with gaps. Obviously it is no reply to a critic to caU a proof 
unsystematicaUy conclusive. Nor will it do to invoke the corresponding 
conditional, since establishing that is tantamount to establishing the 
correctness of the conclusion directly.76 Hence Posidonius may have 
invoked self-evident principles - axioms - to fiU the gaps he could not 
analyze away. And he may have described the proofs with gaps, and 
unsystematically conclusive arguments in general, as valid on the strength 
of an axiom. 
Af ter the composition of the Elements the common notions or axioms 
were a matter of great controversy, which centered on the need or lack 
of need for more axioms than the first three. 77 The result of this contro-
versy was the incorporation of a total of ten axioms into the main texts 
of the Elements. The additions are undoubtedly due to a desire to fiU 
aUeged gaps in Euc1id's argumentation. The date of the inception of this 
controversy is uncertain. I would like to suggest that it begins with the 
skeptical attack of Zeno and the more positive reply of Posidonius. The 
earliest person mentioned by Proclus in connection with the controversy 
is Heron, who attempted to limit the axioms to three, apparently the first 
three.78 It would seem that by Heron's time the list ofaxioms had aiready 
been expanded. Unfortunately Heron's dates are uncertain; scholars have 
placed him everywhere between 200 B.C. and 300 A.D. Neugebauer's 
dating of Heron's floruit in the first century A.D.79 seems now to have 
won general acceptance. We do not know who added to the Elements the 
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common notions rejected by Heron. Proclus never mentions Posidonius 
in connection with the axioms and postulates but does mention Geminus, 
who wrote extensively on mathematics,80 several times. Geminus seems 
to be a plausible but by no means certain candidate. 
5. RECAPITULA TION 
(1) Aristotle's formulation of syllogistic in the fourth century is basically 
independent of Greek mathematics. There is no evidence that he or his 
Peripatetic successors did careful study of mathematical proof. 
(2) Similarly, the codification of elementary mathematics by Euclid 
and the rich development of Greek mathematics in the third century are 
independent oflogical theory. 
(3) Likewise, Stoic propositional logic, investigated most thoroughly 
by Chrysippus in the third century, shows no real connection with mathe-
matical proof. 
(4) Subsequent to Chrysippus, hoi neiJteroi considered various new 
forms of argument, including the unsystematically conclusive. Some of 
these new forms of argument may have come from mathematics. How-
ever, as the name 'unsystematically conclusive' suggests, no attempt was 
made to provide a logic for these arguments. 
(5) Around the end of the second century B.C. Zeno of Sidon (and 
perhaps other skeptics and Epicureans) tried to underrnine mathematics 
by pointing out gaps in proofs. Posidonius replied to Zeno, in many cases 
denying the existence ofthe gaps. But Posidonius also recognized that some 
geometric arguments, which resemble unsystematically conclusive argu-
ments, depended on unstated principles. He considered the unstated 
principles seIf-evident and therefore called the arguments valid on the 
strength of an axiom. However, he made no progress in developing a logic 
to apply to these arguments. The debate over the need for further axioms 
in geometry continued for centuries and affected the text of the Elements 
itself. 
(6) The reawakening of interest in Aristotle's works in the first century 
B.C.81 produced a Peripatetic reaction to Posidonius's analysis of ordinary 
mathematical argument. Aristotle's general remarks about the univers ali-
ty ofthe categoricaI syllogism became a dogma to be defended at all costs. 
Unsystematically conclusive arguments were made systematic by adding 
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a universal premiss and attempting to transform the result into a cate-
gorical sylIogism. The attempt was uniformlya failure. 
(7) In Galen's Institutio Logica there is a more balanced view of un-
systematically conclusive arguments, which Galen calIs relational. Rela-
tional arguments depend for their validity on an addition al axiom which is 
usually universal and usuaIly categorical, but relationaI syllogisms are 
distinct from both categoricaI and hypothetical syllogisms. However, 
there is no evidence that Galen made any attempt to formulate a logic 
of relational syIlogisms. 
The University o/ Chicago 
NOTES 
1 The translations of the Elements are by T. Heath, The Thirteen Books of Euclid's 
Elements, 3 vols., Cambridge, England, 1925. 
2 John Philoponus, In Aristotelis Analytica Priora Commentaria (ed. by M. Wallies), 
Berlin, 1905, 246.3-4, gives a similar illustration of the fifth anapodeiktos: 'The side is 
either equal to or greater than or less than the side; but it is neither greater nor less; 
therefore it is equal'. For details on the anapodeiktoi and other aspects of Stoic logic, 
see B. Mates, Stoic Logic, Berkeley 1961. 
3 For example, one reads in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 1 (1970), 372: 
"And what of Greek geometry? What are its characteristics? It employs no symbols, 
for it is concerned not with structures formed by relations between mathematical ob-
jects, but with the objects themselves and their essential properties. It is not operational, 
but contemplative; its logic is the predicate logic of AristotIe's Organon". A footnote 
adds: "Indeed, the Organon includes, with one or two rare exceptions, no elements of 
relational logie" . 
4 These divisions and their names are taken from Proclus, In Primum Euclidis Elemen-
torum Librum Commentarii (ed. by G. Friedlein), Leipzig, 1873, 203.1-210.16. The 
rigidity whieh they suggest is fully eonfirmed by Euclid's Elements; and the terms them-
selves, or forms of them, ean all be found in third-century mathematical works. For 
references, see C. Mugler, Dictionnaire Historique de la terminologie geometrique des 
grecs, Paris 1958. 
5 See 'Investigations into Logica1 Deduetion', in The Collected Papers of Gerhard 
Gentzen (ed. by M. E. Szabo), Amsterdam 1969, pp. 68-81. 
6 As in D. Hilbert, Foundations ofGeometry (trans!. by L. Unger), La Salle, Dl., 10th 
ed., 1971. 
7 Proclus, In Primum Elementorum, 77.7-81.22. 
8 J. Lukasiewiez, Aristotie's Syllogistic, Oxford, 2nd ed., 1957, p. 1, asserts that 
AristotIe does not allow singular terms in syllogisms. If Lukasiewiez is right, then no 
Euclidean argument would be an Aristotelian syllogism. 
9 See, for example, H. Zeuthen, Geschichte der Mathematik im Altertum und Mittelaiter, 
Copenhagen 1896, p. 117. 
10 At the beginning of Galen's Institutio Logica (ed. by C. Kalbfleiseh), Leipzig 1896, 
1.2, the reader is introdueed to the idea of proof by means of the folIowing example: 
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'Theon is equal to Dion; Philon is equal to Dion; things equal to the same thing are 
also equal to one another; therefore Theon is equal to Philon'. 
11 See Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum Librum I Com-
mentarium (ed. by M. Wallies), Berlin 1883, 344.13-20. 
12 For inadequate attempts to explain the move, see Proc!us, In Primum Elementorum, 
49.4-57.8; and J. S. Mill, A System of Logic, London, 9th ed., 1875, 1II.ii.2. 
13 E.g., in III, 5, 6. 
14 E.g., in VII, 9, 15. 
15 E.g., in VIII, 11, 12. 
16 The cases with the stylized proof are VIII, 16, 17 and X, 7, 8, 9. The cases where the 
possibility of the stylized proof is apparently overlooked are X, 16, 18. Each of these 
examples except X, 7, 8 actually contains two instances of failure to recognize the 
elementary logical equivalence. 
17 See, for example, F. Klein, Elementary Mathematics from an Advanced Standpoint 
(trans!. by E. R. Hedrick and C. A. Noble), New York 1939, IT, pp. 196-202. 
18 Heath gives five common notions in his translation ofthe Elements, but in discussing 
the fourth and fifth (I, 225, 232) he admits that they are probably interpolations. 
19 In the standard edition of the Elements (Leipzig 1883), I, 10, now reissued under the 
direction of E. S. Stamatis (Leipzig 1969). 
20 H. Hasse and H. Scholz, 'Die Grundlagenkrisis in der griechischen Mathematik', 
Kant-Studien XXXllI (1928), 17, call it a first attempt at an axiomatization in the 
modem sense. 
21 The notation '(X, Y)' for 'the ratio of X to Y' is taken from E. J. Dijksterhuis. See 
his Archimedes (trans!. by C. Dikshoorn), Copenhagen 1956, p. 51. The symbols '.', 
'<', '>', and '=' do not have their usual numerical sense, since '.' designates an 
operation on magnitudes, and the other three symbols designate relations of size hold-
ing between either magnitudes or ratios of magnitudes to one another. 
22 See 'Continuity and Irrational Numbers' in R. Dedekind, Essays on the Theory of 
Numbers (trans!. by W. Beman), Chicago 1924, pp. 15-17. 
23 F. Beckmann, in 'Neue Gesichtspunkte zum 5. Buch Euklids', Archivefor History 
of Exact Sciences IV (1967/8), 106-107, lists twenty-four 'tacit assumptions' of 
Book V. 
24 Lukasiewicz, Aristotle's Syllogistic, p. 6, denies Platonic influence. But see W. and 
M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford 1962, pp. 44, 67-68. 
25 Translation by T. Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle, Oxford 1949, p. 26. This is an 
excellent work to consult for detaiIs of the mathematica! aspects of the passages I am 
discussing. 
26 W. D. Ross, Aristotie's Prior and Posterior Analytics, Oxford 1949, pp. 412-414. 
27 See, for example, Prior Analytics, II.21.67aI2-16, or 1.25.48a33-37. 
28 Aristotle's Syllogistic, p. 15. 
29 See, for example, Alexander, In Analyticorum Priorum, 373.29-31, or Galen, Insti-
tutio, IV.6. 
30 In Analyticorum Priorum, 372.29-30. 
31 For the detaiIs, see Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Quattuor Priores 
Commentaria (ed. by H. Dieis), Berlin 1882, 60.22-68.32. 
32 See the passage cited in n. 31. 
33 The evidence is collected in F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles, Basel/Stuttgart, 
2nd ed., 1969, VIII, 11-20. 
34 In Analyticorum Priorum, 260.9-261.28. 
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35 Aristotie discusses argument from a hypothesis briefly in 1.23.41a22-41b5 and in 
somewhat more detail in 1.44. 
36 Aristotie's Syllogistic, pp. 49, 74. 
37 Quoted by Simplicius, In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium (ed. by C. Kalbfleisch), 
Berlin 1907, 394.13-395.31. 
38 Institutio, III.3, 4. 
39 Institutio, V.5 (said of those about Chrysippus). Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philos-
ophorum (ed. by H. S. Long), Oxford 1964, VII.190, lists amons Chrysippus's works 
'On a true diezeugmenon' and 'On a true sunemmenon' . 
40 See In Analyticorum Priorum, 262.28-32. 
41 See, for example, In Analyticorum Priorum, 21.30-31; 22.18. 
42 FolIowing the words, not their meanings (In Analyticorum Priorum, 373.29-30); 
espousing the hypothetical syllogism (ibid., 262.28-29); using the words adiaphora and 
proegmena (In Aristotelis Topicorum Libros Octo Commentarium (ed. by M. Wallies), 
Berlin 1891, 211.9-10). 
43 Attributed to the neoteroi by Alexander, In Analyticorum Priorum, 17.11-12. 
44 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VIII.443, in Opera n (ed. by H. Mutsch-
mann and J. Mau), Leipzig 1914. Alexander associates the one-premissed arguments 
with 'those about Antipater' (In Topicorum, 8.16-19). Other relevant passages are col-
lected in C. Prant!, Geschichte der Logik im Abendiande, Leipzig 1855, I, 477-478. 
45 Alexander, In Analyticorum Priorum, 19.4-6, 262.9, 263.31-32, 324.17-18. 
46 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, VII.76. 
47 In Topicorum, 539.18. 
48 Vitae Philosophorum, VII.191. 
49 Vitae Philosophorum, VII.79-81; Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, 
VIlI.223-226; Galen, Institutio, V1.6. 
60 In Analyticorum Priorum, 164.30-31, 278.6-14. At 284.13-17 Alexander ascribes to 
hoi apo tes Stoas the second, third, and fourth themata. On the themata, see O. Becker, 
Ober die vier Themata des stoischen Logik, in Zwei Untersuchungen zur antiken Logik, 
Klassisch-philologische Studien xvn (1957), 27-49. 
51 Explicit attribution of these three arguments to the neoteroi is found at In Ana-
ylticorumPriorum, 164.28-30. The examples of the fust two are taken from Alexander's 
commentary on the Topics, 10.8-12. Nothing is known about the infinite matter argu-
ment. For a guess as to its character, see O. Becker, Ober die vier Themata, 38. 
52 In Analyticorum Priorum, 84.12-15. 
53 Ascribed by Alexander to the neoteroi (In Analyticorum Priorum, 22.18; 345.13), but 
elsewhere simply to the Stoics. However, these arguments are discussed in dose con-
junction with the one-premissed arguments at 21.10-23.2, the source of the example 
in the text. This example and others are discussed below, p. 27ff. 
54 In Analytica Priora, 245.24-246.32. 
55 In Primum Elementorum, 256.1-8. 
56 In Analyticorum Priorum, 22.3-7. 
57 In AnalyticorumPriorum, 22.17-19. 
58 Institutio, XVII.7. Alexander takes the same approach (In Analyticorum Priorum, 
344.9-345.12). 
59 Institutio, XIX.6. 
60 Institutio, XVIII.8. 
61 Institutio, XVI.1. 
62 In Analyticorum Priorum, 344.23-27. 
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63 Institutio, XVI.5. 
64 Institutio, XVI.10-11. The argument in question is of the form 'a is the son (father) 
of b; therefore b is the father (son) of a'. The conditional premiss to be added is, of 
course, 'If a is the son (father) of b, then b is the father (son) of a'. The categorical 
premiss is unfortunately lacking in the manuscript. 
65 Alexander's and Galen's discussions would seem to presuppose this. See especiaIly 
Alexander, In Analyticorum Priorum, 68.21-69.1; 345.13-346.6. 
66 In his article 'Posidonius d'Apamee, theoricien de la geometrie', Revue des etudes 
grecques XXVII (1914), 44-45 (reprinted in Etudes de philosophie antique), E. Brehier 
argues that Posidonius was the first (and also the last) Stoic with a "theory of the logic 
of geometry". 
67 See, for example, Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, VII.65. Other references 
are given in Mates, Stoic Logie, pp. 132-133. 
68 See the passages in H. Bonitz, 'Index Aristotelicus', in Aristotelis Opera (ed. by 
I. Bekker), Berlin 1831-70, V, 70b4-13. 
69 According to Cicero's Academica, I.xii.46 (ed. by O. Plasberg), Leipzig 1922, Zeno 
attended lectures by the skeptie Carneades and admired him very mueh. 
70 G. VIastos, 'Zeno of Sidon as a Critie of Euclid', in The Classical Tradition (ed. by 
L. Wallaeh), Ithaca, N.Y., 1966, pp. 154-155. 
71 Proclus, In Primum Elementorum, 199.11-200.1. 
72 In Primum Elementorum, 200.1-3. 
73 In Primum Elementorum, 214.15-218.11. I shall diseuss the detaiIs of this passage in 
another paper. 
74 In Primum Elementorum, 277.25-279.11. 
75 W. Cronert, Kolotes und Menedemos, Studien zur Palaeographie undPapyruskunde VI 
(1906), 109. 
76 This is a very eommon ancient eriticism of the first anapodeiktos. See, for example, 
Sextus Empirieus, Adversus Mathematieos, VIII.440-442. 
77 See Proclus, In Primum Elementorum, 193.10-198.15. 
78 In Primum Elementorum, 196.15-18. 
79 O. Neugebauer, tJber eine Methode zur Distanzbestimmung Alexandria-Rom hei 
Heron, Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab XXVI (1938),21-24. 
80 See. K Tittel, De Gemini Stoiei Studiis Mathematicis Quaestiones Philologae, Leipzig 
1895. Brehier('Posidonius d'Apamee', pp. 46-49) thinks that Geminus's work on math-
ematies is derived entirely from Posidonius. 
81 See E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, 
Leipzig, 5th ed., 1923, pt. 3, sec. 2, pp. 642-645. The same material is found in E. Zeller, 
A History o/ Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy (transl. by S. F. Alleyne), London 1883, 
pp. 113-117. The importance of the reawakening ofinterest in AristotIe's work for the 
history of logic is stressed by J. Mau, 'Stoisehe Logik', Hermes LXXXV (1957),147-158. 
The historicaI reeonstruetion of the present paper seems to provide support for Mau's 
views. 
JOHN MULHERN 
MODERN NOTATIONS AND ANCIENT LOGIC 
To what extent does ancient logic admit of accurate interpretation in 
modern terms? Blanche [3] and Durr [14] published general surveys of 
research on ancient logic in the mid-1950's. My aim in the present paper 
is to identify studies made available duringthe quarter-century 1945-1970 
that illustrate the influence modern notations have had on our under-
standing of ancient logical texts. Accepting Bochenski's division of 
ancient logic into four temporally distinct stages, I mention research on 
the Prearistotelian, Aristotelian, Stoic and Commentatorial logics in 
Sections 1-4. In Section 5, I offer some generalizations on the utility of 
modern notations in writing the history of ancient logic. 
1. PREARISTOTELIAN LOGI C 
Of the four stages of Greek logic, the Prearistotelian, which goes back 
perhaps as far as Parmenides (sixth century, B.C.) or beyond, has received 
least attention during the quarter-century of this study. The sources for 
Prearistotelian 10gic - the Presocratic fragments and the dialogues of 
Plato - contain many arguments that exemplify argument schemata but 
none of the schemata themselves. Bochenski wrote in 1951 ([4], p. 15), 
"we know of no correct logical principle stated and examined for its own 
sake before Aristotle"; and he gave no example of even an incorrect 
logical principle stated and examined at this stage. Where there are no 
principles stated in the naturallanguage of the text, there are none to be 
transcribed directly into a modern notation. Accordingly, historians of 
logic have had to settle for discovering and recording the logical prin-
ciples exemplified by philosophical arguments stated in the natural lan-
guage materials of this first stage. 
While little work of this sort has been done with the Presocratic frag-
ments, some inroads have been made on the dialogues ofPlato (427-347). 
In 1945, Durr [13], 'Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik', made 
extensive use of modern notations to clarify the argument of parts of 
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Plato's Sophist. A year later, Beth [2] summarized the results of his partly 
transeriptional analyses of the Theory of Ideas and the Theory of Ideal 
Numbers, along with similar analyses of Presoeratie logie, Aristotelian 
logie, and Stoic logic. Then, in 1951, Boehenski [4] east doubts on the 
enterprise of Diirr, Beth, and the like by stating flatly of Plato: "Correet 
logie we find none in his work". 
Boehenski had transeribed what he eonsidered a flagrant example of the 
intolerable goings-on in the dialogues - the false prineiple r Sap::::J Sal', 
exemplified in Gorgias 507A - as evidenee for his view. Sprague [31] 
pointed out in 1962, however, that the text in question needn't be trans-
eribed as Boehenski had transeribed it, that otherwise transeribed it 
exemplified a true prineiple, that similar but true principles were exem-
plified elsewhere in the Platonic writings, and that the principle's being 
false, if false it was, might be aeeounted for by the literary form of the 
dialogue as well as by the logieal ineptitude of its author: an author of 
dramatic literature need not be held responsibie for the logical deficiencies 
of his mixed bag of eharaeters. To Sprague belongs the eredit for dis-
tinguishing intelleetual biography from history of logie and for showing 
that the clear and unmistakable exemplifieation of a false logieal prineiple 
in a dialogue, if it is supposed de1iberate, may well interest the histo-
rian of logic just as much as would the exemplifieation of a true prin-
eiple. 
Since 1954, many seholarly papers have been written that eall attention 
to a false metalogical principle - a violation of type ruIes - in Plato's 
Parmenides. A bibliography of the literature is given in VIastos [35]. One 
seholar writes of this as "a still-rising flood of literature, intended to 
c1arify Plato's text but tending to wheIm it with the symbols of modem 
logie" ([8], p. 369). Aetually, the use of modem notations in these papers 
is eomparatively modest, aIthough it is fair to say that the controversy 
over the Parmenides has given eurreney and respeetability to transerip-
tions of the logical material that one finds in this and other dialogues. In 
1955, this vioIation of type ruIes was eonsidered systematically in Wedberg 
[37], Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics, whieh used some importations 
from formal language to reeonstruet the Theory ofIdeas and the Platonie 
philosophies of geometry and arithmetie. 
Readers of this literature are not agreed that the Platonie writings 
eontain any interesting 10gieaI doetrines. Some, sueh as VIastos, find at 
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crucial points only a "record of honest perplexity" where arguments in 
the dialogues seem to go astray ([36], p. 254); others suggest "it is a work 
of Plato's genius that some of the problems he confronted are closely 
related to current problems in logical theory" (Van Fraassen [34], p. 498). 
My own judgment is that both true and untrue logical principles are 
exemplified in the dialogues and that the treatment of syntactical and 
semantical problems in the dialogues is almost always instructive. The 
literary form of the dialogues allows the historian of logic neither to 
affirm nor to deny that the author of the dialogues subscribed to this or 
that logical doetrine ; but it does not prevent his affirming that Plato was 
acquainted with a variety of metalogical doctrines and that he knew how 
to perform numerous interesting logical operations (ef. [25]). 
2. ARISTOTELIAN LOGI C 
The basic assumptions that governed early postwar research on Aris-
totelian logic are traceable to prewar works by Lukasiewicz (notably [19] 
and [20]). Lukasiewicz supposed that there were two quite distinct ancient 
systems of logic, the Aristotelian and the Stoic, and that these systems 
differed from one another in that only term variables occurred in Aris-
totelian syllogisms while only propositional variables occurred in Stoic 
syllogisrns. In drawing this distinction, Lukasiewicz was attributing to 
AristotIe (384-322) exactly those analytical syllogisms that belong to the 
traditional four figures, counting in the non-Aristotelian fourth figure 
syllogisms while excluding all the other logical material that Aristotle's 
definition of syllogism (An. Pr. 24b18-22; Top. lOOa25-27) provides for. 
Lukasiewicz adapted the A, E, I, and O of the mediaeval syllogistic 
mnemonics for use as a functorial notation with term variables to re-
present antecedent and consequent sentences. This notation he supple-
mented with the truth-functional prefixes 'K' and 'C', the latter taking the 
place of the Greek expression si, English 'if', which commonly occurs at 
the beginning of Aristotle's syllogisrns. Rendering si by 'C' was tanta-
mount to embracing the view that Aristotle's analyticai syllogisms were 
implicational rather than inferential. It was a short step from this to 
distributing the moods of syllogistic - construed as logical theses -
among axioms and theorems, and then using the former to derive the 
latter. Lukasiewicz took this step directly. 
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By using this functorial notation for syllogistic antecedent and con-
sequent sentences instead of a quantificational notation with truth-
functors, and by leaving this notation unanalyzed, Lukasiewicz was able 
to keep the problems of existential import from arising in his transcription 
of syllogistic, even if at the cost of failing to provide any analysis of 
syllogistic sentence structure. Indeed, Lukasiewicz expressly rejected the 
use of quantifiers in representing syllogistic antecedent and consequent 
sentences, although he did settle on the universal quantifier as an ap-
propriate sign for indicating the necessity of syllogistic moods. 
In 1951, Lukasiewicz restated his prewar view of syllogistic in mono-
graphic form under the title AristotIe's Syllogistic from the Standpoint 
of Modern Formal Logic [18], adding to it certain historicai observations 
and a chapter on the problem of decision for assertoric analytical syllo-
gistic. 
The year of Lukasiewicz's monograph was the year also of Bochenski 
[4], Ancien! Formal Logic, which has been cited aiready. Bochenski 
surveyed not only the assertoric but also the modal analytical syllogistic, 
differing from Lukasiewicz in admitting quantifiers to the transcription 
of analytical syllogisms. Bochenski avoided the problems of existential 
import by letting the laws of subalternation hold and construing the 
term variables accordingly. 
In his treatment of Aristotle, Bochenski was building on his La logique 
de Theophraste [6] - a study completed before the war but not generally 
circulated until 1947. Here Bochenski had shown that the schema of 
Theophrastus' sentences KaTa n:p6crA:rI'JllV was expressible with quantifiers 
as 
CIIx4JxIIxt/lx ([6], p. 48). 
Subsequently he found that Aristotle's syllogisms also were susceptible 
of a quantificational transcription showing function and argument, and 
he cited An. Pr. 49b14 ff in this connection (he might have cited 32b25 ff 
as well). Once the analyticai syllogisms had been provided with a quan-
tificational transcription, it became plausible to regard Lukasiewicz's 
functorial notation as an abbreviation for a set of quantificational for-
mulae; Prior suggested four years later that the functorial notation be so 
regarded ([27], p. 121). 
The most distinctive feature of Bochenski's writing on Aristotelian 
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logic, however, was the concem it displayed for non-analytical formulae. 
As he wrote himself, 
Modem commentators of AristotIe were fascinated by the Aristotelian [sc. analytical] 
syJlogistics to an extent that they often overlooked the wealth of non-anaJyticaJ for-
mulae which the Organon contains ([4], p. 63; see also [7]). 
These included formulae belonging to the logic of clas ses, predicates, 
identity, and relations, as well as to propositional calculus. Bochenski 
ended his exposition of this material by remarking: "Further research 
would probably discover more non-analytical laws in the Organon, 
especiaIly in the Topics" ([4], p. 71). Bochenski used the famiIiar nota-
tions of the several parts of non-analytical logic, mainly those of Prin-
cipia Mathematica, for transcribing this material. 
Already in 1951, then, Bochenski had gone beyond the prewar view 
according to which only term variables occurred in Aristotelian syllogisms 
and these syllogisms themselves were object language impIications rather 
than inference schemata. In his Formale Logik [5], which appeared in 
1956, to be followed by an English translation [5e] in 1961, Bochenski 
presented an ordinary language transcription of the principal texts used 
for the history of ancient logic, supplemented by a bare minimum of 
special notation. 
Lukasiewicz added three chapters on AristotIe's modallogic to a second 
edition of Aristotle' s Syllogistic [18 2 ] in 1957. In the course ofthis exercise, 
Lukasiewicz broke with the concepts and notations of the older modem 
modallogic that Becker [1] had reIied on in his Aristotelian studies and 
other scholars had used afterward. Lukasiewicz believed that a satis-
factory modallogic would have to be four-valued, and that only a satis-
factory modallogic would suffice for understanding AristotIe. From the 
standpoint of his new four-valued modal logic (the C-n-8-p system), 
Lukasiewicz claimed to be able to "explain the difficulties and correct 
the errors of the Aristotelian modal syllogistic" ([18 2 ], p. v). His proce-
dure was to set up the system, transcribe Aristotle's modal syllogisms 
into its notation, and then see how the transcript compared to the system. 
Lukasiewicz's work was criticized and built upon in 1959 by Patzig 
[26] - five essays presented under the collective tide Die Aristotelische 
Syllogistik - which appeared in an English translation [26e] in 1968. 
Patzig picked up many points of detail in earlier historians that wanted 
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correction. His thematic, however, amounted to assigning to analyticai 
syllogistic the status of a special part of the logic of binary relations. He 
did not drop the A-E-I-O functorial notation in favor of the usual nota-
tion for relations, but rather construed the functorial notation as having 
to do with binary relations; and he supplemented this with notations 
drawn from the logic of predicates and classes. 
If we leave out of account W. and M. Kneale [17], The Development of 
Logic (1962), which avoids the use of modem notations for Aristotelian 
logic, the next important item to appear was McCall [24], AristotIe's 
Modal Syllogisms (1963). Unlike Lukasiewicz, McCall adopted an in-
tuitive approach to Aristotle's modallogic, working from the intuition to 
the formalism rather than the other way round. Rejecting Lukasiewicz's 
four-valued apparatus as well as the quantified modallogic of Becker [1] 
and the non-formal approach of Rescher [28], "Aristotle's Theory of 
Modal Syllogisms and Its Interpretation" (which was not published until 
1964), McCall presented a complicated axiom system of unquantified 
modallogic that was c1aimed to coincide exactly with Aristotle's intui-
tions about 'apodeictic' analyticai syllogisms and, to alesser extent, with 
his intuitions about 'contingent' syllogisms. 
Two years later, in 1965, the revival ofinterest in Aristotle's non-analy-
ticallogic was rewarded by the appearance of de Pater [11], Les Topiques 
d' Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne. This work consolidated a great 
deal of the research done on the Topica during the last hundred years and 
more. De Pater transcribed Aristotle's non-analytical formulae into an 
amalgam of ordinary language and logical notation, using sentence 
schemata with name and predicate variables. In order to reflect Aristotle's 
distinction of predicables from one another according to their logical 
features and powers, de Pater provided that, in his transcriptions, l/J should 
be replaced by the names ofproperties only, '" by the names of accidents, 
" by the names of differentiae, and D by the names of definitions. 
The last important monograph on Aristotle's logic in this quarter-
century was Rose [30], Aristotle' s Syllogistic. Rose followed an aside of 
Prior ([272 ], p. 116) in suggesting that Aristotle had formulated his 
assertoric analyticai syllogisms as inference schemata in the metalan-
guage rather than as laws in the object language. Accordingly, he denied 
that these syllogisms ought to be construed as implications. In denying 
this, Rose was not recommending a return to the four schemata of tradi-
MODERN NOT A TIONS AND ANCIENT LOGIC 77 
tional syllogistic as instruments for interpreting Aristotle; he was pro-
posing instead a return to Aristotle's own abbreviated capital letter 
variable notation, in which the capital letter variables have predicables 
as their substitution instances. Rose's Aristotelian notation had the 
advantage that it allowed for only three figures of analyticaI syllogisms 
rather than four and that it thus countered the view held by Bochenski, 
Lukasiewicz, and Ross that either Aristotle was wrong in finding only 
three figures or else he was wrong when he said he was dividing the figures 
according to the position of the middle term. 
In 1970 (cf. Corcoran [IOD 'A Mathematical Modelof Aristotle's Syl-
logistic' , argued against viewing the assertoric analyticaI syllogistic as an 
axiom system, in this respect introducing a major revision of the 
Lukasiewicz interpretation. According to Corcoran, Aristotle's syllogistic 
was concerned not merely with the validity of syllogistic arguments or the 
truth of syllogistic laws but also, even mainly, with the structure of 
syllogistic proofs, after the manner of a modern natural deduction system. 
Corcoran represented Aristotelian deductions first in ordinary language, 
sentence by sentence, and then in an abbreviatory notation using the four 
traditional functors (renamed A-N-S-$) with term variables. These de-
ductions were identical with the traditional reductions of imperfect to 
perfect syllogisrns. His result was a representation that showed the details 
of Aristotelian deductions in an obvious fashion. Corcoran did not 
conditionalize these deductions but left his premisses marked as as sump-
tions, thus avoiding the implicational interpretation of syllogistic. 
3. STOIC LOGIC 
The major achievements of modern research on Stoic logic are accessibIe 
in Mates [22] and W. and M. Kneale [17]. Among these have been the iden-
tification of inference schemata that belong to the modern propositional 
ca1culus. The Stoics distinguished five indemonstrable (ava1t60etK'tot) 
propositional inference schemata. These have been discussed by Mates 
and the Kneales, as have the theorems derived from them. Both Mates 
and the Kneales use modern notations to clarify the derivations of theo-
rems from the indemonstrables. 
According to these historians, the sort of implication one finds in the 
indemonstrables and in the theorems is material implication. This matter 
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appears to be settled. The Stoics, however, recognized other varieties of 
implication as well; and these other varieties of implication have been a 
problem for modern scholars. 
The prewar assumptions of Lukasiewicz concerning two ancient logics 
were as infiuential with historians of Stoic logic as with their Aristotelian 
counterparts. In 1934, Lukasiewicz [20] had assimilated Philonian impli-
cation to material implication, as apparently all scholars continue to 
do, and Diodorean implication to Lewis's strict implication. Other 
seholars, notably Hurst Kneale [16] and Chisholm [9], naturally followed 
this precedent, sinee there were no varieties of implication commonly 
known except material and strict for propositional calculus, and no 
notations for these implications commonly used except the three main 
ones (Peano-Russell, Hilbert, and Polish prefix) for material implication 
and the Lewis fishhook for striet implieation. Further clarifieation of 
Diodorean implication awaited further development in specialized logics 
and their notations. 
The first important breakthrough appeared in Mates [21], 'Diodorean 
Implication' (1949), later ineorporated into [22], Stoic Logic (1953). 
Diodorus, aecording to Mates, had held the view that "a conditional 
holds ... if and only if it holds at all times in the Philonian [i.e. material] 
sense" (ef. [22], p. 45). Expressing this required the invention of a tense 
operator that worked like a quantifier, and Mates settled on the following 
definition, in which '--+' represents Diodorean implieation: 
(F--+ G) == (t) (F(t):::J G(t)). 
Starting from this point, Prior and others began to reeonstrue temporal 
operators by analogy with modal operators, opening up interesting if 
eontroversial avenues of research both in the history of Stoic logic and 
in the contemporary logie of tense and modality. The development of 
research on Diodorean implication thus appears to exemplify a pattern 
of trial and error in transcription. This pattern is exemplified again in 
research on the logic of the commentators. 
4. COMMENT A TORlAL Lome 
Probably the most striking example of this pattern to occur in recent 
research on Commentatoriallogic, which, like research on Prearistotelian 
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logic, remains underdeveloped, is that concerning certain formulae in the 
De syllogismo hypothetico ofBoethius (480-524). Here the first important 
work was Durr [12], 'Aussagenlogik im Mittelalter' (1938). Durr, under 
the infiuence of Lukasiewicz, began by transcribing the Latin expressions 
'si', 'cum', and 'aut' into the prefix notation for propositional calculus. 
It turned out subsequently, however, that, in Diirr's transcription, several 
Boethian formulae were false. This situation was remedied when van den 
Driessche [33], 'Le De syllogismo hypothetico de Boece' (1949), showed 
that a uniform transcription of these Latin expressions each by a single 
truth-functor was mistaken, and that Boethius had intended by 'si' 
sometimes 'C' (for implication) and sometimes 'E' (for equivalence), 
by 'cum' sometimes 'C' and sometimes 'K' (for conjunction), and by 
'aut' sometimes, but not always, 'A' (for non-exc1usive alternation) (cf. 
Mates [23]). Durr subsequently published a monograph on Boethius 
[15] which he had written before the war. 
Two other figures ofthis last stage ofancient logic - Apuleius (125-171) 
and Galen (129-199) - have been the subject of recent monographs. 
According to the thorough researches of Sullivan [32], Apuleius now 
appears to have exercised a much greater infiuence on early mediaeval 
logic than was recognized formerly, either in the original or through the 
excerpts of Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, and Isidore of Seville. 
Sullivan presents Apuleius' syllogistic as a system of conditionalized laws 
of inference; sentence schemata that occur in the conditionals are stated 
in the traditional notation of term variables with mnemonic letters. 
The rules on which Apuleius is supposed to have based his syllogistic 
reductions are transcribed as rules of propositional calculus. Whereas 
Sullivan has made extensive use of modem notations, however, Rescher 
[29] has not had occasion to make use of them in his discussion of Galen. 
5. GENERALIZA TIONS 
At the beginning ofthis paper, I asked to what extent ancient logic admits 
of accurate interpretation in modem terms. While no final answer to this 
question will be available until research in the field has gone a good deal 
further than it has so far, still the progress since 1945 has been remarkable, 
and it is not too early to consider its causes. 
In his history of the history of logic, Bochenski wrote as follows: 
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The rise of modern history of logic concerning all periods save the mathematical was 
made possibie by the work of historians of philosophy and philologists in the 19th 
century. These published for the first time a series of correct texts edited with reference 
to their context in the history of literature. But the majority of ancient philologists, 
medievalists and Sanskrit scholars had only slight understanding of and litde interest 
in formallogie. History of logic could not be established on the sole basis of their great 
and laborious work. 
For its appearance we have to thank the faet that formallogie took on a new lease 
of life and was reborn as mathematica!. Nearly all the more recent researches in this 
history were carried out by mathematical logicians or by historians trained in mathe-
maticallogic. ([5e], pp. 9-10.) 
The trained researchers who have worked on the ancient materials have 
had to do much more than merely transcribe into modern notations 
logical treatises originally written in ancient natural languages. Just 
finding suitable transcriptions has had to wait on considerable analysis of 
the ancient texts. Transcription into modern notations presupposes some 
community of understanding and purpose with the andent logicians, and 
this community is something that needs to be argued for. In general, a 
department of ancient logic lends itself to being dealt with in notation if 
and only if its corresponding department of modern logic lends itself to 
being dealt with in notation. Logistic systems and their interpretations 
lend themselves to this to a great extent, theoreticai syntax and especiaIly 
semantics to a much les ser extent. Where a modern notation foIlows or 
reproduces or elucidates the logical form of asentenee or inferenee or 
sehema that interests an ancient logieian, then its use is in order. The 
studies diseussed in Seetions 1-4 of this paper point to the conclusion that 
the judicious use of modern notations has been one eause of progress - over 
the last two deeades and a half - in our understanding of ancient logic. 
Bryn M awr College 
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PART THREE 
ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC 
JOHN CORCORAN 
ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 
Here and elsewhere we shalI not obtain the 
best insight into things untiI we actually 
see them growing from the beginning. 
AristotIe 
In the present article we attempt to show that Aristotie's syllogistic is an 
underlying logie which includes a natural deductive system and that it is 
not an axiomatic theoryas had previously been thought. We construct 
a mathematical model which reflects certain structural aspects of 
Aristotle's logic and we examine both the mathematical properties of the 
model and the relation of the model to the system of logic envisaged in 
certain scattered parts of Prior and Posterior Ana/ytjes. 
Our interpretation restores Aristotle's reputation as a logician of 
consummate imagination and skill. Several attributions of shortcomings 
and logical errors to Aristotle are shown to be without merit. Aristotle's 
logic is found to be self-sufficient in several senses. In the :fint place, his 
theory of deduction is logicaIly sound in every detail. (His indirect de-
ductions have been criticized, but incorrectly on our account.) In the 
second place, Aristotle's logic presupposes no other logical concepts, not 
even those of propositionallogic. In the third place, the Aristotelian sys-
tem is seen to be complete in the sense that every valid argument expres-
sible in his system admits of a deduction within his deductive system; 
i.e., every semantically valid argument is deducible. 
There are six sections in this article. The :fint section includes method-
ological remarks, a preliminary survey of the present interpretation and 
a discussion of the differences between our interpretation and that of 
Lukasiewicz. The next three sections develop the three parts of the mathe-
matical model. The fifth section deals with general properties ofthe model 
and its relation to the Aristotelian system. The final section contains 
conclusions. 
J. Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and Its Modem Interpretations, 85-131. All Rights Reserved 
Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland 
86 JOHN CORCORAN 
1. PRELIMINARIES 
1.1. M athematical Logics 
Logicians are beginning to view mathematicallogic as a branch of ap-
plied mathematics which constructs and studies mathematical models in 
order to gain understanding of logical phenomena. From this standpoint 
mathematicallogics are comparable to the mathematical models of solar 
systems, vibrating strings, or atoms in mathematicai physics and to the 
mathematical models of computers in automata theory 1 (cf. Kreisel, . 
p. 204). Thus one thinks of mathematicallogics as mathematical models 
of real or idealized logical systems. 
In the most common case a mathematicallogic can be thought of as a 
mathematical model composed of three interrelated parts: a 'language', a 
'deductive system' and a 'semantics'. The language is a syntactica1 system 
often designed to reflect what has been called the logical form of proposi-
tions (cf. Church, pp. 2, 3). The elements of the language are called sen-
tences. The deductive system, another syntactical system, contains ele-
ments sometimes called formal proofs or formal deductions. These 
elements usually involve sequences of sentences constructed in accord 
with syntactical rules themselves designed to reflect actual or idealized 
principles of reasoning (cf. Church, pp. 49-54). Finally, the semantics is 
usually a set-theoretic structure intended to model certain aspects of 
meaning (cf. Church, pp. 54ft), e.g., how denotations attach to noun 
phrases and how truth-values attach to sentences. 2 
Many theories of logic involve a theory of propositional forms, a 
theory of deductive reasoning and a theory of meaning (cf. Church, pp. 1, 
3, 23). Such theories are intended to account for logical phenomena relat-
ing to a natural language or to an ideal language perhaps alleged to 
underlie natural language, or even to an artificial language proposed as a 
substitute for natural language. In any case, it is often possibie to construct 
a mathematicai model which reflects many of the structural aspects of 
'the system' envisaged in the theory. Once a mathematical logic has been 
constructed, it is possibie to ask definite, well-defined questions concerning 
how well, or to what degree and in what respects, the model reflects the 
structure of 'the system' envisaged by the theory. Such activity usually 
contributes toward the clarification of the theory in question. Indeed any 
attempt to construct such a model necessarily involves an organized and 
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detailed study of the theory and often raises questions not considered by 
the author of the theory. 
1.1.1. Underlying logies. Because some articulations of the ab ove view-
point admit of certain misunderstandings, a few further comments may be 
in order. Consider a deductive science such as geometry. We may imagine 
that geometry presupposes its own subject matter which gives rise to its 
own laws, some of which are taken without deductive justification. In 
addition, geometry presupposes a geometrical language. The activity of 
deductively justifying some laws on the basis of others further presupposes 
a system of demonstrative discourses (the deductions). The activity of 
establishing by means of reinterpretations of the language of geometry 
that certain geometrical statements are independent of others further 
presupposes a system of reinterpretations of the language. The last three 
presupposed systems taken together from the underlying logic (cf. Church, 
p. 58, 317; Tarski, p. 297) of geometry. 
Although the underlying logic is not a science it ean be the subject 
matter of a scientific investigation. Of course, there is much more to be 
said about this approach to the study of deductive sciences, but what has 
been said should be sufficient to enable the reader to see that there is a 
clear distinction to be made between logic as a scientific study of underly-
ing logics on one hand, and the underlying logic of a science on the other. 
It is roughly the difference between zoology and fishes. A science has an 
underlying logic which is treated scientifically by the subject called logic. 
Logic, then, is a science (in our sense, not Aristotle's), but an underlying 
logic of a science (Aristotle's sense) is not a science; rather it is a complex, 
abstract system presupposed by a science. Some of the possibility for 
confusion could be eliminated by using the term 'science' in Aristotle's 
sense and the term 'metascience' to indicate activities sueh as logic. Then 
we eould say that a science presupposes an underlying logie which is then 
studied in a metascienee, viz. logic. 
It is unfortunate that in a previous article (Coreoran, 'Theories') I 
spoke of the 'science of logic' for what I should have terrned 'the meta-
science, logic' or 'the science of logics'. That unfortunate usage, among 
other things, brought about Mary Mulhern's justified eriticism (ef. her 
paper below) to the effect that lam myself guilty ofblurring adistinetion 
which I take to be crucial to understanding Aristotle's logic (metascience). 
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Readers of Mulhern's article should be advised that the present para-
graphs were added as a resuIt of Mulhern's remarks, which are still im-
portant and interesting but, hopefuIly, no longer applicable to me. 
1.2. The Data 
In the present paper we consider only Aristotle's theory of non-modal 
logic, which has been caIIed 'the theory of the assertoric syIlogism' and 
'Aristotle's syllogistic'. Aristotle presents the theory almost completely 
in Chapters l, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the first book of Prior Analytics, aIthough 
it presupposes certain developments in previous works - especiaIly the 
folIowing two: first, a theory of form and meaning of propositions having 
an essential component in Categories (Chapter 5, esp. 2a34-2b7); second, 
a doctrine of opposition (contradiction) more fully explained in Inter-
pretations (Chapter 7, and cf. Ross, p. 3). Bochenski has called this theory 
'Aristotle's second logic' because it was evidently developed after the 
relatively immature logic of Topics and Sophistical Refutations, but before 
the theory of modal logic appearing mainly in Chapters 3 and 8-22 of 
Prior Analytics I. an the basis of our own investigations we have come to 
accept the essential correctness of Bochenski's chronology and classifica-
tion of the Organon (Bochenski, p. 43; Lukasiewicz, p. 133; Tredennick, 
p. 185). 
Although the theory is rather succinetly stated and developed (in five 
short chapters), the system of logic envisaged by it is discussed at some 
length and detail throughout the first bo ok of Prior Analytics (esp. 
Chapters 7, 23-30, 42 and 45) and it is presupposed (or applied) in the 
fust bo ok of Posterior Analytics. Book II of Prior Analyties is not relevant 
to this study. 
1.3. Theories of Deduetion Distinguished From Axiomatie Sciences 
We agree with Ross (p. 6), Scholz (p. 3) and many others that the theory 
of the categoricai syIIogisms is a logical theory concerned in part with 
deductive reasoning (as this term is normally understood). Because a 
recent chaIIenge to this view has gained wide popularity (Lukasiewicz, 
Preface to 2nd ed.) a short discussion of the differences between a theory 
of deduction (whether natural or axiomatic) and an axiomatic science is 
necessary. 
A theory of deduction puts forth a number of principles (logi cal axioms 
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and rules of inferences) which describe deductions of conclusions from 
premises. All principles of a theory of deduction are necessarily metalin-
guistic - they concern constructions involving object language sentences 
and, as was said above, a theory of deduction is one part of a theory of 
logic (which deals with grammar and meaning as well). Theories of deduc-
tion (and, of course, deductive systems) have been classified as 'natural' 
or 'axiomatic' by means of a loose criterion based on the prominence of 
logical axioms as opposed to rules - the more rules the more natural, the 
more axioms the more axiomatic. On one extreme we find the so-called 
Jaskowski-type systems which have no logical axioms and which are 
therefore most properly called 'natural'. On the other extreme there are 
the so-called Hilbert-type systems which employ infinitely many axioms 
though only one rule and which are most properly called 'axiomatic'. 
The reason for the choice of the term 'natural' may be attributed to the 
fact that our normal reasoning seems better represented by a system in 
which rules predominate, whereas axiomatic systems of deduction seem 
contrived in comparison (cf. Corcoran, 'Theories' , pp. 162-171). 
A science, on the other hand, deals not with reasoning (actual or 
idealized) but with a certain universe or domain of objects insofar as 
certain properties and relations are involved. For example, arithmetic 
deals with the universe of numbers in regard to certain properties (odd, 
even, prime, perfect, etc.) and relations (less than, greater than, divides, 
etc.). Aristotle was clear about this (Posterior Analytics I, 10, 28) and 
modern efforts have not obscured his insights (Church, pp. 57,317-341). 
The laws of a science are all stated in the object language whose non-
logical constants are interpreted as indicating the required properties and 
relations and whose variables are interpreted as referring to objects in the 
universe of discourse. From the axioms of a science other laws of the 
science are deduced by logical reasoning. Thus an axiomatic science, 
though not itself a logical system, presupposes a logical system for its 
deductions (cf. Church, pp. 57, 317). The logic which is presupposed by a 
given science is called the under/ying logic of the science (cf. Church, 
p. 58 and Tarski, p. 297). 
It has been traditional procedure in the presentation of an axiomatic 
science to leave the underlying logic implicit. For example, neither in 
Euclid's geometry nor in Hilbert's does one find any codification of the 
logical rules used in the deduction of the theorems from the axioms and 
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definitions. It is also worth noting that even Peano's axiomatization of 
arithmetic and Zermelo's axiomatization of set theory were both presented 
originally without expIicit description of the underlying logic (cf. Church, 
p. 57). The need to be explicit concerning the underlying logic developed 
late in modern logic. 
1.4. Preliminary Discussion of the Present Interpretation 
We hold that in the above-mentioned chapters of Prior Analytics, AristotIe 
developed a logical theory which included a theory of deduction for de-
ducing categoricaI conclusions from categoricaI premises. We further 
hold that AristotIe treated the logic thus developed as the underlying logic 
of the axiomatic sciences discussed in the first book of Posterior Analytics. 
The relation of the relevant parts of Prior Analytics to the first book of 
Posterior Analytics is largely the same as the relation of Church's Chapter 
4, where first order logic is developed, to the part of Chapter 5 where the 
axiomatic science of arithmetic is developed with the preceding as its 
underlying logic. This interpretation properly includes the traditional view 
(cf. Ross, p. 6 and Scholz, p. 3) which is supported by reference to the 
Analytics as a whole as well as to crucial passages in the Prior Analy/ics 
where AristotIe teIIs what he is doing (Prior Analytics I, 1; and cf. Ross, 
p. 2). In these passages AristotIe gives very general definitions - in fact, 
definitions which seem to have more generality than he ever uses (cf. Ross, 
p.35). 
In this article the term syllogism is not restricted to arguments having 
only two premises. Indeed, were this the case, either here or throughout 
the Aristotelian corpus, the whole discussion would amount to an elabor-
ate triviality. Barnes (q. v.) has argued that at least two premises are 
required. Additional reasons are available. That Aristotle did not so 
restriet his usage throughout is suggested by the form of his definition of 
sylIogism (24bI9-21), by his statement that every demonstration is a 
sylIogism (25b27-31; cf. 71 b17, 72b28, 85b23), by the content of Chap-
ter 23 of Prior Analytics I and by several other circumstances to be 
mentioned below. Unmistakable evidence that AristotIe appIied the term 
in cases of more than two premises is found in Prior Analytics 1,23 (esp. 
41al7) and in Prior Analytics II, 17, 18 and 19 (esp. 65b17, 66a18 and 
66b2). However, it is equalIy clear that in many places AristotIe does 
restriet the term to the two-premise case. It may be possibie to explain 
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AristotIe's emphasis on two-premise syllogisms by reference to his 
discovery (Prior Ana/y tics I, 23) that if all two-premise syllogisms are 
deducible in his system then all syllogisms without restrietion are 
so deducible. As mentioned above, in this article the term has the more 
general sen se. Thus 'sorites' are syllogisms (but, of course, enthymemes 
are not). 
The Ana/ylies as a whole forms a treatise on scientific knowledge (24a, 
2Sb28-31). an AristotIe's view every item of scientific knowledge is either 
known in itself by experience (or some other non-deductive method) or 
else deduced from items known in themselves (Posterior Ana/y tics, passim, 
esp. II, 19). The Posterior Analytics deals with the acquisition and deduc-
tive organization of scientific knowledge. It is the earliest general treatise 
on the axiomatic method 3 in sciences. The Prior Ana/y tics, on the other 
hand, develops the underlying logic used in the inference of deductively 
known scientific propositions from those known in themselves ; but the 
logic of the Prior Ana/y ties is not designe d solely for sueh use (cf., e.g., 
53b4-1 l ; Kneale and Kneale, p. 24). 
According to Aristotle's view, once the first principles have been dis-
covered, all subsequent knowledge is gained by means of 'demonstrative 
syllogisms', syllogisms having antecedently known premises, and it is only 
demonstrative syllogisms which lead to 'new' knowledge (Posterior 
Ana/y tics I, 2). af course, the knowledge thus gained is in a sense not 
'new' because it is already implicit in the premises (Posterior Ana/y tics 1,1). 
According to more recent terminology (cf. Mates, E/ementary Logic, 
p. 3) a premise-eonclusion argument (P-e argument) is simply a set of 
sentences called the premises together with a single sentence called the 
eonclusion. af course the conclusion need not follow from the premises, 
if it does then the argument is said to be valid. If the conclusion does not 
follow, the argument is invalid. It is obvious that even a valid argument 
with known premises do es not prove anything - one is not expected to 
come to know the conclusion by reading the argument because there is no 
reasoning expressed in a P-e argument. For example, take the premises 
to be the axioms and definitions in geometry and take the conclusion to 
be any complicated theorem which actually follows. Such a valid argu-
ment, far from demonstrating anything, is the very kind of thing which 
needs 'demonstrating'. In 'demonstrating' the validity of an argument one 
adds more sentences until one has construeted a ehain of reasoning pro-
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ceeding from the premises and ending with the conclusion. The result of such 
a construction is called a deductive argument (premises, conclusion, plus 
a chain of reasoning) or, more briefty, a deduction. If the reasoning in a 
deduction actually shows that the conclusion follows from the premises 
the deduction is said to be sound; otherwise unsound. Given this terminol-
ogy we ean say that by perfect syllogism Aristotle meant precisely what we 
mean by sound deduction and that Aristotle understood the term syl-
logism to include both valid P-c arguments and sound deductions 4 (cf. 
24bI9-32). For Aristotle an invalid premise-conclusion argument is not 
a syllogism at all (cf. Rose, pp. 27-28). In an imperfect syllogism the 
conclusion follows, but it is not evident that it does. An imperfect syl-
logism is 'potentially perfect' (27a2, 28a16, 41 b33, and Patzig, p. 46) and 
it is made perfect by adding more propositions which express a chain of 
reasoning from the premises to the conclusion (24b22-25, 28al-1O, 29a15, 
passim). Thus a demonstrative syllogism for Aristotle is a sound deduction 
with antecedently known premises (71b9-24, 72a5, passim). 
That 'a demonstrative syllogism', for Aristotle, is not simply a valid 
P-c argument with appropriately known premises is aiready obvious from 
his view that such syllogisms are produetive of knowledge and conviction 
(73a21; Ross, pp. 508, 517; also cf. Chureh, p. 53). Afortiori, a syllogism 
cannot be a single sentence of a certain kind, as other interpreters have 
suggested (see below; ef. Coreoran, 'Aristotelian Syllogisrns' and cf. 
Smiley). 
Aristotle is quite clear throughout that treatment of seientific knowledge 
presupposes a treatment of syllogisms (in partieular, of perfeet syllogisms). 
In order to be able to produee demonstrative syllogisms one must be able 
to reason deduetively, i.e., to produce perfect syllogisms. Demonstration 
is a kind of syllogism but not vice versa (25b26-31, 71 b22-24). Aeeording 
to our view outlined above, Aristotle's syllogistie includes a theory of 
deduction whieh, in his terminology, is nothing more than a theory of 
perfeeting syllogisms. More speeifically and in more modem parlanee, 
Aristotle's syllogistie includes a natural deduction system by means of 
which eategorical conclusions are deduced from eategorieal premises. 
The system countenances two types of deductions (direct and indirect) 
and, exeept for 'eonversions', each applieation of a rule of inference is 
(literally) a first figure syllogism. Moreover, as wiIl be clear below, 
Aristotle' s theory of deduction is fundamental in the sense that it pre-
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supposes no other logic, not even propositional logic. 5 It also turns out 
that the Aristotelian system (cf. Section 5 be1ow) is complete in the sense 
that every valid P-c argument composed of categoricai sentences can be 
'demonstrated' to be valid by means of a formal deduction in the system. 
In Aristotelian terminology this means that every imperfect syllogism ean 
be perfected by Aristotelian methods. 
As will become clear below in Section 4, our interpretation is able to 
account for the correctness of certain Aristotelian doctrines which previ-
ous scholars have had to adjudge incorrect. For example, both 
Lukasiewicz (p. 57) and Patzig (p. 133) agree that Aristotle believed that 
all deductive reasoning is carried out by means of syllogisms, i.e., that 
imperfect syllogisms are perfected by means ofperfect syllogisms, but they 
als o hold that Aristotle was wrong in this belief (Lukasiewicz, p. 44; 
Patzig, pp. 135). Rose (p. 55) has wondered how one syllogism can be 
used to prove another but he did not make the mistake of disagreeing 
with Aristotle's view. Indeed, in the light of our own research one ean see 
that Rose was very close (p. 53) to answering his own question. We quote 
in part: 
We have seen how AristotIe establishes the validity of... imperfect [syllogisms] ... This 
amounts to presenting an extended argument with the premises of the imperfect 
[syllogism] ... as ... premises ... using several intermediate steps, ... finally reaching as 
the ultimate conc1usion the conc1usion of the imperfect [syllogism] ... being established. 
A natural reaction ... is to think of the first figure [syllogisms] ... as axioms and the 
imperfect [syllogisms] ... as theorems and to ask to what extent Aristotle is dealing 
with a formal deductive system. 
This would be natural indeed to someone not concerned with formal 
'natural' deductive systems. To someone concerned with the latter, it 
would be natural to consider the first figure syllogisms as 'applications' of 
rules of inference, to consider the imperfect syllogisms as derived argu-
ments, and then to scrutinize Chapters 2 and 4 (Prior Analytics I) in 
search of parts needed to complete the specification of a natural deductive 
system. What Rose calls 'an extended argument' is simply a deduction or, 
in Aristotle's terms, a discourse got by perfecting an imperfect syllogism. 
Rose had aiready seen the relevance of pointing out (p. 10) that the term 
'syllogism' had been in common use in the sense of 'mathematical com-
putation'. One would not normally apply the term 'computation' to mere 
data-and-answer reported in the form of an equation, e.g. (330 + 1955 = 
=2285). The sine qua non of a computation would seem to be the inter-
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mediate steps, and one might be indined to call the mere data-plus-answer 
complex an 'imperfect computation' or a 'potential computation'. A 
'perfect' or 'completed' computation would then be the entire complex 
of data, answer and intermediate steps. At one point Patzig seems to 
have been doser to our view than Rose. We quote from Patzig (p. 135), 
who sometimes uses 'argument' for 'syllogism' . 
... the odd locution 'a potential argument' (synonymous with 'imperfect argument' ... ) 
which, as was shown, properly means 'a potentially per/ect argument' ... has no clear 
sense unless we assume that AristotIe intended to state a procedure by which 'actual' 
syllogisms could be produced from these 'potential' ones, i.e., actually evident syl-
logisms produced from potentially evident ones. 
Although Rose seems to have missed our view by failing to consider the 
possibility of a natural deduction system in AristotIe, Patzig was diverted 
in less subtle ways, as well. In the fint place Patzig uncritically accepted 
the false condusion of previous interpreters that all perfect syllogisms are 
in the first figure and thus arrives at the strange view that imperfect 
syllogisms are "as it were disguised first figure syllogisms" (loc. cit.). 
Secondly, and surprisingly, Patzig (p. 136) seems to be unaware of the 
distinction between a valid P-c argument and a sound deduction having 
the same premises and conc1usion. 
1.5. The Lukasiewicz View and Its Inadequacies 
In order to contrast our view with the Lukasiewicz view it is useful to 
represent categoricai statements with a notion which is mnemonic for 
readers of twentieth century English. 
Amd All m are d. 
Smd Some m is d. 
Nmd No m is d. 
$md Some m is not d. 
Lukasiewicz holds that Aristotle's theory of syllogistic is an axiomatic 
science which presupposes 'a theory of deduction' unknown to Aristotle 
(p. 14, 15, 49). The universe of the Lukasiewicz science is the c1ass of 
secondary substances (man, dog, animal, etc.) and the relevant relations 
are those indicated above by A, N, S, and $, i.e., the relations of inc1usion, 
disjointness, partial inc1usion and partial non-inc1usion respectively (pp. 
14-15). Accordingly, he understands Aristotle's schematic letters (alpha, 
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beta, gamma, mu, nu, xi, pi, rho and sigma) as variables ranging over the 
class of secondary substances and he takes A, N, S and $ as non-Iogical 
constants (ibid.). Some of the axioms of the Lukasiewicz science corre-
spond to Aristotelian syllogisms. But his axioms are single sentences (not 
arguments) and they are generalized with respect to the schematic letters 
(see Mates, op. cif., p. 178). For example, the argument scheme 
All Z are Y. 
All X are Z. 
So All X are Y. 
corresponds to the following sort ofaxiom in the Lukasiewicz system 
'v'xyz«Azy & Axz) => Axy). 
It should be noted, however, that Lukasiewicz does not use quantifiers 
in his reeonstruction of Aristotle's syllogistie (p. 83). Universal quantifi-
cation is nevertheless expressed in the theorems of the Lukasiewicz re-
eonstruction - it is expressed by means of 'free variables', as ean be 
verified by notieing the 'Rule ofSubstitution' that Lukasiewicz uses (p. 88). 
Indeed, the deductive system of the underlying logic presupposed by 
Aristotle (aceording to Lukasiewicz) is more than a propositionallogic-
it is what today would be called a free variable logic, a logic which in-
volves truth-functions and universal quantification (expressed by free vari-
ables). Lukasiewicz refers to the deductive system ofthe underlying logic 
as 'the theory of deduction' and he sometimes seems to ignore the fact 
that a free variable logic is more than simply a propositionallogic. [Using 
propositionallogic alone one cannot derive Ayy from Axx (i.e., 'v'yAyy 
from 'v'xAxx) but in a free variable logic it is done in one step.] 
The Lukasiewicz view is ingenious and his book contains a wealth of 
useful scholarship. Indeed it is worth emphasizing that without his bo ok 
the present work could not have been done in even twice the time. Despite 
the value of the book, its viewpoint must be ineorrect for the following 
reasons. In the first place, as mentioned above, Lukasiewicz (p. 44) does 
not take seriously Aristotle's own claims that imperfect syllogisms are 
"proved by means of syllogisms" . Re even says that Aristotle was wrong 
in this claim. In the second place, he completely overlooks the many 
passages in which Aristotle speaks ofperfecting imperfect syllogisms (e.g., 
Prior Analytics, 27a17, 29a30, 29bl-2S). Lukasiewicz (p. 43) understands 
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'perfect syllogism' to indicate only the [valid] syllogisms in the first figure. 
This leads him to negleet the crucial faet that Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of Prior 
Ana/y tics deal with Aristotle's theory of deduction. Thirdly, Aristotle is 
clear in Posterior Ana/y tics (I, 10) about the nature ofaxiomatic sciences 
and he nowhere mentions syllogistic as a science (Ross, p. 24), but 
Lukasiewicz still wants to regard the syllogistic as such. (Lukasiewicz 
does seem uneasy (p. 44) about the faet that Aristotle does not call his 
basic syllogisms 'axioms'.) Indeed, as Scholz has aiready noticed (p. 6), 
Aristotle could not have regarded the syllogistic as a science because to 
do so he would have had to take the syllogistic as its own underlying 
logic. Again, were the Lukasiewicz system to be a science in Aristotle's 
terms then its universe of discourse would have to form a genus (e.g., 
Posterior Ana/y tics I, 28) - but Aristotle nowhere mentions the class of 
secondary substances as a genus. Indeed, on reading the tenth chapter of 
the Posterior Analytics one would expect that if the syllogistic were a 
science then its genus would be mentioned on the first page of Prior Ana-
[y tics. Not only does Aristotle fail to indicate the subject matter required 
by the Lukasiewicz view, he even indicates a different one - viz. demon-
stration - but not as a genus (Prior Ana/ytjes, first sentence).6 In the 
fourth place, if the syllogistic were an axiomatic science and A, N, S and 
$ were relational terms, as Lukasiewicz must have it, then awkward ques-
tions ensue: (a) Why are these not mentioned in Categories, Chapter 7, 
where relations are discussed? (b) Why did Aristotle not seek for axioms 
the simplest and most obvious of the propositions involving these rela-
tions, i.e., 'Everything is predicated of all of itself' and 'Everything is 
predicated of some of itself'? In faet Aristotle may have deIiberately 
avoided 'self-predication', although he surely knew of several reflexive 
relations (identity, equality, congruence). Lukasiewicz counts this as an 
oversight and adds the first ofthe ab ove self-predications as a 'new' axiom. 
In connection with the above questions we mayaIso note that the relations 
needed in the Lukasiewicz science are of a different 'logical type' than 
those considered by Aristotle in Categories - the former relate secondary 
substances whereas the latter relate primary substances, Fifth, if indeed 
Aristotle is axiomatizing a system of true relational sentences on a par 
with the system of true relational sentences which characterize the order-
ing ofthe numbers, as Lukasiewicz must and does claim (pp. 14, 15,73), 
then again awkward questions ensue: (a) Why is there no discussion 
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anywhere in the second logic of the general topic of relational sentences? 
(b) Why does Aristotle axiomatize only one such system? The 'theory 
of congruence' (equivalence relations) and the 'theory of the orde-
ring of numbers' (linear order) are obvious, similar systems and 
nowhere does Aristotle even hint at the analogies. Sixth, as Lukasiewicz 
himself implicitlY recognizes in a section called 'Theory of Deduction' 
(pp. 79-82), if the theory of syllogisms is understood as an axiomatic 
science then, as indicated above, it would presuppose an underlying logic 
(which Lukasiewicz supplies). But all indications in the Aristotelian corpus 
suggest not only that Aristotle regarded the theory of syllogistic as the 
most fundamental sort of reasoning (Kneale and Kneale, p. 44, and even 
Lukasiewicz, p. 57) but also that he regarded its logic as the underlying 
logic of all axiomatic sciences.7 Lukasiewicz himself says, "It seems that 
Aristotle did not suspect the existence of a system of logic besides his 
theory of the syllogism" (p. 49). Seventh, the view that syllogisms are 
sentences of a certain kind and not extended discourses is incompatible 
with Aristotle's occasional but essential reference to ostensive syllogisms 
and to per impossibile syllogisms (4Ia30-40, 45a23, 65b16, e.g.). These re-
ferences imply that some syllogisms have internat structure even over and 
above 'premises' and 'conclusion'. Finally, although Lukasiewicz gives 
a mathematicaIly precise system which obtains and rejects 'laws' corre-
sponding to those which Aristotle obtains and rejects, the Lukasiewicz 
system neither justifies nor accounts for the methods that Aristotle used. 
Our point is that the method is what Aristotle regarded as most impor-
tant. In this connection, Aristotle obtained metamathematical results 
using methods which are clearly accounted for by the present interpre-
tation but which must remain a mystery on the Lukasiewicz interpreta-
tion.s 
It will be seen that Aristotie's theory of deduction contains a self-
sufficient natural deduction system which presupposes no other logic. 
Perhaps the reason that Aristotle's theory of deduction has been over-
looked is that it differs radically from many of the 'standard' modem 
systems. It has no axioms, it involves no truth-functional combinations 
and it lacks both the explicit and implicit quantifiers (in the modem sense). 
1.6. The Importance of the Issue 
Universally absent from discussions of this issue is reference to why it 
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is important. My opinion is this: ifthe Lukasiewicz view is correct then 
Aristotle cannot be regarded as the founder of logic. AristotIe would 
merit this titIe no more than Euclid, Peano, or Zermelo insofar as these 
men are regarded as founders, respectively, ofaxiomatic geometry, axio-
matie arithmetic and axiomatic set theo ry. (AristotIe would be merely the 
founder of 'the axiomatic theory of universals'.) Each ofthe former three 
men set down an axiomatization of a body of information without ex-
plicitly developing the underlying logic. That is, each of these men put 
down axioms and regarded as theorems of the system the sentences ob-
tainable from the axioms by logical deductions but without bothering to 
say what a logical deduction is. Lukasiewicz is claiming that thi s is what 
Aristotle did. In my view, logic must begin with observations explicitly 
related to questions concerning the nature of an underlying logic. In short, 
Iogic must be explicitly concerned with deductive reasoning. 
II Lukasiewicz is correct then the Stoics were the genuine founders of 
logic. Of course, my view is that in the Prior Analytics Aristotle developed 
the underlying logic for the axiomatically organized sciences that he dis-
cussed in the Posterior Analytics and that he, therefore, is the founder of 
logic. 
2. THE LANGUAGE L 
In formulating a logic which is to serve as the underlying logic for severaI 
axiomatic science s it is standard to define a 'master language' which in-
volves: (1) punctuation, (2) finitely many logical constants, (3) infinitely 
many variables and (4) infinitely many non-Iogical constants or content 
words (cf. Church, p. 169). Any given axiomatic science will invoIve all 
of the logical constants and all of the variables, but onIy finitely many 
content words. The full infinite set of content words plays a role only in 
abstract theoreticaI considerations. In Aristotle there is no evidence of 
explicit consideration of a master language, aIthough theoreticaI consider-
ations involving infinitely many content words do occur in Posterior Ana-
ly tics (I, 19,20,21). It is worth noticing that there is no need to postulate 
object language variables for AristotIe's system. 
The vocabulary of the master language (L) involved in the present 
development of AristotIe's logic consists in the four logical constants (A, 
N, S and $) and an infinite set U of non-Iogical constants (Ul' U2' U3' •.• ). 
The latter play the roles of 'categoricaI terms'. The rule of formation 
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which defines 'sentence of L' is simply the folIowing : asentence of L is 
the result of attaching a logical constant to a string of two distinct non-
logical constants. Thus each sentence of L is one of the folIowing where 
x and y are distinct content words: Axy, Nxy, Sxy, $xy. 
It is to be emphasized that no sentence of L has two occurrences of the 
same content word (or non-Iogical constant). This means, in the above 
terminology, that the system eschews self-predication. Self-predication is 
here avoided because AristotIe avoids it in the system of the Prior Ana-
ly tics (so our model needs to do so for faithfulness) and also because, as 
J. Mulhern (pp. 111-115) has argued, AristotIe had theoreticai reasons 
for such avoidance. Thus, contrary to the Lukasiewicz interpretation 
(p. 45), AristotIe's 'omission of the laws of identity' (All X are X; Some 
X are X) need not be construed as an oversight. The textual situation is 
the folIowing : In the whole of the passages which contain the 'second 
logic' there is no appearance of self-predication. The only appearance of 
self-predication in Analytics is in the second bo ok of Prior Analytics 
(63b40-64b25), which was written later. In this passage the sentences 'No 
knowledge is knowledge' and 'Some knowledge is not knowledge' appear 
as conclusions of syllogisms with contradictory premises and there are 
ample grounds for urging the extrasystematic character of the examples. 
In any case, no affirmative self-predications occur at all. Indeed, it may 
be possibie to explain the absence of a doctrine of logical truth in AristotIe 
as being a practical 'consequence' of the faet that there are no logically 
true sentences in his abstract language. 
It is readily admitted, however, that the reader's subjective feelings of 
'naturainess' will color his judgment concerning which of the choices is an 
interpolation. If self-predications are thought to be 'naturally present' 
then our decision to exclude them will seem an interpolation. On the other 
hand, if they are thought to be 'naturally absent' then the Lukasiewicz 
inclusion will seem an interpolation. The facts that they do not occur in 
the second logic and that the system works out without them may tip the 
scales slightly in favor ofthe present view. Perhaps further slight evidence 
that AristotIe needed to exclude them can be got by noticing that the mood 
Barbara with a necessary major and necessary conclusion (regarded as 
valid by AristotIe) is absurdly invalid when the predicate and middle are 
identical. 
Some mayaiso question our omission of the 'indefinite propositions' 
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like 'Men are greedy' which lack 'quantification' (cf. M. Mulhern, p. 51). 
Although these are mentioned by Aristotle, he seems to treat them as 
extra-systematic insofar as his system of scientific reasoning is concerned. 
In the first book of Prior Analytics (43a24-44) Aristotle also seems to 
exclude both adjectives and proper names from scientific languages. 
Lukasiewicz (p. 7) seems correct in saying that both the latter were banned 
because neither ean be used both in subject and in predicate positions 
(also see Kneale and Kneale, p. 67 and Patzig, p. 6). It must also be noted 
that our model makes no room for relatives (and neither does the Lukasie-
wicz interpretation). 
Even if subsequent research shows that these opinions are incorreet, 
our model need not be changed. However, its significance will change. 
Inclusion of proper nouns, adjectives, relatives and/or indefinite proposi-
tions would imply only additions to our model; no other changes would 
be required. Our language seems to be a sublanguage, at least, of any 
faithful analogue of the abstract language of Aristotle's system.9 
The language L Uust defined) is an abstract mathematical object design-
ed in analogy with what might be called the ideal language envisaged in 
AristotIe's theory of scientifically meaningful statements. In effect each 
sentence in L should be thought of as representing a specific categorical 
proposition. The structure of a sentence in L is supposed to reflect the 
structure ofthe specific categoricaI proposition it represents. For example, 
if u and v represent the universals 'man and 'animal' then the structure 
of Auv should reflect the structure of the proposition' All men are animais' . 
It is to be emphasized that a sentence in L is supposed to represent a 
particular proposition (as envisaged by AristotIe's theory) and not a pro-
positional form, propositional function, proposition scheme or anything 
of the sort. There is no need within Aristotle's theory, nor within our 
model, of postulating the existence of propositional functions, proposi-
tional schemes or even object language variables. Our view is that Aristotle 
used metalinguistic variables, but that he neither used nor had a doetrine 
concerning object language variables.10 
2.1. Topieal Sublanguages 
As was said ab ove, Aristotle developed his logic largely (but not solely) 
as the underlying logic of the various sciences. In the first book of Posterior 
Ana/y tics, Aristotle develops his view of the organization of sciences and 
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at severa1 places therein he makes it clear that each science has its own 
genus and its own peculiar terms (Posterior Analytics I; 7, 9, 10, 12,28). 
A given science can have only finitely many terms (88b6-7; cf. Barnes, 
p. 123; Ross, p. 603) and it is somehow wrong (impossib1e?) to mix terms 
from different sciences.ll Aristotle even goes so far as to claim that a 
proposition which seems common to two sciences is really two analogous 
propositions (76a37-b2). 
We conclude that each science has its ownfinite language. We call such 
a speciallanguage a 'topical sublanguage' of the 'master' language. The 
notion of 'base' in Lewis and Langford (p. 348) corresponds to the finite 
vocabulary of terms of a topicai sublanguage. It is very likely that Aristotle 
would have regarded his master language not as literally infinite but rather 
as indefinitely large or perhaps as potentially infinite. 
2.2. Grammatical Concepts 
Once the language has been defined, we can define some useful concepts 
which depend only on the language, i.e., which are independent of se-
mantic and/or deductive notions. As above, a premise-conclusion argu-
ment (P-c argument) is a set P of sentences together with a single sentence 
c; P is called the premises and c is called the conclusion. F our things are 
to be noted at this point. First, Aristotle seems to have no term equivalent 
in meaning to 'P-c argument' ; each time he refers by means of a common 
noun to a P-c argument it is always by means of the term 'syllogism' 
which carries the connotation ofvalidity (cf. Rose, p. 27). Second, Aristotle 
never refers to P-c arguments having the empty set of premises (which 
is not surprising, if only because none are valid). Third, although the 'laws 
of conversion' involve arguments having only a single premise, Aristotle 
did not recognize that fact, insisting repeatedly that every syllogism must 
have at least two premises (e. g., Prior Analylics, 42a8, 53b 19; Posterior 
Analytics 73a9). Fourth, there is no question that Aristotle treated, in 
detail, syllogisms with more than two premises (e.g., Prior Ana/y tics I, 
23, 25, 42; Posterior Ana/y tics I, 25, also see above). In fact, Posterior 
Analytics implicitly considers syllogisms whose premises are all of the 
axioms of a science (Posterior Analytics I, 10) and it explicitly considers 
the possibility of syllogisms with infinitely many premises (Posterior Ana-
/ytics I, 19, 20, 21). 
Underlying much of Aristotle's thought (but never explicitly formu-
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lated) is the notion of form of argument, but onIy in the relational sense 
in which one argument ean be said to be in the same form as another. This 
notion is pureIy syntactic and ean be defined given the language alone. 
In particuIar, let (P, e) and (P', e') be two arguments. (P, e) is in the same 
form as (P', e') if and only if there is a one-one correspondence between 
their respective sets of content words so that substitution according to 
the correspondence converts one argument into the other. In order to 
exhibit examples let us agree to represent an argument by listing the pre-
mises and conclusion - indicating the conclusion by a question mark. 
Example 1: The foIlowing two arguments are in the same form by 
means of the one-one correspondence on the right: 
Aab Aed a e 
Sbe Sda b d 
$ab $ed c a 
?Ned ?Nae d e 
Example 2: In the folIowing pairs the respective arguments are not in 
the same form: 
Aab Aab 
Sbe Sbe 
?Nae ?Nea 
Aab Aab 
Sae $ae 
?$ae ?$ae 
Aab Aab 
?Nae $ae 
?Nae 
It foIIows from the definition that in order for two arguments to be in 
the same form, it is necessary that they have (1) the same number of 
premises, (2) the same number of distinct content words and (3) the same 
number of sentences of any of the four kinds. 
It is obvious that one need know absolutely nothing about how the 
sentences in L are to be interpreted or how one 'reasons' about their 
logical interrelations in order to be able to decide whether two arguments 
are in the same form. Relative to this system, the notion ofform is purely 
grammaticai (cf. Church. pp. 2-3). 
Define P + s as the result of adjoining the sentence s with the set P. 
Finally we define Nxy and Axy to be eontradietories respectiveIy of 
Sxy and $xy (and vice versa) and we define the function C which when 
appIied to a sentence in L produces its contradictory. The table of the 
function is given below. 
ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 103 
c 
Axy $xy 
Nxy Sxy 
Sxy Nxy 
$xy Axy 
3. TRE SEMANTIC SYSTEM S 
Aristotle regarded the truth-values of the non-modal categoricai propo-
sitions as determined extensionaIly (Prior Ana/y ties, 24a26 ff.).12 Thus, 
for Aristotie : (1) 'All X is Y' is true if the extension of X is included in that 
of Y; (2) 'No X is Y' is true if the extension of X is disjoint with that of 
Y; (3) 'Some X is Y' is true if an object is in both extensions and (4) 'Some 
X is not Y' is true if some object in the extension of X is outside of the 
extension of Y. Thus, given the meanings of the logical constants, the 
truth-values of the categoricai sentences are determined by the extensions 
of the universals involved in the manner just indicated. Now imagine 
that the content words (characters in U) are correlated with the secondary 
substances (sortal universals) and consider the folIowing interpretation i 
of L. The interpretation ix of the content word x is the extension of the 
secondary substance correlated with x. Given i we can easily define a 
function Vi which assigns the correct truth-value to each sentence in L 
as follows: 
(1) Vi(Axy) = t if ix is included in iy, 
Vi(Axy) = fif ix is not included in iy. 
(2) Vi(Nxy) = t if ix is disjoint with iy, 
Vi(Nxy) = fif ix is not disjoint with iy. 
(3) Vi(Sxy) = t if ix is not disjoint with iy, 
Vi(Sxy) = fif ix is disjoint with iy. 
(4) Vi($xy) = t if ix is not included in iy, 
Vi($xy) = fif ix is included in iy. 
The function i defined above may be regarded as the intended interpre-
tation of L. In order to complete the construction of the semantics for L 
we must specify, in addition, the non-intended or 'possible' interpretations 
of L. The non-intended interpretations of a language are structures which 
share all 'purely logical' features with the intended interpretation. What 
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is essential to the intended interpretation is that it assigns to each content 
word a set of primary substances (individuals) which 'could be' the ex-
tension of a secondary substance. Since Aristotle held that every second-
ary substance must subsume at least one primary substance (Categories, 
2a34-2b7), we give the folIowing general definition of an interpretation 
of L: j is an interpretation of L if and only if j is a function which assigns 
a non-empty set13 to each member of U. The general definition of truth-
values of sentences of L under an arbitrary interpretation j is exactly the 
same as that for the intended interpretation. 
The absence of the notion of universe of discourse warrants special 
comment if only because it is prominent, not only in modem semantics 
but also in Aristotles treatment ofaxiomatic science (see above). In the 
first place, this concept plays no role in the system of the Prior Analyties, 
which is what we are building a model for. So we deliberately leave it out, 
although from a modem point of view it is unnatural to do so. [Of course, 
in an underlying logic based on a topicai sublanguage, universes of dis-
course are needed (each science has its genus). To supply them we would 
require that, for eachj, eachjx is a subclass of some set, say Dj, given in 
advance. Hs omission has no mathematical consequences.] In the second 
place there may be a tradition (cf. Jaskowski, p. 161; Patzig, p. 7) which 
holds that Aristotle prohibited his content words from having the universe 
as extension. (So both the null set and the universe would be excluded. 
Since the universe of sets is not itself a set, our definitions respect the 
tradition without special attention - and perhaps without special signi-
ficance. 14) 
H must be admitted that Aristotle nowhere makes specific reference to 
alternative interpretations nor do es he anywhere perform operations 
which suggest that he had envisaged alternative interpretations. Rather it 
seems that at every point he thought of his ideal language as interpreted 
in what we would ean its intended interpretation. Moreover, it is doubtful 
that Aristotle ever conceived of a language apart from its intended inter-
pretation. In other word s, it seems that Aristotle did not separate logical 
syntax from semantics (but cf. De. Int., chapter 1 and Soph. Re!, chapter 1). 
3.1. Semantie Coneepts 
In terms of the semantics of L just given, we define some additional useful 
notions as fonows. A sentence s is said to be true [false] in an interpre-
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tationj ir Vi (s) = t [Vi (s) = fl. Ir s true inj thenj is called a true inter-
pretation of s. Ir p is a set of sentences all or which are true inj thenj is 
called a true interpretation of P and if every true interpretation or p is a 
true interpretation or c then P is said to (logicaIly) imply c (written P'F c). 
If P implies c then the argument (P, c) is valid, otherwise (P, c) is invalid. 
A eounter interpretation of an argument (P, c) is a true interpretation of 
the premises, P, in which the conclusion, c, is false. When (P, c) is valid, 
c is said to be a logical eonsequence 15 of P. 
By reference to the definitions just given one can show the folIowing 
important semantic principle - which is suggested by Aristotle's 'con-
trasting instances' method of establishing invalidity of arguments (below 
and cf. Ross, pp. 28, 292-313 and Rose, pp. 37-52). 
(3.0) Principle of counter interpretations. A premise-eonclusion argument 
is invalid if and only if il has a counter interpretation. 
The import or this principle is that whenever an argument is invalid it 
is possibIe to reinterpret its content words in such a way as to make the 
premises true and the conclusion false. It is worth remembering that the 
independence of the Parallel Postulate from the other 'axioms' of geo-
metry was established by construction of a counter interpretation, a re-
interpretation of the language of geometry in which the other axioms 
were true and the Parallel Postulate false (cf. Cohen and Hersh, and also, 
Frege, pp. 107-110).16 
Perhaps the most important semantic principle underlying Aristotle's 
logical work is the following, also deducible from the above defini-
tions. 
(3.1.) Prineiple of Form: An argument is valid if and only if every argu-
ment in the same form is also valid. 
Aristotle tacitly employed this principle 17 throughout the Prior Ana-
ly tics in two ways. First, to establish the validity of all arguments in the 
same form as a given argument, he establishes the validity of an arbitrary 
argument in the same form as the argument in question (i.e. he estab-
lishes the validity of an argument leaving its content words unspecified). 
Second, to establish the invalidity of all arguments in the same form 
as a given argument, he produces a specific argument in the required 
form for which the intended interpetation is a counter interpretation.18 
The latter, or course, is the method or 'contrasting instances'. Inneither of 
these operations, which are applied repeatedly by Aristotle, is it neces-
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sary to postulate either alternative interpretations or argument forms 
(over and above individual arguments; cf. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 below). 
The final semantic consideration is the semantic basis of what wiIl turn 
out to be Aristotie's theory of deduction. The c1auses of the folIowing 
principle are easily established on the basis of the above definitions. 
(3.2.) Semantic Basis o/ Aristotle's Theory o/ Deduction: let x, y, and z 
be dijferent members o/ U. Let P be a set o/ sentences and let d and s be 
sentences. 
Law o/ Contradictions: 
(C) For aIlj, vj(s) -::f= vj(C(s)), 
[i.e., in every interpretation, contradictions have different truth 
values). 
Con version Laws: 
(Cl) Nxy 'F Nyx. 
(C2) Axy 'F Syx. 
(C3) Sxy 'F Syx. 
Laws o/ Perfect Syllogisms: 
(PSI) {Azy, Axz} 'F Axz. 
(PS2) {Nzy, Axz} 'F Nxy. 
(PS3) {Azy, Sxz} 'F Sxy. 
(PS4) {Nzy, Sxz} 'F$xy. 
Reductio Law: 
(R) P'Fd if P + C(d) 'Fs and P + C(d) 'F C(s). 
The law of contradictions, the conversion laws, and the laws of perfect 
syIlogisms are familiar and obvious. The reductio law says that for d to 
follow from P it is sufficient that P and the contradiction of d together 
imply both a sentence s and its contradictory C(s). Although AristotIe 
regarded all of the above c1auses as obviously true, he does not com-
pletely neglect metalogical questions 19 concerning them. 
As far as I can tell AristotIe did not raise the metalogical question con-
cerning reductio reasoning in the Analytics. In Chapter 2 of the first bo ok 
of the Prior Analytics he puts down the conversion laws and then offers 
what seem to be answers to the metalogical questions concerning their 
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validity. Specifically, he establishes (Cl) by a kind of metasystematic 
reductio proof which presupposes (1) non-emptiness of term-extensions, 
(2) contradictory opposition between Nxy and Sxy, and (3) that existence 
of an object having properties x and y prec1udes the truth of Nyx. Then, 
taking (Cl) as established, he establishes (C2) and (C3) by reductio rea-
soning. Two chapters later he gives obviously semantic justification for 
the four laws of perfect syllogisms. 
3.2. An Alternative Semantic System 
Instead of having a c1ass of interpretations some logicians prefer to 'do 
as much semantics as possible' in terms of the folIowing two notions : 
(1) truth-valuation in the intended interpretation and (2) form (cf. Quine, 
Philosophy, p. 49 and Corcoran, 'Review'). Such logicians would have a 
semantic system containing exactly one interpretation, the intended inter-
pretation, and they would define an argument to be valid if every argu-
ment in the same form with true premises (relative to the intended inter-
pretation) has a true conc1usion (relative to the intended interpretation). 
Ockham's razor would favor the new 'one-world' semantics over the 
above 'possible-worlds' semantics (Quine, op. cit., p. 55). Within a frame-
work of a one-world semantics invalidity would be established in the same 
way as above (and as in Aristotle). 
It does not seem possibie to establish by reference to the Aristotelian 
corpus whether one semantic system agrees better with AristotIe's theory 
than the other. The main objection to the one-world semantics is that it 
makes logical issues depend on 'material reality' rather than on 'logical 
possibilities'. For example, ifthe intended interpretation is so structured 
that for every pair of content words the extension of one is identical to 
the extension of the other or else disjoint with it then Axy 'logicaIly im-
plies' Ayx. Thus· in order to get the usual valid arguments in a one-world 
semantics it is necessary to make additional assumptions about the in-
tended interpretation (cf. Quine, op. cit., p. 53). Proponents of the one-
world semantics prefer additional assumptions concerning 'the real world' 
to additional assumptions about 'possibie worlds'. Since the mathematics 
involved with the semantics of the previous section involves fewer 
arbitrary decisions than does the semantics of this section we have 
chosen to make the former the semantic system of our modelof 
Aristotle's system. It is very likely that proponents of the one-world view 
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could honestly weight the available evidence so that attribution of the 
one-world semantics to Aristotle is more probable. Ifthe current dialogue 
between proponents of the two views continues the above may well be-
come an important historicai issue. 
3.3. Forms of Arguments 
Above we used the termform only in relational contexts: (P, c) is in the 
same form as (P*, c*). During previous readings ofthis paper, auditors 
insisted on knowing what logical forms 'really are' and whether Aristotle 
used them as theoretical entities. Perhaps the best way of getting clear 
about the first problem is to first see an 'explication' of the notion. The 
folIowing explication is a deliberate imitation of Russell's explication of 
number in terms of the relation 'has the same number of members as'. 
Consider the class of all arguments and imagine that it is partitioned 
into non-empty subsets so that all and only formally similar arguments 
are grouped together. Define Forms to be these subsets. If we use this 
notion of Form, then many of the traditional uses of the substantive form 
(not the relative) are preserved. Taking in in the sense of membership, we 
ean say that (P, c) is in the same form as (P*, c*) if and only if (P, c) is 
a member of the same Form that (P*, c*) is a member of. 
A Form is simply a set of formally similar arguments. Unfortunately, 
this clear notion ofform is not the one that has been traditionally invoked. 
The traditional 'argument form' is supposed to be like a (real) argument 
except that it doesn't have (concrete) terms. Putting variables for the 
terms will not help because new variables ean be substituted without 
changing the 'form'. Proponents of 'forms' fall back on saying that an 
'argument form'is that which all formally similar arguments have in com-
mon, but (seriously) what ean this be except membership in a clas s of 
formally similar arguments? In any case there are no textual grounds for 
imputing to Aristotle a belief in argument Forms (or, for that matter, in 
'argument forms', assuming that sense ean be made of that notion). 
4. TRE DEDUCTIVE SYSTEM D 
We have aiready implied above that a theory of deduction is intended to 
specify what steps of deductive reasoning may be performed in order to 
come to know that a certain proposition c follows logicaIly from a certain 
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set P of propositions. Aristotle's theory of deduction is his theory of per-
fecting syllogisms. As stated above, our view is that a perfect syllogism 
is a discourse which expresses correct reasoning from premises to con-
clusion. In case the conclusion is immediate, nothing need be added to 
make the implication clear (24a22). In case the conclusion does not fol-
low immediately, then additional sentences must be added (24b23, 27a18, 
28a5, 29a15, 29a30, 42a34, etc.). A valid argument by itself is only po-
tentiaIly perfect (27a2, 28a16, 41b33): it is 'made perfect' (29a33, 29b5, 
29b20, 40b19, etc.) by, so to speak, filling its interstices. 
According to Aristotle's theory, there are only two general methods 20 
for perfecting an imperfect syllogism - either directly (ostensively) or in-
directly (per impossibile) (e.g., 29a30-29bl, 40a30, 45b5-1O, 62b29-40, 
passim). In constructing a direct deduction of a conclusion from premises 
one interpolates new sentences by applying conversions and fint figure 
syllogisms to previous sentences until one arrives at the conclusion. Of 
course, it is permissibie to repeat an aiready obtained line. In constructing 
an indirect deduction of a conclusion from premises one adds to the 
premises, as an additional hypothesis, the contradictory of the conclusion ; 
then one interpolates new sentences as above until both of a pair of con-
tradictory sentences have been reached. 
Dur deductive system D, to be defined presently, is a syntactical math-
ematical modelof the system of deductions found in Aristotle's theory of 
perfecting syllogisms. 
Definition of D. First restate the laws of conversion and perfect syl-
logisms as rules of inference. 21 Use the terms 'a D-conversion of a sen-
tence' to indicate the result of applying one of the three conversion rules 
to it. Use the terms 'D-inference from two sentences' to indicate the result 
of applying one of the perfect syllogism rules to the two sentences. 
A direct deduction in D of c from P is a finite list of sentences ending 
with c, beginning with all or some of the sentences in P, and such that 
each subsequent line (af ter those in P) is either (a) a repetition of a previ-
ous line, (b) a D-conversion of a previous line or (c) a D-inference from 
two previous lines. 
An indirect deduction in D of c from P is a finite list of sentences end-
ing in a contradictory pair, beginning with a list of all or some of the 
sentences in P followed by the contradictory of c, and such that each 
subsequent additional line (after the contradictory of c) is either (a) a 
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repetition of a previous line, (b) a D-conversion of a previous line or 
(c) a D-inference from two previous lines. 
All examples of deductions will be annotated according to the folIowing 
scheme: (1) Premises will be prefixed by , +' so that ' + Axy' can be read 
'assume Axy as a premise'. (2) Mter the premises are put down we inter-
ject the conclusion prefixed by '?' so that '?Axy' can be read 'we want to 
show why Axy follows'. (3) The hypothesis of an indirect (reductio) de-
duction is prefixed by 'h' so that 'hAxy' can be read 'suppose Axy for 
purposes of reasoning'. (4) A line entered by repetition is prefixed by 'a' 
so that 'aAxy' can be read 'we have aiready accepted Axy'. (5) Lines en-
tered by conversion and syllogistic inference are prefixed by 'c' and 
's', respectively. (6) Finally, the last line of an indirect deduction has 
'B' prefixed to its other annotation so that 'BaAxy' can be read 'but we 
have aiready acceptedAxy', etc. We define an annotated deduction in D to 
be a deduction in Dannotated according to the above scheme. In ac-
cordance with now standard practice we say that c is deducible from P in 
D to mean that there is a deduction of c from P in the system D. It is als o 
sometimes convenient to use the locution 'the argument (P, c) is deducible 
in D'. 
The folIowing is a consequence of the above definitions (cf. Frege, 
pp. 101-11). 
(4.1) Deductive Principle of Form: An argument is deducible in D if and 
only if every argument in the same form is also deducible. 
The significance of D is as follows. We c1aim that D is a faithful math-
ematical modelof Aristotle's theory of perfecting syllogisms in the sense 
that every perfect syllogism (in Aristotle's sense) corresponds in a direct 
and obvious way to a deduction in D. Thus what can be added to an im-
perfect syllogism to render it perfect corresponds to what can be 'added' 
to a valid argument to produce a deduction in D. In the case of a direct 
deduction the 'space' between the premises and conclusion is filled up in 
accordance with the given rules. 
In order to establish these c1aims as well as they can be established 
(taking account of the vague nature of the data), the reader may go 
through the deductions presented by Aristotle and convince himself that 
each may be faithfully represented in D. We give four examples below; 
three direct deductions and one indirect deduction. The others raise no 
problems. 
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We reproduce two of Aristotle's deductions (27a5-15; Rose, p. 34), 
each followed by the corresponding annotated deductions in D. 
(1) Let M be predicated of no N + Nnm 
and of All X + Axm 
(2) 
(conclusion omitted in text). 
Then since the negative premise converts 
N belongs to no M. 
But it was supposed that M belongs to all X. 
Therefore N will belong to no X. 
Again, if M belongs to all N 
and to no X, 
X will belong to no N. 
For if M belongs to no X, 
X belongs to no M. 
But M belonged to all N. 
Therefore X will belong to no N. 
(?Nxn) 
cNmn 
aAxm 
sNxn 
+Anm 
+Nxm 
?Nnx 
aNxm 
cNmx 
aAnm 
sNnx 
Below we reproduce Aristotle's words (28b8-12) followed by the corre-
sponding annotated deduction in D. 
(3) For if R belongs to all S, 
P belongs to some S, 
P must belong to some R. 
Since the affirmative statement is convertible 
S will belong to some P, 
consequently since R belongs to all S, 
and S to some P, 
R must also belong to some P: 
therefore P must belong to some R. 
+ Asr 
+Ssp 
?Srp 
eSps 
aAsr 
aSps 
sSpr 
cSrp 
To exemplify an indirect deduction we do the same for 28 bl 7-20. 
(4) For if R belongs to all S, 
but P does not belong to some S, 
it is necessary that P does not belong to some R. 
For if P belongs to all R, 
and R belongs to all S, 
then P will belong to all S: 
but we assumed that it did not. 
+Asr 
+$sp 
?$rp 
hArp 
aAsr 
sAsp 
Ba$sp 
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Readers can verify the folIowing (by 'translating' Aristotle's proofs of 
the syllogisms he proved, using ingenuity in the other cases). 
(4.2) All valid arguments in any oJ the Jour traditional figures 22 are 
deducible in D. 
4.1. Deductive Concepts 
As is to be expected given the above developments, a deductive concept 
is one which can be defined in terms of concepts employed in the deduc-
tive system without reference to semantics. In many cases one relies on 
semantic insights for the motivation to delimit one concept rather than 
another. This is irrelevant to the criterion for distinguishing deductive 
from semantic concepts; just as reliance on mechanical insight for moti-
vation to define mathematical concepts is irrelevant to distinguishing 
physical and mathematical concepts. 
Already several deductive notions have been used - 'direct deduction', 
'indirect deduction', 'rule of inference', 'deducible from', 'contradictory' 
(as used here), etc. Relative to D the notion of consistency is defined as 
follows. A set P of sentences is consistent if no two deductions from P 
have contradictory conclusions. If there are two deductions from P one 
of which yields the contradictory of the conclusion of the other then, of 
course, P is inconsistent. 
Aristotle did not have occasion to define the notion of inconsistency but 
he showed a degree of sophistication lacking in somecurrent thinkers by dis-
cussing valid arguments having inconsistent premise sets 23 (63b40-64b25). 
4.2. Some Metamathematical Results in Aristotie 
Generally speaking, a metamathematical result is a mathematical result 
concerning a logical or mathematical system. Such results can also be 
called metasystematic. The point of the terminology is to distinguish the 
results codified by the system from results concerning the system itself. 
The latter would necessarily be stated in the metalanguage and codified 
in a metasystem. It is also convenient (but sometimes artificial) to dis-
tinguish intrasystematic and intersystematic resuIts. The former would 
concern mathematical relations among parts of the given system whereas 
the latter would concern mathematical relations between the given system 
and another system. The artificiality arises when the 'other' system is ac-
actually a part of the given system. 
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It is worth noting that the theorem/metatheorem confusion cannot 
arise in discussion of Aristotle's syllogistic for the reason that there are 
no theorems. This observation is important but it is not deep. It is simply 
a reflection of two facts: fint, that within the passages treating the second 
logic Aristotle did not consider the possibility of 'logical truths' (object 
language sentences true in virtue of logic alone); second, and more im-
portantly, that Aristotle regarded logic as a 'canon of inference' rather 
than as a codification of 'the most generallaws of nature'. 
Given the three-part structure of a logic one can anticipate four kinds 
of metasystematic results: 'grammaticaI' results which concern the lan-
guage alone; 'semantic' results which concern the language and the se-
mantic system; 'proof-theoretic' results which concern the language and 
the deductive system; and 'bridge' results which bridge or interrelate the 
semantic system with the deductive system. Since the Aristotelian gram-
mar is so trivial, there is nothing of interest to be expected there. The 
semantics, however, is complex enough to admit of analogues to mo-
dern semantic results. For example, the analogue to the L6wenheim-
Skolem theorem is that any satisfiable set of sentences of L involving no 
more than n content words is satisfiable in a universe of not more than 
r objects (for proof see Corcoran, 'Completeness'). Unfortunately there 
are no semantic results (in this sen se) in Aristotle's 'second logic'. As 
mentioned above, Aristotle may not have addressed himself to broader 
questions concerning the semantic system of his logic. As is explained in 
detail below, most of Aristotle's metasystematic results are proof-theo-
retic: they concern the relationship between the deductive system D and 
various subsystems of it. There is, however, one bridge result, viz., the 
completeness of the deductive system relative to the semantics. Unfor-
tunately, Aristotle's apparent inattention to semantics may have prevent-
ed him from developing a rigorous proof of completeness. 
There are several metasystematic results in the 'second logic', none of 
which have been given adequate explanation previously. We regard an 
explanation of an Aristotelian metasystematic result to be adequate only 
when it accounts for the way in which Aristotle obtained the result. 
4.2.1. Aristotle' s Seeond Deduetive System D2. As aIready indicated ab ove, 
the first five chapters of the 'second logic' (Prior Analytjes I, 1,2,4, 5, 
6) incIude a general introductory chapter, two chapters presenting the 
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system and dealing with the fint figure and two chapters which present 
deductions for the valid arguments in the second and third figures. 24 The 
next chapter (Chapter 7) is perhaps the first substantial metasystematic 
discussion in the history of 10gic. 
The first interesting metasystematic passage begins at 29a30 and merely 
summarizes the work of the preceding three chapters. It reads as follows 
It is clear too that all the imperfect syllogisms are made perfect by means of the first 
figure. All are brought to conclusion either ostensively or per impossibile. 
From the context it is obvious that by 'all' Aristotle means 'all second 
and third figure'. Shortly thereafter begins a long passage (29b 1-25) which 
states and proves a substantial metasystematic result. We quote (29bl-2) 
It is possibie also to reduce all syllogisms to the universal syllogisms in the first figure. 
Again 'all' is used as above; 'reduce to' here means 'deduce by means of' 
and 'universal syllogism' means 'one having an N or A conclusion'. What 
Aristotle has claimed is that all of the syllogisms previously proved ean 
be established by means of deductions whieh do not involve the 'par-
tieular' perfect syllogistic rules (PS3 and PS4). Aristotle goes on to explain 
in coneise, general, but mathematically preeise terms exactly how one ean 
construet the twelve particular deduetions which would substantiate the 
claim. Anyone ean follow AristotIe's directions and thereby construct the 
twelve formal deductions in our system D. 
In regard to the validity of the present interpretation these facts are 
significant. Not only have we accounted for the content of Aristotle's 
discovery but we have also been able to reproduce exactly the methods 
that he used to obtain them. Nothing of this sort has been attempted in 
previous interpretations (ef. Lukasiewicz, p. 45). 
Let D2 indicate the deductive system obtained by deleting PS3 and PS4 
from D. Aristotle's metaproof shows that the syllogisms formerly dedueed 
in D ean also be deduced in D2. On the basis of the next chapter (Prior 
Analytics 1,23) of the 'second logic' (cf. Bocheiiski, p. 43; Lukasiewicz, 
p. 133; Tredenniek, p. 185) it beeomes clear that Aristotle thinks that he 
has shown that every syllogism deducible in D ean also be deduced in D2. 
On reading the relevant passages (29bl-25) it is obvious that Aristotle has 
not proved the result. However, it is now known that the result is correct; 
it follows immediately from the main theorem of Coreoran 'Comple-
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teness' (q. v.). But regardless of the correctness of Aristotle's proof one 
must credit him with conception ofthe first significant hypothesis in proof 
theory. 
4.2.2. Redundancy of Direct Deductions. Among indirect deductions it is 
interesting to distinguish two subc1asses on the basis of the role of the 
added hypothesis. Let us caU an indirect deduction normal if a rule of 
inference is applied to the added hypothesis and abnormal otherwise. In 
many of the abnormal cases, one reasons from the premises ignoring the 
added hypothesis until the desired conc1usion is reached and then one 
notes 'but we have assumed the contradictory' . 
Aristotle begins Chapter 29 (Prior Ana/y tics I) by stating that whatever 
can be proved directly can also be proved indirectly. Re then gives two 
examples of normal indirect deductions for syllogisms he has aiready 
deduced directly. Shortly thereafter (45bl-5) he says, 
Again ir it has been proved by an ostensive syl!ogism that A belongs to no E, assume 
that A belongs to some E and it wil! be proved per impossibile to belong to no E. 
Similarly with the rest. 
The first sentence means that by interpolating the added hypothesis Sea 
into a direct deduction of Nea one transforms it to an indirect deduction 
of the same conc1usion. See the diagram below. 
+----
+---
+---
+----
+----
+---
?Nea Transforming to: ?Nea 
Nea 
hSea 
Nea 
BaSea 
The second quoted sentence is meant to indicate that the same result 
holds regardless of the form of the conclusion. In other words, Aristotle 
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has made clear the fact that whatever can be deduced by a direct deduc-
tion can also be deduced by an abnormal indirect deduction, i.e., that 
direct deductions are redundant from the point of view of the system as a 
whole. 25 
We feel that this is additional evidence that Aristotle was self-con-
sciously studying interrelations among deductions - exactly as is done in 
Hilbert's 'proof theory' (e.g., cf. van Heijenoort, p. 137). 
4.3. Indirect Deductions or a Reductio Rute? 
To the best of my knowledge Aristotle considered indirect reasoning to be 
a certain style of deduction. Af ter the premises are set down one adds the 
contradictory of what is to be proved and then proceeds by 'direct reason-
ing' to each of a pair of contradictory sentences. Imagine, however, the 
folIowing situation: one begins an indirect deduction as usual and imme-
diately gets bogged down. Then one sees that there is a pair of contra-
dictories, say s and C(s), such that (1) s can be got from what is aIready 
assumed by indirect reasoning and (2) that C(s) can be got from s to-
gether with what is aiready assumed by direct reasoning. 
In a normal context of mathematics there would be no problem - the 
outlined strategy would be carried out without a second thought. In fact 
the situation is precisely what is involved in a common proof of 'Russell's 
Theorem' (no set contains exactly the sets which do not contain them-
selve s ). It involves using reductio reasoning as a structural rule of inference 
(cf., e.g., Corcoran, 'Theories', pp. 162ff). The trouble is that the strategy 
requires the addition of aseeond hypothesis and this is not countenanced 
by the Aristotelian system (41a33-36). 
The salient differences between a system with indirect deductions and 
a system with a reduetio rule are the folIowing. In the case of indirect 
deductions, one can add but one additional hypothesis (viz. the contra-
dictory of the conclusion to be reached) and one cannot in general use an 
indirectly obtained conclusion later on in a deduction. Once the indirectly 
obtained conclusion is reached the indirect deduction is, by definition, 
finished. An indirectly obtained conclusion is never written as such in the 
deduction. In the case ofthe reduetio rule one can add as many additional 
hypotheses as desired; once an indirectly obtained conclusion is reached 
it is written as an intermediate conclusion usable in subsequent reasoning. 
The deductive system of Jeffrey (q.v.) consists solely ofindirect deduc-
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tions whereas the system of Anderson and Johnstone (q. v.) has a reductio 
rule. 
MetamathematicaIly, one important difference is the folIowing. Where 
one has a reductio rule it is generally easy to prove the metamathematical 
result that CCd) is (indirectly) deducible from P whenever each of a pair 
of contradictions is separately deducible from P + d. This result ean be 
difficult in the case where one does not have a reductio rule - especiaIly 
when each of the pair of contradictions was reached indirectly. 
In order to modify the system (or systems) to allow such 'iterated or 
nested reductio strategies' one would abandon the distinction between 
direct and indirect deductions; in the place of the indirect deductions one 
would have (simply) deductions which employ one or more applications 
of a reductio rule. Statements of such reductio rules are in general easily 
obtained but they involve several ideas which would unnecessarily com-
plicate this article. Let us assume that D2 has been modified 26 to perrnit 
iterated or nested reductio deductions and let us call the new system D3. 
Now we have two final points to make. In the first place, in one clear 
sense, nothing is gained by adding the reductio rule because, since D2 is 
known to be complete and D3 is sound, every argument deducible in D3 
is aiready deducible in D2. In the second place, Aristotle may well have 
been thinking of reductio as a rule of inference but either Iacked the moti-
vation to state it as such or else actually stated it as such only to have his 
statements deleted or modified by copyists. It may even be the case that 
further scholarship will turn up convincing evidence for a reductio rule in 
the extant corpus. This is left as an open problem in Aristotle scholar-
Ship.27 
4.4. Extended Deductions 
In the course of a development of an axiomatic science it would be silly, 
to say the least, to insist on starting each new deduction from scratch. 
We quite naturally use as premises in each subsequent deduction not only 
the axioms of the science but also any or all previously pro ved theorems. 
Thus at any point in a development of an axiomatic science the last theorem 
proved is proved not by a deduction from the axioms but rather by a 
deduction from the axioms and previously proved theorems. In effect, we 
ean think of the entire sequence of deductions, beginning with that of the 
first theorem and ending with that of the last proved theorem as an 'ex-
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tended deduction' with several conclusions. If the basic deductive system 
is D (above) then the 'extended deductions' ean be defined recursively as 
follows. (In D we define 'deduction of c from P' where c is an individual 
sentence. Now we defined 'extended deduction of C from P' where C is a 
set of sentences.) 
Definition of Deductive System DE. 
(a) All direct and indirect deductions in D of c from P are ex-
tended deductions in DE of {c} from P. 
(b) lf F' is an extended deduction in DE of C from P and F is a 
deduction in D of d from P + C then the result of adjoining 
F to the end of F' is an extended deduction in DE of C +d 
fromP. 
Thus an extended deduction in DE of {Cl' cz, ... , cn} from P could be 
(the concatenation of) a sequence of component deductions (all in D) the 
i + 1st of which is a deduction of Ci+l from one or more members of 
P + {Cl' cz, ... , cJ. Soundness of the system of extended deductions is al-
most immediate given the folIowing principle which holds in the 'possible-
worlds' semantics of Section 3 above. 
(4.0) Semantic Principle of Extended Deduction: 
P 1= d if P + C 1= d and, for all s in C, P 1= s. 
The significance of the system of extended deductions is as follows. 
In the first place, it is natural (if not inevitable) to consider such a system 
in the course of a study ofaxiomatic sciences. Thus, we must consider the 
possibility that the underlying logic of the axiomatic sciences discussed in 
Posterior Analytics had as its deductive system a system similar to the 
system of extended deductions. Secondly, this system loosens to some 
extent the constraint of not being able to use indirectly obtained results 
in deductions in D. (Although the constraint there resulted from an ab-
sence of a reductio rule, strictly speaking, there is still no reductio rule 
in DE.)28 
It may be relevant to point out here that, since an Aristotelian science 
has only a finite number of principles (axioms and theorems), for formal 
purposes each science ean be identified with a single extended deduction. 
Here we wish to consider briefly the possibility that the underlying 
logic presupposed in Posterior Analytjcs is a system of extended deduc-
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tions. At the outset, we should say that there are no grounds whatsoever 
for thinking that Aristotle restricted the use of the term 'demonstration' 
to the two-premise cases. Next we note that if Posterior Analytics requires 
a system of extended deductions then there are grounds for limiting the 
component deductions (direct and indirect) to ones having at most two 
premises. Thus we are considering the possibility that every 'demonstra-
tion' is an extended deduction whose components are all deductions 
having one or two premises. If this possibility were established, it could 
provide an alternative account for the passages where 'syllogism' is clearly 
used in the restricted sense, given that there are passages which refer to 
demonstrations as chains of syllogisms. The latter, however, do not seem 
to exist in Analytics (cf. 25b27, 7l b17, 72b28, 85b23), but there is one 
tempting passage in Topics {lOOa27). In any case, we have been unsuccess-
ful in our attempt to construct persuasive support for this possibility. 
(cf. Smiley.) 
5. THE MATHEMATICAL LOGIC I 
In the previous three sections we considered the components of several 
mathematical logics any one of which could be taken as a reasonably 
faithful modelof the system ( or systems) of logic envisaged in Aristotle's 
theory (or theories) of syllogistic. The model (hereafter called I) which 
we take to be especially important has L as language, S as semantics and 
D as deductive system. It is our view that I is the system most closely 
corresponding to Aristotie's explicit theory.29 
Concerning any mathematical logic there are two kinds of questions. 
In the first place, there are internal questions concerning the mathematical 
properties of the system itself. For example, we have compared the de-
ductive system D with the semantics S by asking whether every deducible 
argument is valid (problem of soundness) and conversely whether every 
valid argument is deducible (problem of completeness). Both of these 
questions and all other internal questions are perfectly definite mathe-
matical questions concerning the logic as a mathematical object. And if 
they are answered, then they are answered by the same means used to 
answer any mathematical question - viz. by logical reasoning from the 
definitions of the systems together with the relevant mathematical laws. 
In the second place, there are external questions concerning the relation-
ship of the model to things outside of itself. In our case the most in-
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teresting question is a fairly vague one - viz. how well does our model 
represent 'the system' treated in Aristotle's theory of the syllogism? 
As the various components ofthe model were developed, we considered 
the external questions in some detail and concluded that the model can 
be used to account for many important aspects of the development of 
Aristotle's theory, as recorded in the indicated parts of Analytics. More-
over, the logic I adds nothing to what Aristotle wrote except for giving 
an explicit reference to 'possibie worlds' and formulating a systematic 
definition of formal deductions. It is especiaIly important to notice that 
the deductive system involves nothing different in kind from what Aris-
totle explicitly used - no 'new axioms' were needed and no more basic 
sort of reasoning was presupposed. 
As far as internal questions are concerned it is obvious that I is sound, 
i.e., that all arguments deducible in D are valid. This is clear from Sec-
tion 3 above. The completeness of I has been proved 30 - i.e., we have 
been able to demonstrate as a mathematical fact eoncerning the logic I 
that every argument valid aeeording to the semantics S can be obtained by 
means of a formal deduction in D. Thus not only is Aristotie's Iogie self-
sufficient in the sense of not presupposing any more basic logie but it is 
aIso self-sufficient in the sense that no further sound rules ean be added 
without reduncaney. 
5.1. The Possibi/ily of a Completeness Proof in Prior Analytics 
Aecording to Bochenski's view (p. 43), in whieh we coneur, Chapter 23 
follows Chapter 7 in Prior Analytics, Book r. As aiready indicated Chap-
ter 7 shows that all syllogisms in the three figures are "perfected by means 
of the universal syllogisms in the first figure". Chapter 23 (40bI7-23) 
begins with the following words. 
It is clear from what has been said that the syllogisms in these figures are made perfect 
by means of universal syllogisms in the first figure and are redueed to them. That every 
syllogism without qualification ean be so treated will be clear presently, when it has 
been proved that every syllogism is forrned through one or the other of these figures. 
The same ehapter (41 b3-5) ends thus. 
But when this has been shown it is clear that every syllogism is perfected by means of 
the first figure and is reducible to the universal syllogisms in this figure. 
From these passages a/one we might suppose that the intermediate 
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material contained the main part of a completeness proof for D2, which 
depended on a 'small' unproved lemma. We might further suppose that 
the imagined completeness proof had the following three main parts. 
First, it would define a new deductive system which had the syllogisms in 
all three figures as rules. Second, it would prove the completeness of the 
new system. Third, it would show that every deduction in the new system 
ean be transformed into a deduction in D2 having the same premises and 
conclusion. 
Unfortunately, the text will not support thi s interpretation. Before con-
sidering a more adequate interpretation one ean make a few historicaI 
observations. In the first place, even raising a problem of completeness 
seems to be a very difficult intellectual achievement. Indeed, neither Boole 
nor Frege nor Russell asked such questions.31 Apparently no one stated 
a completeness problem 32 before it emerged naturally in connection with 
the underlying logic of modem Euclidean geometry in the 1920's (Cor-
coran, 'Classical Logic' , pp. 41,42), and it is probably the case that no com-
pleteness result (in this exact sense) was printed before 1951 (cf. Corcoran, 
'Theories', p. 177 for related results), although the necessary mathe-
matical tools were available in the 1920's. In the second p1ace, Aristotle 
does not seem to be clear enough about his own semantics to under-
stand the problem. If he had been, then he could have solved the prob-
lem definitively for any finite 'topical sublogic' by the same methods 
employed in Prior Analytics (I, 4, 5, 6). In faet, in these chapters he 
'solves' the problem for a 'topicaI sublogic' having only three content 
words. 
In the intervening passages of Chapter 23 Aristotle seems to argue, not 
that every syllogism is deducible in D2, but rather that any syllogism 
deducible at all is deducible in D2. And, as indicated in his final sentence, 
he does not believe he has completed his argument. He reasons as follows. 
In the first place he asserts without proof that any syllogism deducible by 
means of syllogisms in the three figures is deducible in D2 (but here he is 
overlooking the problem of iterated reductio mentioned in Section 4.3 
above). In any case, granting him that hypothesis, he then argues that 
any syllogism deducible at all is deducible by means of the syllogisms in 
the three figures, thus: Every deduction is either direct or hypothetical -
the latter including both indirect deductions and those involving ecthesis 
(see above). He considers the direct case first. Here he argues that every 
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direct deduction must have at least two premises as in the three figures 
and that in the two-premise case the conclusion has aiready been proved. 
Then he simply asserts that it is "the same if several middle terms should 
be necessary" (4IaI8). In considering the hypothetical deductions he takes 
up indirect deductions first and observes that af ter the contradictory of 
the conclusion is also assumed one proceeds as in the direct case - con-
cluding that the reduction to D2 is evident in this case also (4la35ff). 
Finally, he simply asserts that it is the same with the other hypothetical 
deductions. But this he has immediate misgivings about (4lbl). He leaves 
the proof unfinished to the extent that the non-indirect hypothetical de-
ductions have not been completely dealt with. 
6. CONCLUSION 
As a kind of summary of our research we present a review of what we 
take to be the fundamental achievements of Aristotie's logical theory. 
In the first place, he clearly distinguished the role of deduction from 
the role of experience (or intuition) in the development of scienctific 
theories. This is revealed by his distinction between the axioms of a 
science and the logical apparatus used in deducing the theorems. Today 
this would imply a distinction between logical and nonlogical axioms; 
but Aristotle had no idea of logical axioms (but cf. 71a22-25). Indeed, 
he gave no systematic discussion of logical truth (Axx is not even 
mentioned once). In the second place, Aristotle developed a natural 
deduction system which he exemplified and discussed at great length. 
Moreover, he formulated fairly intricate metamathematical results relating 
his central system to a simpier one. It is also important to notice that 
Aristotle's system is sound and strongly complete. In the third place, 
Aristotle was clear enough ab out logical consequence so that he was able 
to discover the method of counter instances for establishing invalidity. 
This method is the cornerstone of all independence (or invalidity) results, 
though it probably had to be rediscovered in modern times cf. Cohen 
and Hersh). In the fourth place, his distinction between perfect and imper-
fect syllogisms suggests a clear understanding of the difference between 
deducibility and implication - a distinction which modern logicians be-
lieve to be their own (cf. Church, p. 323, fn. 529). In the fifth place, 
Aristotle used principles concerning form repeatedly and accurately, al-
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though it is not possibie to establish that he was able to state them nor is 
even clear that he was consciously aware of them as logical prin-
ciples. 
The above are all highly theoretical points - but Aristotle did not merely 
theorize; he carried out his ideas and programs in amazing detail despite 
the handicap of inadequate notation. In the course of pursuing details 
Aristotle originated many important discoveries and devices. Re described 
indirect proof. Re used syntactical variables (alpha, beta, etc.) to stand 
for content words - a device whose importance in modem logic has not 
been underestimated. Re formulated several rules of inference and dis-
cussed their interrelations. 
Philosophers sometimes say that Aristotle is the best introduction to 
philosophy. This is perhaps an exaggeration. One of the Polish logicians 
once said that the Analyties is the best introduction to logic. My own 
reaction to this remark was unambiguously negative - the severe diffi-
culties in reading the Analytjes form one obstacle and I felt then that the 
meager results did not warrant so much study. After carrying out the 
above research I can compromise to the folIowing extent. I now believe 
that Aristotle's logic is rich enough, detailed enough, and sufficiently re-
presentative of modem logics that a useful set of introductory lectures on 
mathematical logic could be organized around what I have called the 
main Aristotelian system. 
From a modem point of view, there is only one mistake which can 
sensibly be charged to Aristotle: his theory ofpropositional forms is very 
seriously inadequate. It is remarkable that he did not come to discover 
this for himself, especiaIly since he mentions specific proofs from arith-
metic and geometry. If he had tried to reduce these to his system he may 
have seen the problem (cf. Mueller, pp. 174-177). But, once the theory of 
propositional forms is taken for granted, there are no important in-
adequacies attributable to Aristotle, given the historical context. Indeed, 
his work is comparable in completeness and accuracy to that of Boole 
and seems incomparably more comprehensive than the Stoic or medieval 
efforts. It is tempting to speculate that it was the oversimplified theory of 
propositional forms that made possibie the otherwise comprehensive sys-
tem. A more adequate theory of propositional forms would have required 
a much more complicated theory of deduction - indeed, one which was 
not developed until the present era. 
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NOTES 
1 It should be realized that the notion of a 'mode!' used here is the ordinary one used 
in discussion of, e.g., wooden models of airplanes, plastic models of boats, etc. Here 
the adjective 'mathematica!' indicates the kind of material employed in the model. I.e., 
here we are talking about models 'constructed from' mathematical objects. Familiar 
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mathematical objects are numbers, (mathematical) points, lines, planes, (syntactic) 
characters, sets, functions, etc. Here we need as basic elements only syntactic characters, 
but the development beiowaiso presupposes sets ab initio. It should also be realized 
that a mathematical model is not a distinctive sort of mathematical entity - it is simply 
a mathematical entity conceived of as analogous to something else. 
[In order to avoid excessive notes bracketed expressions are used to refer by author 
(and/or by abbreviated title) and location to items in the list of references at the end 
of this article. Unless otherwise stated, translations are taken from the Oxford transla-
tion (see 'Aristotie').] 
2 These ideas are scattered throughout Church's introductory chapter, but in Schoen-
field (q. v.) Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 treat, respectively, languages, semantic systems and 
deductive systems. 
3 From the best evidence of the respective dates of the Analytics (Ross, p. 23) and 
Euclid's Elements (Heath, pp. 1, 2), one can infer that the former was written in the 
neighborhood of fifty years before the latter. The lives of the two authors probably 
overlapped; AristotIe is known to have been teaching in Athens from 334 until 322 
(Edel, pp. 40, 41) and it is probable both that Euclid received his mathematical 
training from Aristotie's contemporaries and that he flourished c. 300 (Heath, p. 2). 
In any case, from internal evidence Ross (p. 56) has inferred that Euclid was probably 
influenced by the Analytics. Indeed, some scholarship on the Elements makes important 
use of AristotIe's theory of the axiomatic organization of science (cf. Heath, pp. 
117-124). However, it should be admitted that Hilbert's geometry (q. v.) is much 
more in accord with Aristotie's principles than is Euclid's. For example, Hilbert 
leaves some terms 'undefined' and he states his universe of discourse at the outset, 
whereas Euclid fails on both of these points, which were aIready clear Aristotelian 
requirements. 
4 AristotIe may have included deductive arguments which would be sound were certain 
intermediate steps added; cf. Section 5.1 below. 
5 This wiIl account somewhat for the otherwise inexplicable fact aiready noted by 
Lukasiewicz (p. 49) and others that there are few passages in the Aristotelian corpus 
which could be construed as indicating an awareness of propositionallogic. 
6 In a doubly remarkable passage (p. 13) Lukasiewicz claims that AristotIe did not 
reveal the object of his logical theory. It is not difficult to see that Lukasiewicz is 
correct in saying that AristotIe nowhere admits to the purpose which Lukasiewicz 
imputes to him. However, other scholars have had no difficulty in discovering passages 
whichdo revealAristotIe's true purpose (cf. Ross, pp. 2, 24, 288; Knealeand Kneale, p. 24). 
7 This point has aiready been made by Kneale and Kneale (pp. 80-81), who point out 
further difficulties with Lukasiewicz's interpretation. For yet further sensitive criticism 
see Austin's review and also Iverson, pp. 35-36. 
8 Although we have no interest in giving an account of how Lukasiewicz may have 
arrived at his view, it may be of interest to some readers to note the possibility that 
Lukasiewicz was guided in his research by certain attitudes and preferences not shared 
by Aristotle. The Lukasiewicz book seems to indicate the folIowing: (1) Lukasiewicz 
preferred to consider logic as concerned more with truth than with either logical 
consequence or deduction (e.g., pp. 20, 81). (2) He understands 'inference' in such a 
way that correctness of inference depends on starting with true premises (e.g., p. 55). 
(3) He feels that propositional logic is somehow objectively more fundamental than 
quantificational or syIIogistic logic (e.g., pp. 47, 79). (4) He tends to concentrate his 
attention on axiomatic deductive systems to the neglect of natural systems. (5) He 
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tends to underemphasize the differences between axiomatic deductive systems and 
axiomatic sciences. (6) He places the theory of the syllogism on a par with a certain 
branch of pure mathematics (pp. 14, 15, 73) and he believes that logic has no special 
relation to thought (pp. 14, 15). Indeed, he seems to fear that talk of logic as a study of 
reasoning necessarily involves some sort of psychologistic view of logic. (7) He believes 
that content words or non-Iogical constants cannot be introduced into logic (pp. 72, 96). 
The Lukasiewicz attitudes are shared by several other logicians, notably, in this context, 
by Bochenski (q. v.). It may not be possibie to argue in an objective way that the above 
attitudes are incorrect but one can say with certainty that they were not shared by 
AristotIe. 
9 Exclusion of proper names, relatives, adjectives and indefinite propositions is based 
more on a reading of the second logic as a whole than on specific passages (but cf. 
43a25--40). M. Mulhern, in substantial agreement with this view, has shown my 
previous attempts to base it on specific passages to be inconclusive as aresult of re-
liance on faulty translation. Her criticisms together with re1ated ones by Charles Kahn 
(University of Pennsylvania) and Dale Gottlieb (Johns Hopkins) have led to the 
present version of the last two paragraphs. 
10 Rose (p. 39) has criticized the Lukasiewicz view that no syllogisms with content 
words are found in the Aristotelian corpus. Our view goes further in holding that all 
Aristotelian syllogisms have content words, Le., that AristotIe nowhere refers to argu-
ment forms or propositional functions. All apparent exceptions are best understood as 
metalinguistic reference to 'concrete syllogisms'. This view is in substantial agreement 
with the view implied by Rose at least in one place (p. 25). 
11 In many of the locations cited above AristotIe seems remarkably close to a recogni-
tion of 'category mistakes' - a view that nonsense of some sort results from mixing 
terms from different sciences in the same proposition (e.g., 'the sum of two triangles 
is a prime number'). 
12 It must be recognized that other interpretations are possibie - cf. Kneale and 
Kneale, pp. 55-67. However, in several places (e.g., 85a31-32) Aristode seems to imply 
that a secondary substance is nothing but its extension. 
13 This would explain the so-called existential import of A and N sentences. Notice 
that, according to this view, existential import is aresult of the semantics of the terms 
and has no connection whatever with the meaning of 'All'. In particular, the traditional 
concern with the meaning of 'All' was misplaced - the issue is properly one of the 
meaning of categoricai terms. As far as we have been able to determine this is the first 
clear theoreticai account of existential import based on textual materiaI. 
14 Jaskowski (loc. cit.) gives no textual grounds. There are, however, some passages 
(e.g., 998b22) which imply that the class of all existent individuals is not a genus. 
In subsequent developments of 'Aristotelian logic' which include 'negative terms', 
exclusion of the universe must be maintained to save exclusion of the null set. 
15 This is the mathematical analogue of the classical notion of logical consequence 
which is clearly presupposed in traditional work on so-ca1led 'postulate theory' . It is 
important to notice that we have offered only a mathematical analogue of the concept 
and not a definition of the concept itself. The basic idea is this: Each interpretation 
represents a 'possibie world'. To say that it is logically impossible for the premises 
to be true and the conclusion false is to say that there is no possibie world in which 
the prembes actuaIly are true and the conclusion actually is false. The analogue, 
therefore, is that no true interpretation of the premises makes the conclusion false. 
Church (p. 325) attributes this mathematical analogue of logical consequence to Tarski 
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(pp. 409-420), but Tarski's notion of true interpretation (model) seems too narrow (at 
best toa vague) in that no mention of alternative universes of discourse is made or 
implied. In faet the limited Tarskian notion seems to have been already known even 
before 1932 by Lewis and Langford (p. 342), to whom, incidentally, I am indebted 
for the terms 'interpretation' and 'true interpretation' which seem heuristically superior 
to the Tarskian terms 'sequence' and 'model', the latter ofwhich has engendered category 
mistakes - a 'modelof set of sentences' in the Tarskian sense is by no means a model, 
in any ordinary sense, of a set of sentences. 
16 The method of 'contrasting instances' is a fundamental discovery in logic which 
may not yet be fully appreciated in its historicai context. Because Lukasiewicz (p. 71) 
misconstrued the Alistotelian frarnework, he said that modem logic does not employ 
this method. It is obvious, however, that all modem independence (invalidity) results 
from Hilbert (pp. 30--36) to Cohen (see Cohen and Hersh) are based on developments 
of this method. Indeed, there were essentiaIly no systematic investigations of questions 
of invalidity from the time of AristotIe until Beltrami's famous demonstration of the 
invalidity of the argument whose premises are the axioms of geometry less the Parallel 
Postulate and whose conclusion is the Parallel Po~tulate itself(Heath, p. 219). Although 
there is not a single invalidity result in the Port Royal Logic or in Boole's work, for 
example, modern logic is almost characterizable by its wealth of such results - all 
harking back to AristotIe's method of contrasting instances. 
17 The Principle of Form is generally accepted in current logic (cf. Church, p. 55). 
Recognition of its general acceptance is sometimes obscured by two kinds of apparent 
challenges - each correct in its own way but not to the point at issue. (1) Ryle wants 
to say (e.g.) that 'All animais are brown' implies 'All horses are brown' and, so, that 
implication is not a matter of form alone (Ryle, pp. 115-116). It is easy to regard the 
objection as verbal because, obviously, Ryle is understanding an argument to be 'valid' 
if addition of certain truths as premises will produce an argument valid in the above 
sense. (2) Oliver makes a more subtle point (p. 463). He attacks a variant of the Principle 
of Form by producing examples of the folIowing sort. 
IfAxy then Nxy If Sxy then Axy 
Nxy Axy 
?Axy ?Sxy 
According to Oliver's usage these two arguments are in the same form and yet the one 
on the left is obviously invalid (suppose x indicates 'men' and y 'horses') while the one 
on the right is obviously valid (in faet the conclusion follows immediately from the 
second premise). The resolution is that Oliver's notion of 'being in same form' is not 
the traditional one; rather it is a different but equally useful notion. Oliver takes two 
arguments to be in the same form if there is a scheme which subsumes both. Since both 
are subsumed under the scheme '(if P then Q, Q/P)' they are in the same form. It so 
happens that the scheme is not a valid scheme; it subsumes both valid and invalid 
arguments. He does allow the correctness of the above principle as stated (Oliver, 
p.465). 
18 Rose (p. 39) emphasizes the faet that AristotIe would establish the invalidity of 
several arguments at once by judicious choice of interrelated counter interpretations. 
19 A logical question concerning the validity of an argument is settled by using pre-
supposed procedures to deduce the conclusion from the premises. A metalogical 
question concerns the validity of the presupposed procedures and is usually 'answered' 
in terms of a theory of meaning (or a semantic system). 
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20 One is impressed with the sheer number of times that AristotIe alludes to the faet 
that tbere are but two methods of perfecting syllogisms - and tbis makes it all tbe 
more remarkable that an apparent third method occurs, the so-called method of 
ecthesis. There are two ways of explaining the discrepaney. In the first place, ecthesis 
is not a method of proof on a par with the direct and indirect methods; rather it con· 
sists in a c1ass of rwes of inference on a par with the c1ass of conversion rules and the 
c1ass of perfect syllogism rules (see be1ow). In the seeond place, and more importantly, 
ecthesis is c1early extrasystematic relative to AristotIe's logical system (or systems). 
It is only used three times (Lukasiewiez, p. 59), once in a c1early metalogical passage 
(25a17) and twice redundantly (28a23, 28b14). 
21 Specifieally, for example with regard to the first conversion rule (Cl), define the 
set-theoretic relation [RCI] on L such that for all s and s' in L, s [RCI]s' iff for some x 
and y in U, s=Nxy and s'=Nyx. Thus the rule [RCI] is, in effect, the set of all 'its 
applications'. Generally speaking, an n-plaeed rule of inference is an n + 1 - placed 
relation on sentenees. But, of course, not necessarily vice versa (cf. Corcoran, 'Theo-
ries', pp. 171-175). 
22 Quine has eonveniently listed all such arguments in pp. 76-79 of his Methods o/ 
Logic. Incidentally, the reader should regard the notion of 'valid argument' in principle 
4.2 as eonvenient parlanee for referring to Quine's list - so that no semantic notions 
have been used in this section in any essential way. 
23 There seems to be a vague feeling in some current circ1es that an argument with 
ineonsistent premises should not be regarded as an argument at all and that an 
'authentic' deduction eannot begin with an ineonsistent premise set. However, the 
only way of determining that a premise set is inconsistent is by dedueing contradictory 
conc1usions from it. Thus it wowd seem that those who wish to withhold 'authenticity' 
from deductions with inconsistent premise sets must accept the 'authentieity' of those 
very deductions in order to aseertain their 'non-authenticity'. One must admit, however, 
that the issue does seem to involve convention (nomos) more than nature (physis). On 
the other band, how does one determine the natural joints of the fowl except by noting 
where the neatest cuts are made? (ef. Phaedrus, 265e). 
24 For an interesting solution to 'the mystery of the fourth figure' (the problem of 
explaining why AristotIe seerned to stop at the third figure) see Rose, Aristotle's 
Syllogistic, pp. 57-79. 
25 It is in the interest or accuracy that we reluetantly admit that AristotIe also seems 
to claim the converse. It is gerrnane also to observe that, although the above c1aim is 
substantiated not only by examples but also by a general formula, the converse is false. 
It is also relevant to point out that the existence of this metaproof provides a negative 
answer to a question raised by William Parry concerning the nature of indirect deduc-
tions in Aristotle. Parry wondered whether AristotIe required that the contradiction 
explicitly involve one of the premises. An affirmative answer would rwe out abnormal 
indirect deductions which, as indicated above, form the basis of AristotIe's metaproof. 
26 For example, the whole revised system D3 ean be obtained from the system of 
Coreoran and Weaver (p. 373) by the folIowing changes in the latter. (1) Change the 
language to L. (2) Replace negations by contradictions. (3) Replace the rules of con-
ditionals and modal operators by the conversion and syllogism rwes. 
27 As an indication that AristotIe's c1arity concerning reductio is significant one may 
note with Iverson (p. 36) that Lukasiewicz (p. 55) misunderstood indirect proof. 
28 The consideration of extended deductions emerged from a suggestion by Howard 
Wasserman (Linguistics Department, University of Pennsylvania). 
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29 Of course one shouId not overlook the historicaI importance of Il (the Iogic having 
components L, S and D2) nor shouId the possibIe importance of lE (the Iogic having 
components L, S and DE) be minimized. In this connection we have been asked whether 
there are deductive systems other than D, DE, D2 and D3 implicit in the second logic. 
This question is confidently answered negatively, even though Patzig (p. 47) alleges to 
have found other systems in Prior Analytics I, 45. It is clear that this chapter merely 
investigates certain interrelationships among the three figures without raising any 
issues concerning alternative deductive systems. Although AristotIe speaks of 'reducing' 
first figure syllogisms to the other figures there is no mention of 'perfecting' first figure 
syllogisms (or any others for that matter) by means of syJlogisms in the other figures. 
Indeed, because of AristotIe's belief that syllogisms can be perfeeted only through the 
first figure, one should not expect to find any deductive systems besides those based 
on first figure syllogistic rules. In addition, one may note that Bochenski (p. 79) alleges 
to have found other deductive systems outside of the second logic in Prior Analyties II, 
10. But this chapter is the last of a group of three which together are largely repetitious 
of the material in Prior Ana/y ties I, 45 which we just discussed. 
30 See Corcoran, 'Completeness' and/or 'Natural Deduction'. 
31 Mates (Stoie Logie, pp. 4, 81, 82, 111, 112) has argued that the Stoics believed their 
deductive system to be complete. But had the Aristotelian passage (from 4Ob23 up 
to but not including 41bl) been lost Mates would have equivaIent grounds for saying 
that Aristotle believed his system complete. There are no grounds for thinking that 
the problem was raised in either case. 
32 Unfortunately, the Lukasiewicz formulation makes it possibIe to confuse these 
problems with the so-called decision problems. The two types of problems are distinct 
but interreIated to the extent that decidable logics are generally (but not necessarily) 
complete. It is hardly necessary to mention the fact that ordinary first order predi-
cate logic is complete but not decidable (Jeffrey, pp. 195ff; Kneale and Kneale, pp. 
733-734). 
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CORCORAN ON ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL THEOR y 
Jan Lukasiewicz, by his own account, entered the lists in 1923 as an inter-
preter of ancient logic from the standpoint of modem formallogic. In that 
year he began defending his view of the contrast of Stoic logic with 
Aristotelian logic; this view appeared in print for the fint time in 1930.1 
This was followed by the Polish version in 1934, and the German in 1935, 
of his landmark paper, 'On the History of the Logic of Propositions' [9]. 
During the same period Lukasiewicz was lecturing on Aristotle's syllogis-
tic. An authorized version of his lectures on this and other logical topics 
was published by students at the University ofWarsaw in 1929, republish-
ed in Warsaw in 1958, and finally translated into English in 1963 under 
the title Elements of Mathematical Logic [7]. Lukasiewicz elaborated his 
researches until he issued in 1951 his now famous monograph Aristotie's 
Syllogisticfrom the Stand point of Modem Formal Logic. A second edition, 
enlarged but not revised, appeared in 1957, its author's death having oc-
curred in the previous year [6]. 
Lukasiewicz thus has held the field for nearly half a century. Questions 
have been raised about some details of his interpretation, and corrections 
have been made of some of his mistakes in matters of fact, but, so far as 
I know, no one had brought a direct challenge against the main lines of 
Lukasiewicz's interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic and its place in an-
cient logic until John Corcoran did so in 'A Mathematical Modelof 
Aristotle's Syllogistic' [3]. Indeed, so spectacular a tour de force was 
Lukasiewicz's book that, despite his own protestations that he was setting 
out the system merely "in dose connexion with the ideas set forth by 
Aristotle himself" ([6], p. 77) and "on the lines laid down by Aristotle 
himself" ([6], p. viii), his account has gained wide acceptance as the de-
finitive presentation of Aristotie's syllogistic, and some writers lead one 
to believe that Aristotle's system is no more and no less than what 
Lukasiewicz proposes. 
Lukasiewicz's view, very briefly put, is this: The logic of Aristotle is 
a theory of the relations A, E, I, and O (in their mediaeval senses) in the 
J. Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations, 133-148. All Rights Reserved 
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field of universal terms ([6], p. 14). It is a theory of special relations, like 
a mathematical theory ([6], p. 15). As a logic of terms, it presupposes a 
more fundamentallogic of propositions, which, however, was unknown 
to Aristotle and was discovered by the Stoics in the century after him 
([6], p. 49). AristotIe's theory is an axiomatized deductive system, in which 
the reduction of the other syllogistic moods to those of the first figure is 
to be understood as the proof of these moods as theorems by means of 
the axioms of the system ([6], p. 44). 
Corcoran has proposed, on the other hand, that Aristotle's syllogistic 
is not an axiomatic science but rather a natural deduction system, and 
that the theory is itself fundamental, presupposing neither the logic of 
propositions nor any other underlying logic. 
Corcoran's proposals have a go od deal to recommend them. First, Cor-
coran provides a faithful reconstruction of Aristotle's method. Although 
Lukasiewicz gives a system that does arrive at Aristotie's results, obtain-
ing and rejecting laws corresponding to the moods which Aristotle ob-
tains and rejects, his derivations, by substitution and detachment from 
axioms, have nothing in common with Aristotie's own method. Indeed, 
Lukasiewicz must say that Aristotle's proposals about method are wrong, 
and that Aristotle did not and could not use the technique of perfecting 
syllogisms, which Aristotle daims over and over again that he is using. 2 
Corcoran, on the other hand, not only makes perfect sense of the doctrine 
ofperfecting syllogisms, but he is willing to take Aristotle at his word in-
stead of being content to elaborate a system allegedly in dose connexion 
with Aristotie's ideas. The upshot is that Corcoran succeeds, as Lukasie-
wicz did, in reproducing Aristotle's results, and he succeeds, as 
Lukasiewicz did not, in reproducing Aristotle's method step by step, so 
that the annotated deductions of his system D are faithful translations of 
Aristotle's exposition. Corcoran's concern for method is prompted by his 
belief that AristotIe shared this concern. I think there can be no doubt 
that he is correct. Aristotle sets out his method in detail which if concise 
is yet minute, and when, at the beginning of Chapter XXX of the first 
bo ok of the Priora (46a4), he summarizes his work so far, he speaks not 
of the same results in philosophy and every kind of art and study what-
soever, but of the same method (606<;) in all these branches of inquiry. 
Corcoran's interpretation also has the virtue of making sense of 
Aristotle's views concerning the place of syllogistic in his doctrine as a 
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whole. While Lukasiewicz apparently held that syllogistic was a science 
which must take its place beside the other sciences in the Aristotelian 
scheme, Corcoran proposes to take syllogistic as the underlying logic of 
the demonstrative sciences. Lukasiewicz held further that syllogistic itself 
presupposes propositional logic as an underlying logic - of which Aris-
totle, however, was ignorant. Corcoran, by contrast, suggests that syl-
logistic is a fundamentallogical system, presupposing no other. 
This circumstance, rather than Aristotle's ignorance, Corcoran observes, 
accounts for their being few passages in the corpus which ean be con-
strued as references to propositionallogic. But these passages are not so 
few nor so insignificant as Lukasiewicz and some other writers would have 
us believe. They include, for instance, the use of propositional variables 
(documented by Bochenski ([2], pp. 77, 97-98) at An. Pr. 4Ib36-42a5; 
53b12 sqq; 34a5 sqq; and by Ross ([16], ad loc.) at An. Post. 72b32-73a6), 
the use and even the explicit statement of laws of propositional logic 
(documented by Bochenski ([2], p. 98) at An. Pr. 53b7-10; 57a36 sqq; 
and by Lukasiewicz ([6], pp. 49-50) at An. Pr. 57bl [transposition]; 57b6 
[hypothetical syllogism]; 57b3 [both laws]), and the use of, or the 
discussion of the use of, propositional units of argumentation (among 
others, De Int. 17a20-24; An. Pr. 48a29, 38-39; Soph. E4. 169aI2-15; 
181a22-30). It should be remembered, too, that at the beginning of the 
Ana/ytica Priora Aristotle starts with premisses and resolves them into 
terms; he does not start with terms and build them up into premisses. 
The evidence points rather to Aristotle's awareness of propositional 
logic but his rejection of it as an instrument unfit for the purposes he 
intended. Aristotle, I propose, knew enough about propositional logic 
to have recognized it as the underlying logic of syllogistic and of all 
the other sciences on a par with syllogistic if it really played this rale.3 
We should then expect to find throughout the Analytica references to 
propositional logic as the underlying logic of syllogistic and of each of 
the demonstrative sciences. But we do not find them. What we do find, as 
Corcoran points out, is every indication both that Aristotle regarded syl-
logistic as a fundamentallogie and that he considered it to be the under-
lying logic of the demonstrative sciences. My suggestion is, then, that 
Aristotle could have elaborated a system of propositionallogic, but that 
the theory of demonstrative science which he envisioned required a system 
of analyzed propositions, in which the modality of predications could be 
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clearly shown. Thus he rejected a logic of unanalyzed propositions in 
favor of syllogistic. 
Corcoran, it seems to me, has made a very important contribution to 
our understanding of Aristotle's logic, and the suggestions offered in what 
follows should not be construed as impugning in any substantive way the 
value of that contribution. 
Of the many points Corcoran raises, I intend to take up four: (1) 
whether syllogistic is a science; (2) whether the theory of propositional 
forms presupposed by syllogistic is adequate; (3) whether Aristotle had 
a doctrine of logical truth; and (4) whether Aristotle considered reasoning 
natural or conventional. 
The fint question needs to be divided. Corcoran notes that a theory of 
deduction is to be distinguished from an axiomatic science and further 
that theories of deduction have been distinguished as 'natural' or 'axiom-
atic'. He seeks to refute what he regards as Lukasiewicz's claim that 
syllogistic is an axiomatic science, and, moreover, a science in Aristotle's 
terms. However, there seems to be some ambivalence both in the claim 
and in the refutation. Lukasiewicz, if pressed, would probably not have 
insisted that syllogistic is a science in Aristotle's terms, since he was well 
aware of the quarrel between the Stoics and the Peripatetics about the 
relation of logic to philosophy. In this connection he quotes Ammonius 
to the effect that the Peripatetics folIowing Aristotle treated logic as an 
instrument of philosophy, opposing the Stoics who treated it as part of 
philosophy ([6], p. 13). But Corcoran is correct in that Lukasiewicz's 
work as it stands leaves itself open to his charge: in contending that 
syllogistic is a science like a mathematical theory, Lukasiewicz has led us 
to believe that it would occupy a place beside physics, mathematics, astro-
nomy, and theology in the Aristotelian scheme.4 
Corcoran argues convincingly, I think, both that syllogistic is not a 
science in AristotIe's sense (because it has no genus) and that it is not an 
axiomatic science in any sense (because either it would be its own under-
lying logic, which is impossible, or it would presuppose an underlying 
logic, which is false). Having established that syllogistic is a theory of 
deduction and not an axiomatic science, Corcoran goes on to refute 
Lukasiewicz's more serious claim, that syllogistic is an axiomatic deduc-
tive system, by showing, again convincingly, that syllogistic is a natural 
deduction system. 
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But I wonder how hard and fast Corcoran himself draws the lines which 
he accuses Lukasiewicz of overstepping. Corcoran titles his study 'A 
Mathematical Modelof Aristotle's Syllogistic', and in an earlier version 
he spoke of 
mathematica! logic as a branch of applied mathematics which constructs and studies 
mathematical models in order to gain understanding of logical phenomena. From this 
standpoint mathematica! logics are comparab!e to the mathematical models of solar 
systems, vibrating strings, or atoms in mathematical physics and to the mathematical 
models of computers in automata theory. 
Thus it appears that, even if syllogistic itself is not a scientific exercise, 
at least Corcoran's reconstruction of it is a scientific exercise. 
Furthermore, in 'Three Logical Theories', the comprehensive study 
laying the ground for his present work, Corcoran describes what he does 
therein as "a contribution to the philosophy of the science of logic" in 
the course of which he will "apply a certain methodological principle to 
logical systems considered as theories [Corcoran's italics]" ([4], p. 153). 
Hence, if Lukasiewicz, in comparing Aristotle's syllogistic to a part of 
the science of mathematics, merely intends that we should consider syl-
logistic as a theory, perhaps he is not so far wrong, even by Corcoran's 
standards. 
On the other hand, suppose we take the apparently stricter criterion 
proposed by Corcoran in his study of syllogistic - that a theory of deduc-
tion deals metalinguisticaUy with reasoning (it says how to perform con-
structions involving object language sentences), while a science deals with 
a domain of objects, insofar as certain properties and relations are in-
volved, and states its axioms in an object language whose non-Iogical 
constants are interpreted as indicating the required properties and rela-
tions and whose variables are interpreted as referring to objects in the 
universe of discourse. I am still not sure that Lukasiewicz ean be pinned. 
Lukasiewicz calls the logic of Aristotle "a theory of the relations A, 
E, I, and O in the field of universal terms" ([6], p. 14). Note that 
Lukasiewicz says 'universal terms', not 'secondary substances', as Cor-
coran would have it. Further, Lukasiewicz states that the 'term-variables' 
of his formalization of Aristotle's system "have as values universal terms, 
as 'man' or 'anima!''' ([6], p. 77). Here Lukasiewicz not only reiterates 
his provision that Aristotle's theory concerns not objects but expressions, 
he also uses the convention of single quotes to indicate, by mentioning 
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and not using the values of his variables, that these values are not objects 
but expressions. So Lukasiewicz's reconstruction comes out as theory of 
object language sentences, not as a theory of objects. Lukasiewicz will 
not be pushed as far as Corcoran wants to push him, but Corcoran is 
undoubtedly right in challenging what appears to be Lukasiewicz's identi-
fication of syllogistic with axiomatized science. Lukasiewicz did only say 
that syllogistic was "like a mathematical theory" ([6], p. 13) and "similar 
to a mathematical theory" ([6], p. 73), but he failed to attach such riders 
to his claim as would have rendered that claim consistent with the details 
of his reconstruction as he actually performed it. 
The second point I wish to take up is the charge Corcoran lays against 
Aristotle that the theory of propositional forms presupposed in syllogistic 
is "very seriously inadequate" and "oversimplified". Corcoran gives me 
to understand that by this charge he means especially that Aristotle's 
theory of propositional forms is inadequate to the expression of the axioms 
of science in his own day. Re further invites my attention to three ques-
tions which he thinks ought to be distinguished: (i) is the theory of 
propositional forms presupposed in the second logic the entire Aristote-
lian theory (Corcoran answers his own question in the negative and says 
Aristotle would have admitted as much); (ii) is the theory of propositional 
forms ofthe second logic adequate for, say, geometry (answer: no, again 
Aristotle would have admitted this); and (iii) is Aristotle's whole theory 
of propositional forms (as found in the Categoriae, De Interpretatione, 
etc.) adequate for geometry (a much harder question, says Corcoran). 
Now, not being a geometrician or even ahistorian of geometry, I shall 
not attempt to answer the question whether Aristotle's theory of proposi-
tional forms is adequate for geometry. What I shall try to point out is 
that the theory of propositional forms presupposed by analytical syllo-
gistic is not so simple as Corcoran suggests. By 'analyticai syllogistic', I 
mean the deductive system set out in the Analytica Priora; thi s is a part 
of syllogistic in general, which also includes non-analytical syllogistic, or 
dialectical syllogistic, as it is sometimes called, set out in the Topica and 
elsewhere.5 I further distinguish, within analytical syllogistic, non-demon-
strative syllogistic and demonstrative syllogistic. 
It is true that the theory of propositional forms in use in demonstrative 
syllogistic is severely limited, and limited for cogent reasons connected 
with its intended interpretation, but there is no reason to suppose that 
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the theory in use in Aristotle's exposition of analytieal syllogistie is any 
less eomplex than the theory presented in the Categoriae, De Interpreta-
tione, Topica, and elsewhere in the corpus. Coreoran takes the view that 
Aristotle's syllogistie 'master language' is made up of the logical con-
stants A, N, S, $ (Corcoran's updated A, E, I, O) and the set U of non-
logical eonstants or content words. Coreoran had formerly held, in an 
apparent effort to assimilate AristotIe's work to that of eontemporary 
logicians, that the set U comprised infinitely many characters representing 
infinitely many secondary substanees or universals. Coreoran held further, 
however - regarding what he saw as a contrast with contemporary com-
prehensive theories of deduction - that the only content words appearing 
in syllogistic premises were the names of secondary substanees and that 
these premisses exc1uded proper names, adjectives, and relational ex-
pressions. He has modified this view so that he now holds simply that 
the set U of characters is non-empty, while he dec1ines to say what these 
characters represent, and that, even if proper names, adjectives, and re-
lational expressions are not exc1uded from syllogistic, still they are not 
"explicitly handled" therein. I believe that in what follows I present some 
of the evidenee which helped to induce him to modify his view. 
Myevidence is designed to show: first, that proper names, adjectives, 
and relational expressions ean appear in syllogistie premisses, although 
their roles in them are restricted ; second, that the characters in the set U 
represent designata in all the ten categories and that aecording to Aris-
totIe, although these designata are infinite in number, still the set U of 
characters representing them is finite; and, third, although it might be 
the case that Aristotle's theory of propositional forms is inadequate for 
some purposes, it is adequate for the purposes for which it was devised. 
To begin, it should be pointed out that in Aristotle's logical syntax 
'universal' (Ku90AOU) - a prepositional phrase which does not admit of 
a plural - is not a stand-in for 'secondary substanee' or 'name of a se-
condary substance'. Aristotle reeognizes quantifying conventions for sub-
jeets and for propositions but not for predicates (De Int. 17a39-b6). De-
signata ('trov npanUl'tmv, 17a39) of subject expressions are universal if 
they are such that their signs ean be predicated of many subjects ('man', 
for example); they are individual if they are such that their signs cannot 
be predicated of many subjects ('Callias', for example). 
A proposition may have either an individual or a universal subject 
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(De Int. 17b3). A proposition with an individual subject is a singular pro-
position. A proposition with a universal subject is either universal, if the 
predicate applies to all or to none of the subject, or not-universal, if the 
predicate applies to less than all and more than none of the subject. 
Aristotle modifies this analysis in the Analytica Priora only by introducing 
two sub-classifications of not-universal propositions - particular and in-
definite. 
Now it is true that, for Aristotle, only expressions whose designata are 
substances can take the subject place in sentences and only expressions 
whose designata are secondary substances - and these within certain addi-
tionallimits - can take both the subject place and the predicate place in 
sentences. The name of an individual primary substance cannot be a 
predicate; sentences with names of individuals in the predicate place are 
ill-formed - they are predications only accidentally (KU-rU OUI1PePllKO\;; 
cf. An. Pr. 43a34--35). 
Names of accidental attributes, on the other hand, may take only the 
predicate place in sentences, never the subject place (An. Post. 83bI9-22). 
When accidents appear to be treated as subjects, Aristotle holds, it is 
actually the object in which the accident is present which is the subject of 
predication (Cat. 5b ad init.; An. Post. 83a33). 
But this doctrine of Aristotle's does not exclude proper names and ad-
jectives from the premisses of syllogistic. All it accomplishes is the exclu-
sion of proper names from the predicate place, since these are les s general 
than their putative subjects, and the exclusion of disembodied accidents 
from the subject place, since there are no such things as disembodied 
accidents. Proper names are not excluded from the subject place, nor are 
adjective-qualified subjects excluded from the subject place. Examples of 
syllogistic premisses containing proper names (Aristornenes, 47b22; Mic-
calus, 47b30; Pittacus, 70a16, 26) occur in the Priora, as do examples 
containing adjectives (good, 24alO, 25a7, etc., white, 25b6 sqq, 26a38, 
etc.; inanimate, 26b 14, 27b ad fin., etc.). It is true, of course, that proper 
names are oflittle importance in Aristotelian scientific inquiry; his reasons 
for this are given in the well-known passage beginning at 43a25: indi-
viduals cannot be predicates, except in an accidental sense (lCU-rU oUI1Pe-
f311KO\;), highest genera cannot be subjects, except by way of opinion 
(KU-rU 06~uv); scientific inquiry is concerned chiefly with the orders inter-
mediate between these two extremes. But this no more excludes proper 
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names from the premisses of syllogistic than it excludes the names of 
highest genera therefrom. 
As to adjectives, several points ought to be noted. The first is that the 
ancient Greeks did not distinguish parts of speech preciselyas we do; 
moreover, they were especiaIly wont to use adjectives as substantives (by 
prefixing a definite article or by some other device). The second point is 
that AristotIe's logical syntax does not distinguish adjectives from nouns, 
nor indeed from verbs. His logical syntax recognizes only the name 
(OVOIlU) and the verb (piillu). These are best understood, I think, as 'argu-
ment', and 'function' or 'predicate'. A name, for Aristotle, is "a sound 
significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which 
no part is significant apart from the rest" (De Int. 16aI9-21). Names 
stand for states of affairs (1tpaYllu't'oc;, 16b23), and verbs not conjoined 
with arguments are names in this sense, but they make no assertions about 
states of affairs unless conjoined with arguments. Names serve as argu-
ments to proposition-forming functors; some inftexions of nouns are ex-
cluded because they do not meet this condition (De Int. 16a35-b5). A 
verb for Aristotle is 
that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time... it 
is a sign of something said of something else ... i.e. of something either predicable of 
or present in some other thing. (De Inf. l6b6-ll.) 
Verbs and tenses of verbs are proposition-forming functors; no expres-
sion, no matter how complex, is a proposition (AOYOV U1tOCPUV't'tKOV) un-
less it contains a verb (De Int. 17all-15). 
The third point is that AristotIe's semantic theory recognizes ten cate-
gories, or varieties of designata of expressions - substance and the nine 
accidents. In the definition of 'verb' above, the expression 'something 
either predicable of or present in some other thing' makes it clear that a 
verb or predicate may designate any non-individual falling under any of 
the ten categories. For Aristotle, secondary substances are predicable of 
other subjects, that is, they effect definitory predications ofthose subjects. 
Accidents, on the other hand, are present in subjects, that is, they effect 
descriptive predications of the subjects in which they inhere (Cat. la20-
lb9). 
AristotIe's list of categories cuts across distinctions among parts of 
speech. Likewise, his thematic separation of definitory predication from 
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descriptive predication cuts across those distinctions. Thus it is the case that 
for Aristotle adjectives, as well as more complex expressions, expressive 
of quantity, quality, relation,6 action, passion, time, place, habitus and 
situs are admitted to the premisses of syllogistic. 7 They are excluded from 
the premisses of demonstrative syllogistic, but not because they are adjec-
tives - rather because they are mere descriptive predicates, since their 
designata are accidents. Predicates in demonstrative premisses must be 
assigned to all of the subjects to which they might belong, and must be 
assigned to those subjects because ofwhat they are (Ku8'uu'tO).8 Demon-
strative premisses are definitory predications. Some adjectives, however, 
by contrast with expressions whose designata are mere accidents, ean 
effect the definitory or derivatively definitory predications requisite for 
demonstration. For instance, 'inanimate', an adjective we have aiready 
seen exemplified, since it represents a differentia,9 could occur in a de-
monstrative premiss. 
To sum up, then, the vocabulary of analyticai syllogistic -and that of 
dialectical syllogistic as well - draws on expressions in all the ten cate-
gories. The characters in the set U of non-Iogical constants in Corcoran's 
syllogistic master language L should be said to represent not only se-
condary substances but also primary substances (as long as they occur in 
the subject place only) and accidents (as long as they occur in the predicate 
place only). These designata represented by the set U are infinite in num-
ber, but the set U of characters itself is finite. Aristotle's view, as expressed 
at Sophistici Elenchi 165a5 sqq, is that while designata are infinite in 
number (nt os 1tpaYllu'tu 'tov apt81l0v li1tEtpa), these designata them-
selves are not introduced into discussion, but names are used to stand 
for them, and names and the sum total of formulae are finite ('tu ... 
OVOIlU'tU 1tE1ttPUVtat Kui 'to 'tWV 'Aoyrov 1tAfj80r;), so that a single name 
or formula must stand for many designata (avaYKulov ODV 1t'AElro 'tov 
u\nOV 'Aoyov Kui 'tOUVOIlU 'to EV cnllluivElV).l° 
Demonstrative syllogistic, a methodological sub-system of analytical 
syllogistic, employs a sub-Ianguage of the master language. This sub-
language, however, is not a topicai sub-Ianguage, as are the proper lan-
guages of the several sciences in which demonstration is employed. It 
is rather a topic-neutral but modally partisan language whose non-Iogical 
constants are limited to characters representing species, genera, differen-
tiae, properties, and definitions. This set of characters also is finite. 
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It should be mentioned that there are no modally neutral premisses 
even in the so-called assertoric syllogistic. Descriptive predications are 
contingent, and definitory predications are necessary in varying degrees. 
Hence, 'assertoric syllogistic' is something of a misnomer, although Aris-
totle apparently is willing to allow predications to be considered prescind-
ing from the modality conferred on them by their content words. Pre-
scinding from modality is one end which his use of variables allows him 
to accomplish. The relation of this tacit modality to the expressed mod-
ality of the so-called modal syllogistic has yet to be fully explored. 
What I propose in answer to Corcoran, then, is that the theory of 
propositional forms presupposed in the Analytiea and used for analytical 
syllogistic is no more limited and no less complex than the theory elaborat-
ed elsewhere in the corpus. As I have said, I am not competent to deal 
with the question whether Aristotle's theory of propositional forms is 
adequate for geometry. But I would like to draw attention to a statement 
of Aristotle's whose full force has not been appreciated. Everyone has 
noted that in the first sentence of the Analytiea Priora Aristotle announces 
that his inquiry is concerned with demonstration and belongs to demon-
strative science. Now 'demonstrative science' (e7ttcr'ttlJlll~ (btO()St1C'tt1Cii~) 
here could be taken either as a body of knowledge or as a mental activity. 
But whichever way this phrase is construed, Aristotle has laid double 
emphasis on the limited scope of his inquiry: he is concerned first of all 
with a certain method - demonstration, and, in addition, depending on 
how one takes 'demonstrative science', he is concerned with that method, 
either applied in its own proper field - demonstrative science - or applied 
through the exercise of its own proper intellectual virtue - demonstrative 
science. 
According to Aristotle, some sciences, by reason of the exactitude and 
necessity of their subject matter, are appropriate fieIds for the method of 
demonstration. But this is not to say that all the theorems of any given 
science are susceptible of being demonstrated in the Aristotelian fashion. 
A science may be counted among the demonstrative sciences because 
demonstration is used to exhibit some of its propositions. More strictly 
speaking, however, 'demonstrative science' designates solely the necessary 
knowledge secured by demonstration. Thus, while the limitations set on 
propositional forms in demonstrative syllogistic may make them inade-
quate to the expression of all the theses of, say, Greek geometry, still, 
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ex hypothesi, they are adequate to demonstration with its severely limited 
aims. Hence, if we allow Aristotle the intended interpretation of his de-
monstrative syllogistic, recognizing that demonstration is a method ap-
plied in a number of sciences but that it need not be the method which 
exhausts any science, then we should find it easier to grant that he played 
by the rules which he had himself laid down. 
On Corcoran's view, Aristotle had no doctrine of logical truth. There 
can be no doubt that he is entirely correct in pointing out that Aristotle 
did not have a doctrine of logical truth like the doctrines developed in 
this eentury.ll As Corcoran himself points out, however, and as Bochenski 
pointed out earlier ([2], pp. 92-93), Aristotle was conversant with the 
identity relation which plays such an important role in modern theories 
of logical truth. How could this be so? 
The answer seems to be connected with the faet that, for Aristotle, 
identifications are not predieations: on his view, there is no predication 
unless something is said of something else (An. Pr. 43a2S-43; De Int. 
16b6-1I). As he says, predicates must be of a higher order than their 
arguments (Cat. lb9; 2bIS-21). Thus his syllogistic, which is concerned 
with predications, leaves little place for the identity formulae that figure 
so large in theories of logical truth. 
Logically true statements evidently were employed in deductive con-
texts by some of AristotIe's contemporaries, but he seems to view the 
practice with disdain. For example, at Analytica Posteriora 73a6, Aris-
totle, in seeking to refute those who hold that demonstration is circular, 
remarks that their claim amounts to maintaining that "from A being so, 
A is so" (tau A oVto~ "Co A EO""Civ). From this tautology, he correctly 
observes, it is easy to prove anything. Hence it appears that Aristotle, 
aIthough he recognized some of the features found in modern theories of 
logical truth, considered these features disadvantageous in the develop-
ment of his own method of inquiry. 
Corcoran also takes the view that Aristotle, because he had no theory 
of logi cal truth in which logieally true statements are such in virtue of their 
form alone, had no system of logical axioms buiIt up from logicaIly true 
statements. Indeed, according to Corcoran, AristotIe did not distinguish 
logical from non-Iogical axioms beeause he had no idea of logical axioms. 
This, I think, is a littie too strong. Of course, it is true to say that in 
Aristotle there is no close analogue of modern discussions of logical 
CORCORAN ON ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL THEORY 145 
axioms vis-a-vis non-Iogical axioms. On the other hand, Aristotle does 
distinguish common principles of demonstrative science from the proper 
principles of the several demonstrative sciences (An. Post. 77a22 sqq; 
Metaph. 996b26 sqq). Now it must be admitted that Aristotle includes 
among common principles not only what might be acknowledged as logi-
cal laws - for instance, Excluded Middle and Contradiction, but also 
axioms which apply only to quantity - for instance, 'equals subtracted 
from equals have equal remainders'. These latter are reckoned among 
common principles because they are applied in the several fieids of arith-
metic, geometry, astronomy, optics, and so forth. These common prin-
ciples do differ from proper principles, however, in that they are in the 
nature of rules which one might plausibly write as the justification of a 
step in a deduction. Proper principles, by contrast, are the definitions 
assumed by each science of its own peculiar subject matter. So, granted 
that Aristotle does not distinguish logical from non-Iogical axioms quite 
as we do, still I think it is too strong to say that he does not distinguish 
them at all. 
Another feature of Aristotle's doetrine of truth which strikes one as 
anomalous in view both of modem practice and of his own apparent 
practice is his inclusion of a third variety of syllogistic premiss alongside 
universal and particular premisses. This third premiss variety - indefinite 
(åOtoptO"'tO~) - seems to resist extensional truth valuation and so to remain 
outside the set-theoretic interpretation which is usually given to syllogistic 
and which at least some statements of Aristotle's seem to indicate that 
he intended for it. Again, I shaH not attempt to settle this question here, 
but I would like to offer a few suggestions conceming Aristotle's seeming-
ly odd doetrine. 
It has often been supposed that åOtoptO"'toC; indicates a premiss which 
might be universal or particular but whose quantity is left in doubt. It 
has also been proposed that for Aristotle åOtoptO"'tOC; premisses are equiv-
alent to particular premisses (Bochenski [1], p. 43). This last is not true: 
what Aristotle does say is that in a given syllogistic schema replacement 
of a particular affirmative premiss by an a3toptO"'to~ premiss will yield 
the same result - either a valid syllogism or no syllogism, as the case may 
be (cf., for instance, An. Pr. 26b21; 27b36-38; 29a8 sqq; 29a27 sqq). 
Further, there are at least two items of evidence which suggest that 
the first supposition - that å3toptO"'toC; premisses as yet unquantified might 
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still become quantified - is not true either. ane item of evidence is drawn 
from Aristotle's examples of Mt6ptcr'tO~ premisses at 24a20-22: "con-
traries are studied by the same science" and "pleasure is not good". Now 
'contraries' and 'pleasure' are universal since they can be predicates ac-
cording to the rule stated at De Inf. 17a39, but there seems to be some 
question whether the objects they designate are properly numerable. Ryle 
in Dilemmas, for example, points out that pleasure is not the sort ofthing 
that one counts ([17], pp. 54-67, esp. p. 60). 
The suspected innumerability of these objects brings us to the second 
item of evidence - the term Mt6ptcrTO~ itself. This seems to be a technical 
term coined by Aristotle, since according to LSJ it does not occur before 
him and since the Greek word usually rendered 'indefinite' or 'indetermi-
nate' - a6ptcr'tO~ - was available. Aristotle in fact does avail himself of 
MptcrTO~, not only in the De Interpretatione (l6a32, bIS), but right in the 
Priora (32bll sqq), where modality, not quantity, is in question. 
If aot6ptcr'tO~ is an ad hoc coinage, what special force does Aristotle 
mean it to carry? A elue is provided at 26b24, where Mt6ptcr'tO~ is op-
posed to otcOptcr/lEVOV. Translators customarily render these 'indefinite' 
and 'definite', but this seems to be a hedge. Aristotle uses otroptcr/lEVOV 
in the Categoriae in his discussion of the two kinds af quantity (4b20 
sqq). Quantity, he says, is either discrete (otroptcr/lEVOV) or continuous 
(crUVSXE~), and among discrete quantities is number. So, if otroptcr/lEVOV 
means definite in the sense of 'discrete and numerable', I think we may 
take Mt6ptcrTO~ as its opposite, not in the sense of 'continuous', because 
crUVSXE~ aiready takes care of that, but simply in the sen se of 'innumerable'. 
It would appear, then, on this evidence, that Mt6ptcr'tO~ premisses are 
not so much quantifiable and as yet unquantified as they are in principle 
unquantifiable. Corcoran urges that they are extra-systematic with respect 
to syllogistic, and it is true that they are extra-systematic with respect to 
demonstrative syllogistic; but then so are particular premisses. an the 
other hand, aot6ptcr'tO~ premisses are useful in non-demonstrative in-
quiries, and premisses of this sort do figure, for instance, in the argumen-
tation of Books VII and X of the Ethica Nicomachea. 
In his conclusion Corcoran raises the tantalizing question whether rea-
soning on Aristotle's view is natural or conventional. This would be a 
fit subject for a whole monograph, so I shall content myself here with 
suggesting the lines along which such a monograph might be composed. 
CORCORAN ON ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL THEORY 147 
First, one would have to point out that for Aristotle no hard lines divide 
natural from the conventional. Next, one might observe that for Aristotle 
the basis of reasoning, that is, the grasp of first principles, is immediate, 
intuitive, non-discursive, and non-linguistic. The derivation of other 
knowledge from the first principles is mediated, discursive, and linguistic. 
For Aristotle, I think it is safe to say that all logic is language and all 
language is conventional, but that not all conventions are arbitrary. 
Swarthmore College 
NOTES 
1 Lukasiewicz [8]. See McCall [10], p. 69, n. 1, for Lukasiewicz's remark concerning 
the date of his first proposais. 
2 Lukasiewicz [6], p. 44. For texts in An. Pr. and An. Post., see Corcoran [3]. 
3 Please note that I do not make the claim that Aristotle did develop a system of 
propositionallogic. Such an Aristotelian system, if there is one, waits to be discovered. 
My claim is only the much more modest one which attributes the absence of a propo-
sitionallogic not to Aristotle's ignorance nor to his inability but rather to his having 
other interests. 
4 For including astronomy in the Aristotelian division of sciences, see Merlan [11], 
p. 6; for excluding mathematics, see Merlan [12]; for including both mathematics and 
astronomy, see Mulhern [14]. 
5 I follow Bochenski ([2], p. 88 passim) in recognizing analyticai and non-analytical 
branches of syllogistic. 
6 Bochenski ([2], pp. 9S-97) finds laws of the logic of relations at Top. 114a18 sqq; 
119b3 sqq; 114b40-11Sa2; An. Pr. 48a40b9; 48blO-14, 14-19,20-27; and Top. 114b38-
11Sa14. It should be noted that C. S. Peirce claimed over and over an Aristotelian 
precedent for the logic of relatives. Cf. Peirce [IS] 2.532, 2.SS2-SS3, 2.S77, and 3.643. 
7 The occurrence of 'white', 'black', 'good', and 'inanimate' in syllogistic premisses 
has aiready been noted. There also occur in An. Pr. 'wild' (28b adjin.), 'moves' (30a31), 
'waking' and 'sleeping' (3lb9), 'biped' (3lb3l), 'intelligent' (34b33), 'upright' (41blO), 
and so on. Aristotie also discusses the establishment orrefutation, by syllogistic means, 
of accidents and properties, as well as genera (cf. 42b26 sqq). 
8 Cr. An. Post. 73a21-74a3. For a detailed discussion of this passage, see Mulhern 
[13]. 
9 Differentiae, for Aristotle, are products, not conditions, of analysis; they do not 
answer to designata in any category. They are, however, assimilated to genera by 
Aristotle (Top. 101b19). They do not of themselves constitute definitory predicates, 
but their role in Aristotle's theory of predication is to express, in combination with 
the names of genera, analyses of species - that is to say, the definitions which are exhib-
ited in demonstration. 
10 Cf. Aristotle's statement at Metaph. l007al4-1S that accidents are infinite. Norman 
Kretzmann has correctly noted the importance of Soph. El. l6SaS sqq for the history 
of semantics. See Kretzmann [S], p. 362. 
11 For a useful precis of such systems, see Corcoran [4], (1) Logical Truth: Logistic 
Systems. 
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PART FOUR 
STOlC LOGlC 
JOSIAH GOULD 
DEDUCTION IN STOIC LOGIC 
In their logical theory Stoic philosophers made use of a simple but im-
portant distinction alleged to hold among valid arguments, adistinetion 
to which Aristotle had first called attention. l They distinguished those 
arguments whose validity is evident from those whose validity is not 
evident and so needs to be demonstrated. The Stoics, having supposed 
that the distinction obtains, raise and answer the question, how does one 
demonstrate the validity of those arguments whose validity is not plain? 
The Stoics appear to have set forth both adiscursive method of demonstra-
tion and a test for validity. In this paper lexamine these two facets of 
Stoic logic. 2 
The paper is in three parts. The first is essentially terminological and 
taxonomic. There I record Stoic definitions of logical terms and I give 
three Stoic classifications of arguments, appending samples from the 
writings of Sextus Empiricus.3 This provides and puts on exhibit an array 
of typically Stoic arguments to which I refer in the second part of the 
paper. There I examine Sextus' contention that the disagreement among 
the Stoics over the criterion of truth for a conditional proposition renders 
inefficacious the test that had been set forth as sufficient for judging the 
validity of an argument, and I argue that Sextus' charge has to be quali-
fied. Even if an unqualified form ofSextus' accusation could be established, 
its importance, I maintain, would be diminished by the faet that the 
Stoics didn't make extensive use of this test anyhow. As I show in the 
third part of the paper, the Stoics ordinarily claim to prove the validity of 
all valid arguments 4 not by means of a test but by means of a calculus of 
propositions 5 having its base in a theory of deduction, which includes a 
language consisting of connectives and variables, axiomatic inference 
schemata, and rules of derivability. Iconclude with a statement about 
the Stoic theory of deduction in relation to systems of logic developed 
in the 19th and 20th centuries and to Aristotelian syllogistic. 
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In Sextus Empirieus' Outlines o/ Pyrrhonism 6 one finds the folIowing 
Stoic definitions of the expressions 'premises', 'conclusion', and 'argu-
ment' 
(i) 'premises' : the propositions assumed for the establishment of 
the conclusion, 
(ii) 'conclusion' : the proposition which is established by the pre-
mises 7, 
(iii) 'argument': a whole eomposed of premises and a conclusion. 
In terms of these definitions the questions I shaH be attempting to answer 
are: for the Stoies what are the conditions under whieh the premises in 
an argument 10gieaHy imply its conclusion ? And, if the premises of an 
argument in faet imply its conclusion but not evidently so, how aeeording 
to the Stoies may this relation oflogieal eonsequenee be made evident? 
Before dealing with these questions, however, I present several classifi-
cations of Stoic arguments (see the outline of these classifieations below). 
The first division of the first classification of arguments is into valid 
and invalid arguments. An argument is valid "when the eonditional having 
as its anteeedent the conjunetion forrned from the premises of the argu-
ment and as its eonsequent the conclusion of the argument is true" (P.H. 
ii.137). An example of a valid argument is 
(1) If it is day, it is light. 
It is day. 
Therefore it is light. 
Arguments whieh do not satisfy this condition are invalid. 
Next valid arguments are divided into those which are true and those 
whieh are not true. A true valid argument is one of which both the eon-
clusion and the premises are true (P.H. ii.l38). An example of a true 
valid argument is (1) above when set forth during the day. Arguments 
whieh do not satisfy this condition are not true. An example of a not-
true argument is the foHowing when made during the day: 
(2) If it is night, it is dark. 
It is night. 
Therefore it is dark. 
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Of true valid arguments some are demonstrative and some are not de-
monstrative. Demonstrative arguments are "those which conclude some-
thing non-evident through pre-evident premises".8 An example of a 
demonstrative true valid argument, preserved by Sextus (P.H. ii.140), 
is 
(3) If sweat flows through the surface of the skin, there exist im-
perceptible pores. 
Sweat flows through the surface of the skin. 
Therefore there exist imperceptible pores. 
An argument not satisfying this condition is not demonstrative. Argu-
ment (1) is an example of an argument which is valid, true when set forth 
during the day, and not demonstrative. It will be shown subsequently 
that there was another kind of argument called undemonstrated, which 
provides an additional important category of arguments. It is not to be 
confused with a not-demonstrative argument. 
Of demonstrative true valid arguments "some lead us through the pre-
mises to the conclusion ephodeutikos only" (P.H. ii.l41). I am not sure 
precisely what 'ephodeutikos' means. Etymologically the word suggests 
'advancing over a path towards something' and when the expression at-
taches to the word 'argument' a reasonable candidate for the 'something' 
would be the conclusion of the argument. But 'advancing over a path 
towards a conclusion' is a metaphorical description of arguments generaI-
ly and it fails to bring out what is peculiar to the type of argument to which 
the label is here attached. I simply transliterate the expression. A kind of 
this type argument is said to be one which "depends upon belief and 
memory". One might well ask, 'What kind of argument doesn't?' An 
example of an argument which depends on belief and memory is 
(4) If someone said to you that this man would be wealthy, this 
man will be wealthy. 
This god said to you that this man would be wealthy. 
Therefore this man will be wealthy. 
Sextus' comment on this argument is that we "assent to the conclusion 
not so much on account of the necessity of the premises as because we 
believe the assertion of the god" (P.H. ii.l41-142). 
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Contrasted with this type argument are those which "lead us to the 
conclusion not only ephodeutikos but also by way of discovery" (P.H 
ii.142). An example of such an argument is (3). The element of discovery 
in this argument is the disc10sure of the existence of pores through the 
fact that sweat flows through the surface of the skin. The element of be-
lief in the argument, apparently sufficient to provide the ephodeutikos 
component, is the "prior assumption that moisture cannot flow through 
a solid body" (P.H. ii.142). 
The components of a 'demonstration' may be derived from one com-
ponent of each division in this first c1assification, for a demonstration is 
a valid and true argument having a non-evident conclusion and disc10sing 
that conc1usion by the power ofthe premises (P.H. ii.143). I am uncertain 
as to the point of the last c1ause in Sextus' report. It appears to imply 
that the conc1usion is obtained without the aid of assumptions external to 
the premises of the argument, although this would involve the existence 
ofac1ass ofdemonstrative argumentsdifferent from those which are epho-
deutikos. 
Aseeond Stoic c1assifieation of arguments is also reported by Sextus, 
and it, too, ought to be kept in mind when thinking about deduetion in 
Stoic logic. This c1assification begins from a division of arguments into 
demonstrated and undemonstrated. I take a demonstrated argument in 
this eontext to be one whose validity has been made evident. I say more 
subsequently about how the validity of arguments is made evident. An 
argument is undemonstrated in one of two senses. The first sense is the 
eontradictory ofthat of 'demonstrated'. In this sense, then, an argument is 
undemonstrated if it has not been demonstrated (Adv. Math. viii.223), 
i.e., on my interpretation, ifit has not been shown to be valid. In a second 
sense an argument is undemonstrated if it is immediately evident that it 
is valid (ibid.). This distinetion may be brought out by noticing that the 
first sense is temporal inasmueh as an argument which is undemonstrated 
in that sense in 100 B.e. may be demonstrated in 50 B.e., while the 
second sense is non-temporal. 9 An argument is undemonstrated in this 
second sense if it exhibits one of five forms of argument whieh are referred 
to respectively as the first undemonstrated, the second undemonstrated, 
etc. These forms are also called inference schemata, and I have more to say 
about them below. For now I merely give the forms with illustrative ex-
amples (Gould, pp. 83-85): 
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The first undemonstrated 
(5) If the fint, the second. 
The first. 
Therefore the second. 
The second undemonstrated 
(6) If the first, the second. 
Not the second. 
Therefore not the first. 
The third undemonstrated 
(7) Not both the first and the 
second. 
The first. 
Therefore not the second. 
The fourth undemonstrated 
(8) Either the first or the 
second. 
The first. 
Therefore not the second. 
The fifth undemonstrated 
(9) Either the first or the 
second. 
Not the first. 
Therefore the second. 
If it is day, there is light. 
It is day. 
Therefore there is light. 
If it is day, there is light. 
There is not light. 
Therefore it is not day. 
Not both it is day and it is 
night. 
It is day. 
Therefore it is not night. 
Either it is day or it is 
night. 
It is day. 
Therefore it is not night. 
Either it is day or it is 
night. 
It is not day. 
Therefore it is night. 
A third cIassification divides valid arguments first into simple and non-
simple (Adv. Math. viii.228). A simple valid argument is one having the 
form of one of the five undemonstrated argument forms. A non-simple 
valid argument is one 'woven together' out of simple valid arguments in 
order that it may be known to be 'valid' (Adv. Math. viii.229). There are 
two kinds of non-simple arguments, one forrned from two or more simple 
arguments all of the same form, and the other composed from two or 
more simple arguments not of the same form. The former is a homoge-
neous non-simple and the latter, a heterogeneous non-simple argument 
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(ibid.). An example of a homogeneous non-simple argument is 
(lO) If it is day, then if it is day it is light. 
It is day. 
Therefore it is light. 
For upon analysis it may be seen to have been compounded from two 
simple arguments having the form of the fint undemonstrated. Analysis 
of this argument is carried out in accordance with the following 'dia-
lectical theorem' : 
(11) Whenever we have premises from which a certain conclusion 
can be validly deduced, potentially we have also that con-
c1usion among the premises, even ifit is not stated explicitly.l0 
One analyzes (10) by drawing the conclusion from the first two premises 
in accordance with the first undemonstrated inference schema, thus getting 
(12) If it is day, then if it is day it is light. 
It is day. 
Therefore if it is day, it is light. 
Then by the theorem stated in (11) one gets as premises 
(13) If it is day, then if it is day it is light. 
It is day. 
If it is day, it is light. 
And by another application of the first inference schema one gets the 
conclusion in (10). 
II 
Now with tbis array of Stoic arguments on display I go on to consider 
how the Stoics talked about valid argument and valid inference. In three 
relatively extended accounts of Stoic logic from antiquity (Diogenes Laer-
tius' Vitae vii. 42-83; Sextus Empiricus' Outlines o/ Pyrrhonism ii. and 
Adversus Mathematicos viii.) the talk about the validity of arguments is 
of two kinds. On the one hand, and tbis approach is found exc1usively in 
the reports by Sextus, the validity of an argument is linked to the truth of 
its corresponding conditional proposition, ie., to the conditional propo-
sition having as its antecedent a conjunction of the propositions forming 
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the premises of the argument and as its consequent the conclusion of the 
argument. Sextus is even more specific. Re makes the truth of its corre-
sponding conditional a sufficient condition for the validity of an argu-
ment. On the other hand, and this approach is found both in Sextus (Adv. 
Math. viii.228-229) and in Diogenes (Vitae vii. 79-81), the validity of 
some arguments is said to be evident and the validity of others, it is main-
tained, has to be shown by the analysis or resolution of them into those 
which are evidently valid. 
I want first to consider Sextus' ascription to the Stoics of the view that 
a sufficient condition for the validity of an argument is the truth of its 
corresponding conditional (henceforth 'the conditionalization test'). One 
doesn't find in the logic fragments of the Stoics very many references to 
such a test or its use, but that's a historicaI point. It cannot, I think, be 
denied that Sextus is right in suspecting that the conditionalization test 
would yield ambiguous results as long as the disagreement over the crite-
rion for the truth of a conditional proposition remained unsettled, but I 
shaH argue that there is something to be said here in defense of the Stoics. 
Four different criteria are attested and three of them are identical with 
three kinds of 'implication' which have had advocates in the 19th and 
20th centuries. I briefly treat these four criteria and then return to the 
conditionalization test. 
The first criterion is that "the conditional proposition is true when it 
does not begin from the true and conclude with the false" (Adv. Math. 
viii.1l3). This form of implication, as the texts make abundantly clear, is 
what is now caHed 'material implication' (Mates, p. 44). After its author, 
Philo, I caH a conditional true by this criterion a Philonian conditional. 
The second of the criteria is that "the conditional proposition is true 
which neither could nor can beginning from the true conclude with the 
false" (Adv. Math. viii.llS). This criterion is attributed to Diodorus, and 
I caU a conditional true by this criterion a Diodorean conditional. As 
Mates has convicingly shown (pp. 44-47), a Diodorean conditional is an 
always true Philonian conditional. This, then, appears to have been an 
ancient version of Whitehead's and Russe1l's formal implication.l1 The 
third and fourth criteria, which are not attributed to any individual, are 
authored by persons who seem to have interpreted conditional proposi-
tions as statements of necessary connection. As Martha Kneale writes, it 
"seems likely that they were formulated by philosophers who had in mind 
DEDUCTION IN STOIC LOGIC 159 
the use of conditionals in place of entailment statements" (p. 134). The 
third criterion of the truth of a conditional proposition is that such a pro-
position is true "whenever the contradictory of the consequent in it is 
incompatible with the antecedent in it" (P.H. ii.111). This looks very 
much like strict implication.12 It is not explicitly ascribed to Chrysippus, 
but I think he is its author and have said why elsewhere (Gould, pp. 72-
82). A conditional true by this criterion I call a Chrysippean conditional. 
The fourth criterion is that "the conditional proposition is true whose 
consequent is potentially included in its anteeedent" (P.H. ii.1I2). This 
criterion is ascribed to "those who judge by way of signification" and it, 
according to its unnamed authors, explicitly excludes conditionals with 
duplicated propositions, such as 'if it is day, it is day', on the gro und that 
every such duplicated conditional will be false (ibid.). I shall not recur to 
thi s type of true conditional, for I am not at all sure that Iunderstand it, 
and anyhow the Stoics countenanced true duplicated conditionals (Adv. 
Math. viii. 108-110), and so it is probable that none of them adhered to 
the signification theory. 
Now, returning to the conditionalization test, if the Stoics did invoke 
it to test the validity of arguments, it makes sense to raise the question, 
as Sextus did, whether the conditional corresponding to the argument 
being tested has to be a Philonian conditional, a Diodorean conditional, 
or a Chrysippean conditional? And I wish to consider that question, 
making use of the sample Stoic arguments presented in the first part of 
this paper. Consider first the conditional proposition corresponding to 
argument (1). It is 
(14) If (it is day, and if it is day then it is light), then it is light. 
For a Philonian a conditional is true when it does not begin from the 
true and conclude with the false. In particular for a Philonian, then, this 
proposition is true if (i) it is true that it is light and (ii) false that it is day 
and (iii) false that if it is day it is light. For in that case it begins from the 
false and concludes with the true. And so the corresponding argument, 
(1), is valid. But this is an incredibly weak test, for it would also yield the 
verdict valid on the folIowing argument: 
(15) If it is day, then it is day. 
It is day. 
Therefore, it is not day. 
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For the corresponding Philonian conditional is true if, say, it is true (i) 
that it is not day and false (ii) that it is day. Thus the test, using Philonian 
true conditionals, would pronounce valid an argument whose conclusion 
was the contradictory of one of its premises. Judging by examples of 
valid Stoic arguments which have survived in the literature, the Stoics 
did not use a Philonian conditional in the conditionalization test. And, 
as has been seen, there is a go od reason why they shouldn't have. So, if 
adispute broke out at all over this is sue, it would have been over the 
remaining three types of conditionals as candidates for use in the con-
ditionalization test. 
Advocates ofthe Philonian conditional may have claimed that for pur-
poses of a conditionalization test an always true Philonian conditional is 
required. And that would have been to concede that for purposes of the 
test a Diodorean true conditional is required. Now if one applies the 
conditionalization test and regards as true conditionals those which are 
Diodorean true, one will let pass all those conditionals for which it is 
never the case that while the antecedent is true the consequent is false. 
And arguments of the folIowing sort immediately come to mind: 
(16) If it is day and it is not day, then it is light. 
It is day and it is not day. 
Therefore it is light. 
(17) If it is day, then day is day. 
It is day. 
Therefore day is day. 
Leaving aside the faet that the Stoics may not have regarded (17) as being 
well-formed, its corresponding conditional will always be true, for it will 
never have a false consequent; and the corresponding conditional of (16) 
will always be true, for its antecedent will never be true. This brings out 
one of the consequences of regarding true conditionals as Diodorean true, 
and this is that it is not easy to see how one could ever conclude that such 
a conditional is true, unless it be stating a logical truth (Mates, p. 50; 
Hurst, p. 488). It is interesting to observe in this connection, however, 
that none of the sample arguments which have survived are degenerately 
valid arguments like (16) and (17) in form. A typical extant argument is 
(3), and its corresponding conditional is 
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(18) If (sweat flows through the surface of the skin, and if sweat 
flows through the surface of the skin then there exist imper-
ceptible pores), then there exist imperceptible pores. 
The Diodorean says that this conditional is true if it is never the case that 
it is true both (i) that sweat flows through the surface of the skin and (ii) 
that if sweat flows through the surface of the skin, there exist imper-
ceptible pores, while it is false (iii) that there exist imperceptible pores. 
And by this criterion the conditional proposition is of course true. It is 
never the case that one meets with this combination of truth values, be-
cause one cannot logicaIly have that combination. If the conjunction 
forming the antecedent is true, then the consequent must by logic be true, 
and so of course for any time you choose if at that time the antecedent is 
true, then the consequent is true. But, if this is so, the Diodorean truth 
of the conditional is being warranted by the incompatibility test, i.e., by 
the recognition that (18) is Chrysippean true. It is the case not just as a 
matter of fact that the antecedent is never true while the consequent is 
false, but rather it could not be the case that the antecedent is true while 
the consequent is false. And this is a 'could not' that derives not from a 
logically always false antecedent nor from a logicaIly always true con-
sequent, but one which deri ves from the logical incompatibility of the 
antecedent with the negation of the consequent. The conditional, (18), 
is tautologous, but that it is tautologous is guaranteed by the fact that 
its consequent is strictly implied by its anteeedent. Judging by the shape of 
the surviving arguments the Stoics must have believed that a sufficient 
condition - and, given the limitations of the human understanding and 
restrietions on what was to be regarded as logicaIly true (arguments which 
are degenerately valid apparently were not to be regarded as logicaIly 
true), also a necessary condition - for concluding that a conditional is 
Diodorean true is fint concluding that it is Chrysippean true. 
linfer, then, that Sextus was right in thinking that the Stoic disagree-
ment over the criterion of a true conditional proposition would be re-
flected in their doetrine that the truth of an argument' s corresponding 
conditional is a sufficient condition for the validity of the argument. 
Philonians would have had to concede that Philonian true conditionals 
are far too weak a test, passing arguments which no one would regard as 
valid. But there is no reason why they couldn't have said that for pur-
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poses of the conditionalization test, an always true Philonian conditional 
(a Diodorean true conditional) is required. And, while in principle logical 
truth generally guarantees Diodorean truth, in practice, to judge by the 
extant argument samples, it was thought that the Diodorean truth of an 
argument's corresponding conditional had itself to be warranted by a 
strict implication between the statement in its antecedent and that in its 
consequent. In his criticisms of the Stoics Sextus was right in princip le, 
but the Stoics perhaps felt the force of his remark less because of the 
circumstances I have described. 
It is clear that the Stoics maintained that if an argument's corresponding 
conditional is true, then the argument is valid. It is not equally evident 
that the dispute over the criterion for the truth of a conditional made 
the conditionalization test inefficacious. Indeed, it is not even evident 
that the Stoics made much use of the test. As I suggested above, the 
evidence shows the Stoics talking more about the proof of the validity of 
arguments than about the application of a criterion for the validity of 
arguments, and it is to this side of their theory of deduction that I now 
tUfll. 
III 
The Stoics assumed as basic or axiomatic the five 'undemonstrated' in-
ference schemata (Bochenski, p. 96). These five inference schemata were 
thought to be evidently valid and were called undemonstrated precisely 
because no demonstration was thought to be required to make their 
validity evident. Secondly, they maintained that the validity of all valid 
arguments in forms other than one ofthe five basic argument forms could 
be shown by analysis, 13 a procedure of reducing these other arguments 
by means of certain rules to a series of two or more arguments exhibiting 
one or more ofthe basic inference schemata. The variables in the schemata 
were the first two ordinal numerals, 'the first' and 'the second'; and the 
substituends for these variables were to be sentences expressing proposi-
tions and denoting truth values. As was suggested two sentences back, the 
Stoics apparently claimed that their propositional calculus was complete 
(P.H. ii. 156-157; Mates, pp. 81-82). 
Galen (SVF II 248) refers to four rules in accordance with which the 
analysis of non-simple arguments was to be carried out. We know two 
and possibly three of these rules. They are: 
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(19) First rule: 'If from two propositions a third is deduced, then 
either of the two together with the denial of the eonclusion 
yields the denial of the other.14 
(20) Third rule: 'Whenever from two premises a third is dedueed, 
and other propositions from whieh one of the premises is de-
ducibie are assumed, then from the other premise and those 
other propositions the same eonclusion will be deducible'. 
(Alexander, In Arist. An. Pr. Comment. 278, 12-14). 
Neither ofthe remaining two ru1es is given as such in the extant fragments, 
but Sextus has preserved (Adv. Math. viii 231) what he ealls a dialectieal 
theorem, and Mates has argued eonvineingly (p. 78, note 77) that this 
must have been the Stoics' seeond rule. It goes as follows: 
(21) = (11) Second rule: 'Whenever we have premises from which a 
certain eonclusion ean be valid1y dedueed, potentially we 
have also that conclusion among the premises, even if it is 
not stated explicitly'. 
We don 't know what the fourth rule was nor very mueh ab out how 
the Stoies applied these rules. Mates' discussion and examples are well-
known. I give now two samples, preserved by Sextus, of heterogeneous 
non-simple arguments. Eaeh makes use of the third rule for an analysis 
of the argument whieh makes its validity beeome evident. The seeond of 
them shows that the Stoics must have had some principle about the inter-
definability of connectives. One sueh argument is the following (Adv. 
Math. viii.234): 
(22) (i) Ifthe phenomena appear in the same way to all those who are 
in a similar eondition and signs are phenomena, then signs 
appear in the same way to all those who are in a similar con-
dition. 
(ii) Phenomena appear in the same way to all those who are in 
a similar condition. 
(iii) Signs do not appear in the same way to all those who are in 
a similar condition. 
(iv) Therefore signs are not phenomena.15 
Putting (i) and (iii) of this argument together one ean deduce the negation 
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of the antecedent in (i) in accordance with the second inference schema. 
Next in accordance with the third rule one can put this negation together 
with (ii) and by the third inference schema obtain the conclusion (iv). 
A second sample argument found in Cicero (De Divinatione xxxviii. 
82-83), a more complex variety of the non-simple heterogeneous form, 
goes as foIIows: 
(23) (i) If the gods exist and they do not dec1are to men beforehand 
what future events wiII be, then either they do not love men, 
they do not know what future events wiII be, they judge that 
it is of no importance to men to know what the future wiII be, 
they think it is not consonant with their dignity to prean-
nounce what future events wiII be, or the gods cannot reveal 
what future events wiII beo 
(ii) It is not the case that they do not love us, nor is it the case that 
they are ignorant of the things which they themselves form 
and design, nor is it of no importance for us to know those 
things which wiII happen in the future, nor does giving signs 
of the future comport badly with their dignity, nor is it the 
case that they cannot reveal what future events wiIl beo 
(iii) Therefore it is not true that there are gods and that they do 
not give signs of future events. 
(iv) There are gods. 
(v) Therefore the gods do give signs of future events. 
In this argument (ii) could have been regarded as the negation of the 
consequent in (i) only if there had been some principle which permitted 
negated conjuncts in a conjunction to be defined in terms of a negated 
disjunction having as disjuncts those conjuncts unnegated. I assume that 
the Stoics had some such principle of the interdefinabiIity of connectives 
(Bochenski, p. 92). Step (iii) is derivable from (i) and (ii) by the second 
undemonstrated inference schema and by Rule Two may appear together 
with the premises. From it together with (iv) the conclusion (v) is derivable 
by the third undemonstrated inference schema.16 
In light of what the Stoics said about valid arguments, their c1assifica-
tion and examples of invalid arguments (as reported by Sextus P.H. 
ii. 146-151) has some curious features. Briefly, they categorized invalid 
arguments as incoherent, redundant, in bad form, or deficient. An ex-
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ample (P.H. ii.146) of an incoherent argument is 
(24) If it is day, it is light. 
Wheat is being sold in the market. 
Therefore Dion is walking. 
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An inchoherent argument, then, appears to be one in which the proposi-
tions forming premises and conclusion are all logicaIly independent of 
one another. Notice that an incoherent argument could pass a condition-
alization test, given the appropriate circumstances, if the conditional in the 
test were regarded as true because Philonian true, but would not pas s 
that test if the conditional in it had to be either Diodorean true or Chrysip-
pean true. 
An example (P.H. ii.147) of a redundant argument is 
(25) If it is day, it is light 
It is day and Dion is walking. 
Therefore it is light. 
Such an 'invalid' argument appears to be one having an unused premise. 
Given a rule for conjunction elimination, the argument could be shown 
to exhibit the first undemonstrated argument form and to pass the con-
ditionalization test. 
The example of an argument in bad form preserved by Sextus (P.H. 
ii.l47) is 
(26) If it is day, it is light. 
It is light. 
Therefore it is day. 
This argument, obviously an instance of the fallacy of affirming the con-
sequent, could pass the conditionalization test if the conditional in ques-
tion were required to be only Philonian true but not otherwise. 
Finally, an example of an argument invalid because of deficiency is 
(P.H. ii.150) 
(27) Wealth is either go od or bad. 
But wealth is not bad. 
Therefore wealth is good. 
The argument is deficient inasmuch as the first premise does not state an 
exhaustive disjunction of the possibilities, having left out that of wealth 
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being indifferent. This extra-logical consideration was evidently thought 
to militate against the validity ofthe argument, an argument which passes 
the conditionalization test whether the conditional invoIved be regarded 
as PhiIonian, Diodorean, or Chrysippean true. 
DeveIopment of a caIcuIus of propositions in the wake of Aristotelian 
logic is a brilliant achievement, whether it be the achievement of the 
Megarians, the Stoics, or the Megarians and the Stoics (Bochenski, pp. 
78-79). How preciseIy and rigorously the system was deveIoped is difficult 
to say on the basis of the extant fragments. Probably it would be going 
toa far to ascribe to the Stoics a logistic including a language of primitive 
symbols (logical connectives and variables), formation rules, ruIes of in-
ference, and definitions. But in their theory of deduction one finds an 
astonishing number of anticipations of work in modem logical theory. 
What is more striking and what has gone more unnoticed is the sym-
metry between the Stoic logic of propositions and Aristotle's syllogistic. 
Corresponding to Aristotle's four perfect syllogisms are the Stoics' five 
basic inference schemata. Corresponding to Aristotle's rules of conver-
sion, reductio, and ecthesis are the Stoics' ruIes for the anaIysis of non-
simple valid arguments. In faet, the first inference rule of the Stoics just 
is a version of reductio ad absurdum (Bochenski, p. 81). Each logic makes 
the claim that all valid arguments ean be shown to be so on the basis of 
its axioms and ruIes of derivability. Finally a Stoic demonstrative argu-
ment is a species of valid argument having true premises just as for 
Aristotle a demonstrative syllogism is a species of valid syllogism having 
true premises. And, just as Aristotle had maintained that one cannot 
demonstrate all propositions, so the Stoics maintained that "one mustn't 
demand a demonstration of all propositions" (Adv. Math. viii.367). 
In concIusion, then, I should say that the Stoics' logic of propositions 
has several structural similarities with Aristotle's syllogistic and that it 
also Iooks forward to the more sophisticated deductive systems of the 
19th and 20th centuries. 
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NOTES 
l Prior Analytics I.24b22-26, 27al6-18. The distinction between plainly valid syIIogisms 
and non-evidently valid syIIogisms is for AristotIe the distinetion between 'perfect' 
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syllogisms, on the one hand, and 'imperfect' syllogisms, on the other. A perfect syl-
logism is one in which, as AristotIe frequently puts it, the necessity (of the conclusion 
if the premises be assumed) is evident. That the Stoics presupposed this distinetion is 
made clear in Part 111 of this paper. 
2 I wish to thank: my colleagues, James A. Thomas and Harold Morick, for helpful 
critical remarks on an earlier draft of this paper. I am also enormously indebted to 
John Corcoran for many incisive remarks and helpful suggestions on two later versions 
of the paper. 
3 Sextus is the richest source we have for a knowledge of Stoic logic. Being a Sceptic he 
is extremely critical of the Stoics. He also tends to be tediously repetitious. He appears 
to have quoted and paraphrased with care, though there aren't always non-circular 
ways of checking this. As Mates has observed (p. 9), "any parts of Stoic logic which 
he found either toa difficult or too good to refute will be absent from his account", 
but even so there is enough material in Sextus to extract a fairly good aceount of the 
elements of Stoic logic. 
4 Mates refers in several places (pp. 4, 58, 82) to and gives evidence for the Stoics' 
claim that their propositional logie was complete. 
5 The Stoics didn't call their logic a calculus of propositions (Diogenes Laertius groups 
Chrysippus' books dealing with the subject under the heading 'Logie in Relation to 
Arguments and Moods', Vitae vii. 193); but Stoic logic shares so many similarities 
with modem propositionallogic, calling their logic 'a calculus of propositions' while 
anachronistic is at least not baneful, and it is, in faet, in my view iIIuminating to use 
this expression to refer to Stoic logic. 
6 ii.135-136. This work will be referred to in the remainder of the paper as P.H. 
7 Thomas has rightly pointed out that the intent here must have been something like 
"the proposition which is allegedly established by the premises". Otherwise every 
conclusion would be the conclusion of a valid argument. 
s P.H. ii.l40. Sextus reports (P.H. ii.97-98) that the 'dogmatists' distinguished three 
kinds of non-evident objects. Some are absolutely non-evident; these are those which 
are not ofthe sort to fall under our apprehension, e.g., that the stars are even in number. 
Some are on occasion non-evident; these are of a sort to be evident but are made non-
evident on occasion by external circumstances, e.g., as a city in which I am not present 
now is to me. Finally, some are naturally non-evident; these are naturally incapable 
of falling under our clear apprehension, e.g., that there are imperceptible pores. 
9 I am indebted to John Corcoran for having suggested to me this feature of the dis-
tinction. 
10 Adv. Math. viii.231. I discuss this theorem below (p. 18) in conjunction with other 
Stoic rules of inference. 
11 'When an implication, say rpx. => .IfIX, is said to hold always, i.e. when (x) :rpx. => .'IIX, 
we shall say that rpxformally implies IfIx; and propositions oftheform '(x):rpx. => .XIfIX' 
will be said to state formal implications.' Alfred N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, 
Principia Mathematica to *56 (2nd ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1964), p. 20. I am 
not altogether certain that Diodorean implication is a species of formal implication, 
but it seems to me to wear that aspect, for, as Mates says (p. 45), '''If [Diodorean] it 
isday, thenitislight'holdsifandonlyif, 'If [Philonian] it is day at t, then it is light at 
t' holds for every value of t". And this appears to me to mean that if a Philonian 
conditional (material implication) holds always, it is Diodorean true, which is very 
like Russell's and Whitehead's characterization of formal implication as given above. 
Since Diodorus holds that what is always true is necessarily true, one might also feel 
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some temptation to say that Diodorean implication is an ancient version of C.I. 
Lewis' striet implication (see folIowing note and Mates' remark on this point, p. 47). 
12 "Thus 'p implies q' or 'p strietly implies q' is to mean 'It is false that it is possibIe 
that p should be true and q false' or 'The statement 'p is true and q is false' is not 
self-consistent'. When q is dedueible from p, to say 'p is true and q is false' is to assert, 
implicitly, a eontradietion." c.1. Lewis and C.H. Langford, Symbolie Logie, 2nd ed., 
Dover Pub!., Ine., New York, 1959, p. 124. 
13 The substantive term used here is 'analysis' (il ava 1..U(7t<,;), 'Sextus Empirieus', 
Adv. Math. viii.229. The verbal term is 'to analyze' (åvaMttv), SVF II 248. 
14 This is Mates' translation (p. 77) of the passage from Apuleius, In De Interp., 
277-278. 
15 This argument is aseribed by Sextus to Aenesidemus (Adv. Math. viii.234, 215), 
but when Sextus goes on to say (Ibid. 235), "An argument sueh as this is eomposed 
from a second and third undemonstrated argument, as it is possibIe to learn from anal y-
sis ... " we may infer that the analysis he applies is a Stoie analysis. 
16 For other passages in whieh some of the Stoic argument forms are exhibited, see 
SVF II 952, 1011, and 1012. 
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JOHN CORCORAN 
REMARKS ON STOlC DEDUCTION 
The purpose of this note is to raise and clarify certain questions concerning 
deduction in Stoic logic. Despite the fact that the extant corpus of relevant 
texts is limited, it may nevertheless be possibIe to answer some of these 
questions with a considerable degree of certainty. Moreover, with the an-
swers obtained one might be able to narrow the range of possibIe solu-
tions to other problems concerning Stoic theories of meaning and in-
ference. 
The content of this note goes somewhat beyond the comments l made 
during the discussion of Professor Gould's paper [8], 'Deduction in Stoic 
Logic', in the symposium. l am grateful to Professors Gould and Kretz-
mann for pointing out the implications of those comments as well as for 
encouraging me to prepare them for this volume. 
One of the obstacles to a careful discussion of Stoic logic is obscurity 
of terminology. Clarification of terminology may catalyze recognition of 
important historicaI facts. For example, in 1956 a modern logician sug-
gested (incorrectly) in a historicaI note [4, fn. 529] that the distinction 
between implication and deduction could not have been made before the 
work of Tarski and Carnap. But once historians had clarified their own 
terminology it became obvious that this distinction played an important 
role in logic from the very beginning. Aristotle's distinction between im-
perfect and perfect syllogisms is a variant of the implication-deduction 
distinction and Gould [8] suggests the existence of a parallel distinction 
in Stoic logic. 
1. lMPLICA TION AND INFERENCE 
Let us clarify our terminology. We use the two-placed verb 'to imply' (P 
implies c) to indicate the converse of the logical consequence relation. 
For us, its subject is always a set of sentences and its object is always a 
single sentence. For example, we might say that Euclid's Postulates imply 
J. Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations, 169-181. All Rights Reserved 
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Playfair's Postulate. As is common in ordinary English, we use the three-
placed verb 'to infer' to indicate a certain rational action. Thus, we might 
say that Playfair inferred his postulate from Euclid's postulates. The sub-
ject is always human, the direct object is always a single sentence and the 
prepositionaI object is always a set of sentences (but it is sometimes omit-
ted by ellipsis). 'To deduce' is a synonym for 'to infer'. 
The more common English usage of 'implies' presupposes that the sub-
ject contains only truths. Occasionally a logician has adopted this con-
vention, e.g., Frege [7; pp. 82, 105, 107] and Lukasiewicz [10, p. 55]. 
When it is not known whether the presupposition obtains, the common 
usage requires the verb to be put in the subjunctive in order to 'cancel' 
the presupposition. Thus Frege might say something like the following: 
the axiom of choice, if true, would imply Zorn's lemma. However, in 
this article the verb 'implies' never carries the presupposition. Our usage 
reftects Aristotle's fundamental discovery that the logical consequence 
relation is separable from issues of the material truth of premises. In 
effect, Aristotle saw that the so-called ground-consequence relation can 
be analyzed into a propert y (being 'grounds') and a relation ('implica-
tion'). 
Likewise, 'to infer' is often used with the presupposition that the sub-
ject knows that the prepositional object is true. According to this usage 
we might assert, "if Zorn inferred his lemma from the axiom of choice, he 
must have known that the axiom of choice is true and he must have dis-
covered that the axiom of choice implies his lemma." However, in this 
article our use of 'to infer' never carries the presupposition. To infer c 
from P is simply to deduce c from P, i.e., to discover by logical reasoning 
that Pimplies c. (Warning: according to this usage 'incorrect inference' 
is not inference, just as 'false pregnancy' is not pregnancy.) 
My opinion, stemming in part from reading Mates' Stoic Logic [12], 
Bury's translation of Sextus' writings [3], Gould [8] and other works, is 
that the Stoics did use the distinction between implication and inference. 
Here we come to the first problem. 
Problem l: (a) To explicate the Stoic analogue of the implication-in-
ference distinction. (b) To determine whether the Stoic usage involved 
presuppositions. (c) To determine whether the Stoics articulated the dis-
tinction (which is much more than simply using it). (d) To develop ex-
tensive textual support for the answers to the above. 
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2. ARGUMENTS, THEIR DEDUCTIONS AND THEIR 
COUNTERINTERPRET ATIONS 
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According to Gould [8] and others [e.g., 12, p. 58], the Stoics had a 
technical term (logos) which translates exactly into our technical term 
'argument' in the sense of a set P of sentences together with c, a single 
sentence (P is the premise set and c is the conclusion). Our technical term 
does not agree with common usage in several respects, the most note-
worthy of which is that one ean produce an argument (technicai sense) 
without engaging in any argumentation (reasoning, inference). To do this 
one simply specifies a set of sentences together with a single sentence. In 
the technical sense, arguments never express reasoning. In faet, one must 
engage in reasoning in order to determine the validity of an argument; 
therefore, the reasoning is not aiready expressed in the argument. An 
argument (P, c) is valid if and only if P implies c, otherwise invalid. An-
other confusion results from the faet that the terms 'premises' and 'con-
clusion' suggest that someone to ok the premises as 'his premises' and 
inferred the conclusion. Resnik [14] and Copi [5] define the term 'argu-
ment' in such a way that to call (P, c) an argument is to presuppose that 
someone to ok the premises as his premises and inferred the conclusion; 
but, of course, their subsequent usage accords with the definition, which 
does not make that logically irrelevant presupposition. Another confusion 
results from the inclination to regard 'argument' as an honorific term and 
to refuse to count as arguments certain 'bad' arguments (those which are 
invalid or which have contradictory premises or which include the con-
clusion among the premises). This confusion is encouraged to some extent 
by translating Aristotle's term syllogismos as 'argument' because for 
Aristotle all 'syllogisms' are valid; an invalid argument cannot be a 'syl-
logism' at all (not even an imperfect one). These reflections bring up the 
second problem. 
Problem 2: (a) What were the non-technical uses of the Stoic terms 
for 'argument', 'premise', 'conclusion' and 'valid' ? (b) What were the 
common connotations of these words ? (c) What kinds of confusions were 
likely to arise in technical usage because of the non-technical connota-
tions ? (d) Which of these confusions actually occurred? 
To proceed we need to review the well-known asymmetry between the 
normal mode of establishing validityand the normal mode of establishing 
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invalidity. For example, in Prior Analytics (I, 4, 5, 6) in order to establish 
that an argument (P, c) is valid, Aristotle produces a deduction, a list of 
easy logical steps leading (although not necessarily directly) from P to c 
and "making clear that the conclusion follows". On the other hand, in 
order to establish that an argument (P, c) is invalid, Aristotle produces a 
counter interpretation, i.e., he interprets the non-Iogical terms in such a 
way as to verify the premises and falsify the conclusion. It's the same in 
more complicated cases. To establish that Euclid's postulates (and axioms) 
imply the Pythagorean Theorem, one produces a step-by-step deduction 
of the latter from the former. To establish that the fifth postulate does 
not follow from the others one produces a counterinterpretation making 
the others true and the fifth false. 
The asymmetry between Aristotle's method of establishing validity and 
his method of establishing invalidity is more than just echoed by modern 
logicians. Tarski, for example, relegates the two methods to separate (but 
adjacent) sections ofhis Introduetion to Logic [16, §36, §37]. Af ter a brief 
discussion of deduction within an axiomatic framework, Tarski adds [op. 
cit., p. 119] 
More generally, if within Iogic or mathematics we estabIish one statement on the basis 
of others, we refer to this process as a derivation or deduction ... 
A few pages later [p. 124], he takes up the problem of showing that a 
certain sentence does not follow from certain premises. Here he discusses 
areinterpretation of the basic terms in a manner that willieave the pre-
mises true while making the conclusion false. 
Because the dichotomy of methods may not have been emphasized 
sufficiently in recent literature, it may appear to persist only in a somewhat 
muted form. However, I think that a case ean be made for the historicai 
thesis that what we now call 'proof theory' has its roots in the method of 
establishing validity whereas what we now call 'model theory' is rooted 
in the method for establishing invalidity. 
Our main concern here is with the Stoic method for establishing validity, 
but we ean still wonder about the Stoic method for establishing invalidity. 
As far as I have been able to determine, very little has been written about 
the latter and it may well be the case that the Aristotelian dichotomy was 
not preserved by the Stoics. They may have been concerned onIy with 
establishing validity. If this conjecture seems strange we may note that 
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there is nothing about establishing invalidity either in The Port-Royal 
Logic or in Boole's The Laws o/ Thought. Moreover, lang before the 
method of counterinterpretations was used to establish the invalidity 
of the argument from the other postulates of geometry to the parallel 
postulate, the argument was widely assumed to be invalid [cf. 4, p. 328]. 
Notice that a deduction is a piece of extended discourse consisting of 
several sentences over and above the premises and condusion. As an 
aside we might point out that our term 'lemma' which usually indicates 
an especially important intermediate line in a lang deduction was used 
by the Stoics to indicate a premise [loc. cit.]. As another aside which may 
be relevant to avoiding confusion we might note that some recent writers 
have used the terms 'a deduction' and 'an implication' interchangeably, 
sometimes using 'an implication' to indicate a valid argument (but, of 
course, for some older writers an implication is just an if-then sentence l). 
It is useful to imagine that the deductions and the counterinterpreta-
tions all exist prior to being 'produced' so that 'produetion' is re ally only 
exhibition. If this is too much, just imagine that all deductions and all 
counterinterpretations potentially exist. In any case think of both dasses 
of 'objects' as 'there'. Now we ean ask interesting questions about the 
completeness of the method for establishing validity and about the com-
pleteness of the method of establishing invalidity. First, does every valid 
argument have a corresponding deduction? Second, does every invalid 
argument have a corresponding counterinterpretation? 
Notice that only one of these questions ean be trivial. 1/ valid means 
having a deduction then the first question is trivial but the second is signi-
ficant. On the other hand, if valid means having no counterinterpretations 
then the second question is trivial while the first is significant. Standard 
practice seems to be to take the latter point of view, Le., to assume that 
valid means having no counterinterpretations. The significant question, 
then, is whether to every argument lacking counter interpretations there 
corresponds a deduction (to establish its validity). If not, then there are 
valid arguments whose validity cannot be established. 
In any case we are led to consider three large dasses : the das s of argu-
ments, the das s of deductions and the das s of interpretations. In the 
balance of this note we focus on the dass of deductions; but, of course, 
the dass of arguments and the das s of interpretations are both continual-
ly in the background. 
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3. AI MS OF THEORIES OF DEDUCTION 
It is unlikely that God gave men language and left it to Aristotle or to 
the Stoics to invent deductions. When Aristotle began his work there was 
an extant corpus of deductive discourses and a well-established activity 
of producing deductions. In fact, historians believe that there were at 
least two axiomatizations of geometry which existed prior to Aristotle's 
time. 
This situation leaves Aristotle with three options as far as the aim of 
his theory of deduction is concerned. He could have had a descriptive aim 
or a prescriptive aim or a conventionalistic aim. That is, roughly, he could 
have set himself the task of describing the class of deductions (by catalog-
ing the rules according to which they had been produced) or he could 
have prescribed the rules which should be used to produce ideally 'correct' 
deductions or he could have devised rules which would produce discourses 
which would serve the same purpose that ordinary deductions serve (viz. 
establishing that conclusions follow from premise-sets). There seems to 
be a tendency among mathematicians to assume that the descriptive ap-
proach is the dominant one not only in Aristotle but even in modern 
logic. Bourbaki [2, p. I], whose foundational writings have been influen-
tial, has said, 
Proofs had to exist before the structure of a proof could be logically analyzed; and this 
analysis, carried out by Aristotle, and again and more deeply by the modem logicians, 
must have rested then, as it does now, on a large body of mathematica! writing. 
Indeed, on reading the Analytics, it is hard to escape the conclusion that 
Aristotle's aim was descriptive. However, as Mueller [13] has shown, 
Aristotle's final product felI far short of success as a descriptive effort be-
cause even the most elementary deductions in Euclid cannot be produced 
by Aristotle's rules. Here we come to another problem. 
Problem 3: (a) To decide whether the Stoic logicians had set themselves 
descriptive or prescriptive or conventionalistic aims. (b) If the fint, to 
decide whether their 'data' incIuded the mathematical and scientific de-
ductions available to them or whether they restricted their data so as to 
incIude only 'philosophicaI' discourse. If the second, to discover the crite-
rion of correctness used to ground the 'should' of the prescriptions. If the 
third, to discover the reason they abandoned (or overlooked) the first 
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two goals. (c) In any case to adduce persuasive philological arguments 
for the above. 
4. SENTENTIAL AND ARGUMENTAL SYSTEMS OF DEDUCTION 
There are many different styles of systems of deduction and it is historical-
ly important to know the exact style that the Stoic system exemplified. 
Here we will characterize two styles which seem relevant to discussion of 
Stoic deduction. In order to determine the style of the latter it may be 
necessary for the historian to first construct an exhaustive survey of the 
extant styles and even then there is no reason to think that the Stoic 
system will necessarily conform to one of them. 
When a person first starts to think ab out deductions he often conceives 
of a deduction of c from P as a list of sentences beginning with those of 
P, having intermediate sentences added according to rules and ending 
with c. A deduction whose 'lines' are all sentences is called a sentential 
deduction. A direct, linear sentential deduction is one of the sort described 
above - one goes from the premises step-by-step directly to the conclusion. 
As I have suggested, I think that there is an inclination to think at first 
that all deductions are direct, linear and sentential. But this would be to 
overlook the indirect, linear, sentential deductions which proceed from 
P to c by assuming sentences in P, supposing also 'the denia!' of c and 
then adding immediate inferences until one arrives at a sentence and its 
own denial. Aristotie's deductive system is a linear sentential system with 
direct and indirect deductions. 
In regard to style the systems of Boole and Hilbert are more primitive 
than that of Aristotle because their deductions are all direct and linear. 
Systems of direct, linear, sentential deductions can have binary rules 
(which proceed from two local premises to a local conclusion, e.g. modus 
ponens) unary rules (which proceed from a single local premise to a local 
conclusion, e.g. universal instantiation) and nullary rules (which need no 
local premises and produce a local conclusion ab initio). Nullary rules are 
commonly referred to as logical axiom schemes. 
In addition to linear rules which proceed from finitely many local 
premises to a local conclusion, a sentential system can als o have sup-
positionaI rules which correspond to inference of a local conclusion (not 
from IocaI premises but) on the basis ofa 'pattern' of reasoning. For ex-
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ample conditionalization can be stated as a suppositional rule which 
proceeds to a conditional on the basis of a pattern of reasoning from the 
antecedent to the consequent. Thus the class of sentential deductive sys-
tems is quite diverse. It includes systems of direct linear deductions (Boole 
and Hilbert), systems of direct and indirect linear deductions (Aristotle) 
and systems of suppositional deductions (Jaskowski, Fitch, etc.). Many 
(but by no means all) of the so-called natural-deduction systems are sen-
tential (cf. [6, lIlD. 
Opposed to the sentential deductions (which are lists of sentences) there 
are those which are lists of arguments. Systems which consist entirely of 
lists of arguments are called argumental deductive systems. The systems of 
Lemmon [9], Suppes [IS] and Mates [11] are in this style. In creating an 
argumental deduction one does not start with premises and proceed to a 
conclusion but rather one takes ab initio certain simple arguments and 
constructs from them, line-by-line, increasingly complex arguments until 
the argument with desired premises and conclusion is reached. In argu-
mental systems the rules produce arguments from arguments (not sen-
tences from sentences). 
Given a certain minimal clear-headedness about the notion of a deduc-
tion, the problem of determining the exact nature of the Stoic deductive 
system (or systems) emerges. Let us put this down with a little care. 
Problem 4: (a) To describe the class(es) of discourses which the Stoic 
logicians regarded as deductions, i.e., which were taken to establish the 
validity of arguments. (b) For the (each) Stoic deductive system we need 
both an exact description of the rules and also an account of how the 
rules were used to produce extended discourses (deductions). 
5. THE STOl C FRAGMENTS 
The main purpose of this section is to review and interpret some of the 
available information concerning Stoic deduction in order to contribute 
toward a solution of the problem of discovering the style of the Stoic 
system. 
It has been suggested that the theory of deduction may have been of 
minor importance in Stoic logic because, since the Stoics had truth-tables, 
they could establish the validity of arguments by a computational rather 
than discursive means. Two points are relevant here. First, Mates claims 
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that there is no evidence that the Stoics used any computational means 
for establishing validity. Apparently the faet that truth-functional validity 
admits of a computational decision procedure, as embarrassingly trivial 
as it is, had to wait untill920 to be noticed. Second, the existence oftruth 
table methods should not disguise the faet that validity is always estab-
lished by a deduction - to compute a truth-table for a truth-functionally 
valid argument is nothing more (or less) than writing a deduction-by-cases 
in tabular form. 
Incidentally, I find it very difficult to understand how anyone could 
believe that the Stoics knew that their deductive system was complete when 
there is no evidence that they availed themselves of truth-table methods 
for establishing validity. Indeed, as has been pointed out elsewhere, if 
the Stoics had demonstrated completeness then sureIy they must have 
worked on the problem and, yet, there seem to be no fragments which 
admit of interpretation either as deliberation on the problem of demon-
strating completeness or as alluding to such deliberation. In my opinion, 
it is not even clear that the Stoics believed their system complete (cf. [12, 
pp. 81-82]). 
(A) Language: The Stoics analyzed sentences as truth-functional com-
binations of atomic sentences using as connectives: the conditional, con-
junction, exclusive disjunction, and negation. Here we use =:>, &, v and ~ . 
(B) Sentential rules: There were evidently five rules which 'produced' 
a single sentence from a pair of sentences and it is clear in each case that 
whenever the operands are true the resultant is true. Thus these five rules 
could serve as immediate sentential-inference rules (SIR, plural: SIRs) 
These can be written as follows: 
(SIRI) 
(SIR2) 
(SIR3) 
(SIR4) 
(SIR5) 
p=:> q,p/q, 
p =:> q, ~ q/ ~ p, 
~ (p & q),p/~ q, 
pvq,p/~ q, 
pvq, ~q/p. 
(C) Argumental rules: There were evidently four ruIes which produced 
an argument from a pair of arguments or (in at least one case) from a single 
argument. It is clear in the three known cases that whenever the operands 
are valid the resultant is also valid. Thus these rules could serve as imme-
diate argumental-injerence rules (AIR, plural AIRs). This concept will 
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be discussed below but, for the present, we will write these ruIes using a 
symboIic notation. For later reference we will quote the rule before 
symbolizing it. In symbolizing the argumental rules we use the arrow to 
separate premises from conclusion and we use the double slant line to 
separate operands from resultant Uust as we used the single slant line to 
separate operands from resultant in the sentential rules). 
(AIRI) Jf from two propositions a third is dedueed, then either of the 
two together with the denial of the eonclusion yields the denial of the other. 
This evidently gives two subrules. 
(AIRl.l) p, q --+ r I I p, '" r --+ '" q, 
(AIR1.2) p, q --+ r I I '" r, q --+ '" p. 
Here it should be noted that the Stoics could have been using the term 
'the denia!' ambiguously to indicate either the result of adding a negation 
to asentence or the result of deleting a negation from asentence (which 
stands with a negation). If this is so, one wouId get sixteen subrules 
(when r is a negation, when p is a negation and when q is a negation). 
(AIR2) Whenever we have premises from whieh a certain eonclusion ean 
be validly deduced, potentially we have also that eonclusion among the 
premises, even if it is not stated explicitly. 
To symbolize this let S be a set of premises and let S + p be the result 
of adding p to S. 
(AIR2) S --+ p; S + P --+ r II S --+ r. 
Today this rule is sometimes called 'the cut rule'; but there are other 
'cut' rules as well. 
(AIR3) Whenever from two premises a third is dedueed and other propo-
si/ions from whieh one of the premises is dedueible are assumed, then from 
the other premise and those other propositions the same eonclusion will be 
deducible. 
(AIR3) p, q --+ r; S --+ p II q + S --+ r. 
This is another 'cut' rule. A modem logician might be bamed by the 
presence of two cut rules. That the 'force' of (AIR2) is so close to that of 
(AIR3) causes some speculation concerning the accuracy of the sources. 
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It is not known what the fourth rule is but it has been alleged that the 
Stoics 'had conditionalization'. One AIR version of conditionalization 
ean be written as follows. 
(AIR4) S+p-q//S-(p:::lq). 
Incidentally, it is important to distinguish between having a rule of 
conditionalization and knowing the principle of the corresponding con-
ditional (which is semantic). The latter ean be stated: an argument is valid 
if and only if the corresponding conditional (if 'conjunction-of-premises', 
then 'conclusion') is logically true. A rule of conditionalization is a rule 
for constructing deductions whereas the principle of the corresponding 
conditional is asemantic metatheorem. Obviously one could have either 
without the other. As far as I have been able to tell the Stoics knew the 
principle of the corresponding conditional but there is noevidence to 
indicate that they employed a deductive rule of conditionalization. (Note 
that the rule of conditionalization does not mention the conjunction con-
nective.) 
Another possibility for the fourth rule is one which would permit 
something like indirect deductions. One way of putting this is as folIows. 
(AIR5) A set of premises implies a conclusion if the premises together 
with the denial of the conclusion imply a contradiction. 
(AIR5) S + P - q, S + P - ~ q / / S - ~ p. 
On grounds of common sense one would be inclined to accept the hy-
pothesis that the Stoics had a rule for constructing 'indirect deductions'. 
However, there seems to be no textual evidence to corroborate that hypo-
thesis. 
(D) The Stoic System: Because of the existence of the argumental rules 
it is impossible that the Stoics had a sentential system. On the other hand, 
a sentential ruleean easily be adapted for use as an ab initio (nullary) argu-
mental rule. Fo~ example, modus ponens ean be adapted to the following 
nulIary argumental rule. 
Thus it seems possibie that the Stoic system was an argumental system. 
Taste for simplicity tends toward this conclusion. However, it may have 
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been the case that the argumental rules were thought of as rules for 
producing sentential rules from sentential rules so that the Stoics had a 
double-tiered sentential system: a kind of argumental system for pro-
ducing sentential rules which were then incorporated into a sentential 
system for producing sentential deductions. 
To exemplify the idea of producing sentential rules from sentential 
rilles by means of argumental rules we offer the folIowing. 
(SIR6) p, '" ql'" (p => q) (from (SIRI) by (AIRl.1)), 
(SIR 7) '" '" q, pi'" (pvq) (from (SIR4) by (AIR1.2)). 
In order to settle these questions it is necessary to review the extant 
corpus and isolate all passages which are expressions of deductions. One 
must then try to discover the kind of rules which would best account for 
each passage. As far as I can see we still do not know exactly what the 
ruIes are because one cannot know what a rule is unIess one knows how 
it is used. 
There is a final consideration which may be important. Imagine that 
a deductive system emerges from a kind of operational conception. For 
example if we think of a logical consequence of a set of sentences as being 
somehow 'contained in' the set then we are inc1ined to view deduction as 
an operation of 'analyzing' a set of sentences to find out what is 'con-
tained in' it. From this conception the linear, direct, sentential systems 
emerge (logical axioms will have to be thought of as catalysts which may 
be added in an analytic proces s without adding to the 'content' of the set 
of sentences being analyzed). An argumental system, especiaIly those of 
Lemmon [9], Mates [Il] and Suppes [15], may be seen as emerging from 
a constructional or synthetic conception; one starts with trivially valid 
arguments and uses them to synthesize increasingly complex arguments. 
According to Mates [12, pp. 64, 77] the Stoics spoke of analyzing com-
plex arguments and of reducing complex arguments to simple arguments. 
If this is to be taken literally then we can assume that the Stoics thought 
of complex arguments as some how 'composed of' simple arguments and 
that they used the argumental rules backward, so to speak, i.e. that they 
established the validity of a given argument by first finding simpIer argu-
ments which could be synthesized to yie1d the given argument, then doing 
the same thing to the simpIer arguments, and so on until a set of 'simple 
arguments' was reached. If this is so then the Stoic 'deductions' were 
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actually tree diagrams fanning out to simpier arguments from the given 
argument and having simple arguments at the extremities. 
This conc1usion seems to be compatibie (at least) with the evidence that 
Mates cites but it goes counter to Mates' own conc1usion. However, 
Mates' own account of the Stoic deductive process [12, p. 78] does not 
involve the argumental rules at all. 
State University of New York at Buffalo 
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PART FIVE 
FINAL SESSION OF THE SYMPOSIUM 
JOHN CORCORAN 
FUTURE RESEARCH ON ANCIENT THEORIES OF 
COMMUNICATION AND REASONING 
In Die Meistersinger one finds some adviee whieh to some extent ex-
presses the general attitude of this symposium. It reads as follows: "If 
you by rules would measure what doth not with your rules agree, forget-
ting all your learning, seek ye first what its rules may be". It is interesting 
to refleet on some possibie explanations of why it is now possibie for us 
to 'forget all our learning' and seek 'the rules that the aneients had pur-
posed' . Perhaps the most relevant faet is that we now possess a frame-
work rieh enough to eneompass and eategorize many diverse theories of 
language and reasoning. In the seeond place, as aresult of what must 
have appeared as 75 years of game-playing, we now have, in reasonably 
developed form, literally hundreds of possibie abstraet languages and 
logies. Consequently, we ean now afford to look with an unjaundieed 
and objeetive eye at the writings of the aneients. The danger of forcing an 
ancient theory into a procrustean bed is eonsiderably diminished. 
Even though many of us have opinions eoncerning 'the truth' in 
some of these matters, many possibie interpretations of aneient logie are 
now so obvious that even the most enthusiastie zealot ean see the issues 
whieh must be objeetively settled in order to establish one interpretation 
as more plausible than another. For example, prior to the 1950's the idea 
of a eomprehensive 10gie devoid of anything resembling truth-funetions 
was practically ineoneeivable. But sinee then Tarski, Scott, and Kalieki 
investigated what are now ealled equationallogies, inspired no doubt by 
the faet that truth-funetions play a deeidedly minor role in many ele-
mentary developments in algebra. In high sehool, we learned to solve 
equations without using truth-funetions in our sehematie diseourses. In 
any case, theoretieally possibie logies devoid oftruth-functions were stud-
ied in some detail and found to be sufficiently rieh to form underlying 
logics for a fair amount of scientifie aetivity. In a sense this development 
made it possibIe to look at Aristotle without assuming in advanee that he 
must have smuggled truth-funetions in somewhere. 
Examples like this ean be repeated. I do not want to overemphasize 
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logic here, but another logical example is too telling to pass over. Prior 
to 1934, all published logics were developed in the so-called axiomatic 
framework which was devised by Frege and aped by all informed logicians. 
In 1934, however, both Gentzen and Jaskowski published logics which 
were as rich in deductive power as the axiomatic logics, but which had 
radically different structures. Thereafter it was no longer plausible to 
assume that if a person had developed a logic then he necessarily had an 
axiom system. This, of course, opened the path to a new assessment of 
Aristotie's logic and, predict, to a new assessment of Stoic logic. 
Before discussing some of the open problems in the understanding of 
ancient theories, I would like to undermine an overly narrow construal of 
our work today. Notice that, in almost all of our expositions of ancient 
doctrines, the emphasis was on placing those doctrines accurately and 
objectively within modern settings. To be more specific, most of us were 
concerned to say, ofthe things that we know, which ofthem were aiready 
known by the ancients. This, of course, is of great importance, not only 
for our own understanding of the historicai development of our own tech-
nical fields, but also because, in order to be part of the cultures of subse-
quent generations, ancient texts must be reinterpreted from the stand-
point of each subsequent generation. The Renaissance interpretation of 
classical antiquity is hardly relevant to our understanding of it. If classical 
antiquity is now of importance to us, then we must try to relate it to the 
categories and is sues of our own times. To assume that the Renaissance 
humanists were more accurate than modern classicists because the former 
were temporally closer to antiquity would be preposterous and irrelevant. 
However, the above approach to ancient theories overlooks one crucial 
and potentially valuable possibility: namely, that the ancients had in-
sights, perhaps even fairly well developed theories, which are substantially 
better than our own views on the same topics. Notice that if some Re-
naissance figures had understood Aristotle's theory of perfecting syllo-
gisms, then some areas of modern logic could have been developed earlier. 
(I have in mind natural deduction systems. We could have had them in 
the late 1800's jf people in the Renaissance had aiready understood that 
Aristotle had one.) I think that we have a responsibility to make it im-
possibie for future generations to say of us that, for example, had we 
understood the Categories, we would have been able to develop theories 
of semantics far superior to those that we are now developing. In other 
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words, I think that we must look at the ancients with the hope of finding 
in them doetrines and ideas which would be substantial contributions to 
modern linguistics and logic. Perhaps the resolution of the current chaos 
in modern modallogie will turn on recapturing the meaning of some of 
the convoluted passages in the Aristotelian corpus. Incidentally, although 
I ean point to no one item, I do feel that my own grasp of logic has been 
enhanced and broadened by my studies of Aristotle. But I do not re-
commend aspiring logicians to start there. 
In addition to the technical insights which may emerge through mo-
dernistic interpretations of ancient logic, we also search for philosophic 
insights. Attempts to understand ancient theories seem to force us to 
reconsider the fundamental and enduring questions concerning logic and 
language. As we all sadly know, successful technical advances have a 
tendency to engender trains of imitative variations which cloud funda-
mental issues. Investigation of ancient theories tends to force us to get 
clearer about what is really important in modern technical developments. 
It challenges us to clarify the philosophic value of modern achievements. 
We are invited to ask of modern developments what they ean provide, 
vis-a-vis the fundamental questions, that the ancient views could not pro-
vide. In the light of modern developments, one is surely refreshed by dis-
covering in Aristotle's works that logic is about reasoning and that lin-
guistics is about the system of communication which seems to distinguish 
us from animais and make science and history possible. Again we are 
refreshed to discover that Aristotle saw deduction as objective and natural 
rather than subjective and contrived. When most logic texts fail to con-
sider that it is humans that produce deductions, and that humans engage 
in such activity for a reason, Aristotle offers us his modest observation 
that perfect syllogisms "make plain that the conclusion follows". And of 
course the refreshment is twofold. We are reminded of the basic motiva-
tion for studying logic and linguistics and we are moved to rejoin the 
centuries-old dialogues on the fundamental issues. 
State University of New York of Buffalo 
A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH 
IN ANCIENT LOGICAL THEOR y 
Participants in order o/ appearance: 
LYNN RosE, SUNY Buffalo - JOHN CoRCORAN, SUNY Buffalo - JOSIAH GoULD, SUNY 
Albany - IAN MUELLER, University o/ Chicago - MARY MULHERN, Swarthmore College-
NEWTON GARVER, SUNY Buffalo - WILLIAM PARRY, SUNY Buffalo - JOHN GLANVILLE, 
California State University (San Francisco) - JOHN MULHERN, Bryn Mawr College -
JOHN SWINIARSKI, Buffalo, New York - KEITH IcKES, University o/Indiana - NORMAN 
KRETZMANN, Cornell University - JOHN RICHARDS, University o/ Georgia. 
INTRODUCTION 
What follows is very nearly a word-for-word transcription of tape re-
cordings of a discussion which took place in the final session of the sym-
posium. The reader will notice a certain spontaneity and liveliness not 
usually found in scholarly writings. Some of the speakers would want to 
revise their remarks were they to be published as scholarly dieta. There-
fore, the reader should take this as a record of free conversation and not 
as part of the research archives of the history of logic. J.e. 
Lynn Rose: One of the topics that has intrigued me for some time is the 
relationship between Plato and the Prior Analytics. I would like to state 
a view that seems to diverge from some of the things that have been said 
in the sessions. Prof. Mueller mentioned that the syllogistic logic seems 
to have been developed independently of Greek mathematics. If my notes 
are right, I think he also mentioned in passing that it was deve10ped more 
or less independently ofPlato and his School, who had almost no in-
terest in logic. Then later on John Corcoran said that the assertoric logic 
is extensional where modallogie is somewhat more intensional. I think he 
connected the intensional aspect of the modallogie with Plato and re-
garded that approach as an error. It seems to me that the assertoric logic 
is closer to Plato than the modallogie is. I would agree that Plato's forms 
are very much intensional rather than extensional, but it seems to me 
that the project of taking a Platonic position about forms and seeking a 
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formallogic that is extensional is quite a consistent one and that in modem 
times people like Russell and Goodman have done these two things at 
once without any real inconsistency. They sound very much like Plato 
when they are talking about forms and qualities and universals or what-
ever and yet their logical position puts a lot of emphasis on an extensional 
viewpoint. 
What I am suggesting is that, in spite of Plato's position ab out the 
forms, he was moving toward a formallogic, that the stage had been set 
for the Prior Analytics by Plato. Briefly, I see the Parmenides as a first 
and abortive search for something like a formallogie (which is why the 
Parmenides is a mess) and the method of division as an approach which 
was somewhat more suecessful from Plato's own point of view. Whether 
anything in the Prior Analytics is attributable to Plato rm not sure, but 
I think he at least set the stage for the Prior Analytics. I ean't see the 
Prior Analytics springing fully elaborated from the brow of AristotIe or 
the brow of anyone else. It must have had a history. There must have 
been a lot of work going on before it got set up in that form. So my 
suggestion is that maybe it is the other way around. Maybe the first work 
in logie by AristotIe was on the assertorie syllogistie and that was under 
Platonie influenee. Then the modallogic, which presumably came later, 
would be more likely to be AristotIe's own work. So, I see the bad part 
of the Prior Analytics as Aristotle's independent work. 
John Corcoran: I really see it the other way around, although I don't 
know Plato as well as you do. Y ou may very well be right, but I think 
the flavor that one gets out ofthe two men is that Aristotle takes eonerete 
individuals as being of much more fundamentalontological nature than 
the universals, and for Plato it's the other way around. In the assertorie 
logie it's the concrete individuals that seem to be what's important. In 
the modallogie it's the universals that seem to be the more important. 
But in eonnection with the Parmenides you may very well be correct. 
Josiah Gould: There is a eurious passage in the Phaedo, the one where 
it appears that the arguments which had been quite good no longer ap-
pear to be go od and Soerates wams everybody against misology. And 
you may remember in that passage he says that just as when a couple of 
friends let you down you may come to hate all men, so when a couple of 
arguments let you down you come to hate all arguments. The corrective 
that is needed is an art oflogic (techne logike). What's odd is that, I think, 
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it is the only reference to such an art in the whole Platonic corpus. It 
seems to me that your point is well taken in so far as that kind of remark 
falling on the mind of a person like Aristotle to ok seed and grew. I don't 
see that Plato himself contributed to the development of such an art. 
What's odd about it is that it was he himself who saw the need. 
Lynn Rose: Well, where I'm not at all confident is what the exact re-
lationship between Plato and the Prior Analytics is. I am confident that 
he was moving toward the Prior Analytics and that the Parmenides re-
presents one effort, the method of division another effort. I see the method 
of division as leading naturally to the Prior Analytics, which is better 
than division and, of course, better than the Parmenides. Almost anything 
would beo 
Ian Mueller: It seems to me that the most crucial thing missing in 
Plato's notion of a techne logike is the concept of form. That seems to be 
the breakthrough of the Prior Analytics. Y ou get some cases in Plato 
where Socrates says that from 'All A are B' you can't necessarily infer 
'All B are A'. It's clear that Plato is trying to make a general point. But 
there is very little in Plato which suggests what John (Corcoran) called a 
revolutionary idea: that the validity of an argument depends on its form. 
John Corcoran: Incidentally, this revolutionary idea isn't explicitly 
stated in Aristotle. 
Ian Mueller: No. 
John Corcoran: He just uses it over and over again. As I said in my 
reply to (and, as it turned out, my agreement with) Mary Mulhern, just 
because someone uses the principle is no grounds for saying that it was 
part of his theory. 
Ian Mueller: Maybe I am changing the subject, but the crux of your 
discussion with Mary Mulhern seems to me to be the distinction between 
having a theory and having an isolated insight. To say that Aristole has 
a propositional logic of some kind just because he states some proposi-
tionallaws seems improper to me. 
Mary Mulhern: Let me point out that I didn't say that he did actually 
have a logic of propositions. What I wished to point out was that I thought 
there was evidence for enough insights so that he could have gone on to 
elaborate a propositional logic if he had been interested to do so. My 
position was that he was not interested in doing so. He did not elaborate 
such a logic but elaborated the other one instead. 
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Ian Mueller: I'd still maintain that the issue arises when you say he 
could have if he had wanted to. Are you implying that he in some sense 
had the idea of stating fundamental propositional arguments or axioms 
and deriving others from them? Are you making that strong a c1aim? 
Or is your c1aim just that there are some rudimentary things in Aristotle 
which, if he had had a propositional logic, you would have called its 
roots? Or something weaker? 
Mary Mulhern: Well, it seems to me that he is able to handle propo-
sitions as units in arguments. Re can work with them. Re has propositional 
variables and what not. Re can work with that sort of basic unit. That 
unit didn't have sufficient explanatory power for him so he had no in-
terest in pursuing it further. AIthough I think it can be shown that he did 
know how to deal with them, he didn't give us a theory concerning them 
because he had other fish to fry. 
Ian Mueller: Could one draw an analogy with a mathematician who 
says, "I see I could go into algebra, but algebra is boring, so 1'11 do some-
thing else."? In this case the discipline is aiready there (I don 't mean that 
it pre-exists) and the mathematician sees that he could develop it, but it 
doesn't look interesting to him. That seems like an awfully strong c1aim 
to make about AristotIe and propositionallogic. 
John Corcoran: I think that what Mary Mulhern is saying has a firm 
kernelof truth in it. But it is going to take a lot of pages and a lot of 
delicate writing to say it in such a way as to be more true than false. I 
think there are no grounds at all for saying that AristotIe envisaged the 
possibility of a theory of truth-functionallogic on a par with the theory of 
syllogistic. 
Mary Mulhern: Row eould it be? As you have pointed out there are 
important differences between them. I don't know that you eould begin 
to treat them as being on a par. 
Newton Garver: As Iunderstand your point, Mary (Mulhern), it's a 
fairly restrieted one. In order to eombat the eriticism that Aristotie's 
logie is deficient for not having taken account of propositional interests, 
you c1aim: well, he makes enough mention of speeifie propositional in-
ferenees that we ean suppose that he would have seen this as a defieieney 
in his system, were it really a deficiency. 
John Corcoran: Oh. This seems to support my point. 
Newton Garver: No. You're adding a eertain amount of sophistication 
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to his logical insight. I take it that Mary's point was that he in faet made 
use of a certain type of argument. Now that kind of argument was needed 
to complete the arguments that he deals with in the syllogistic, so he had 
enough familiarity with it .So we can now say that he didn'tjust overlook 
this because he wasn't even familiar with what a propositional inference 
is at all. 
Mary Mulhern: That is what I mean. Lukasiewiczhadmadethec1aim 
that Aristotelian syllogistic presupposed propositionallogic as an under-
lying logic. As an interpretive procedure this was completely cockeyed. 
He made the further c1aim that, although it was true that propositional 
logic was the underlying logic of syllogistic, Aristotle had no idea in the 
world of this kind of system and that it wasn't invented or thought of or 
talked about or discussed, no one had an inkling of it until it was devel-
oped by the Stoics. Now what John Corcoran showed was that syllogistic 
is itself a fundamentallogical system; it does not presuppose proposi-
tional logic as an underlying logic, nor does it presuppose any other 
logical system as an underlying logic. And he suggested in his paper that 
it was then gratuitous to speak of Aristotle's ignorance here. But he didn't 
go on to say what we might speak of. I just followed it up by pointing 
out what I thought were Aristotle's motives in the matter. 
John Corcoran: So your point is mainly that if it were needed he would 
have easily seen it. Okay. That's a very different kind of a point. 
Ian Mueller: A question just occurred to me. Don't you need transi-
tivity of implication for what you do? 
John Corcoran: It comes out in the wash. H's not presupposed there. 
It's there, but not in the form of a law of propositionallogic. 
William Parry: Actually sometimes Aristotle is much more correct than 
many modern logicians in refraining from hast y generalizations. Now 
you see, for instance, the principle of direct reduction is perfectly sound 
in the syllogism. I mean these arguments (reducing one syllogism to an-
other by direct reduction) are valid. But logicians infer in general that 
when the conjunction P and Q entails R, the conjuction P and not-R will 
entail not-Q. They made a hast y generalization and this gives them the 
paradoxes of strict implication, which, of course, you may swallow if you 
want to, but if you don't want to you don't have to. Aristotle didn't have 
to. Direct reduction works perfectly in a syllogism because there any two 
propositions have all the terms and you never get any novelties. But when 
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you make a general rule out of it then you go from 'P and Q entail P' to 
'P and not-P entail not-Q'. So you can get the conclusion which is com-
pletely irrelevant to the premises. But you can never get that in the use of 
reduction in the syllogism. So Aristotle, if he thought of it, would have 
been smart enough not to generalize the propositional logic too hastily 
from the syllogisms. 
I want to make a different point going back to what Lynn Rose was 
getting at there. Now it seems to me that beginning with assertoric syl-
logistic is quite consistent with Aristotle's first stages of syllogism being 
more Platonic, beeause ifyou are dealing only with forms (and remember, 
of course, only by way of exception does he use singular terms) you want 
general terms, of course. And if your general terms are, e.g., men, ani-
maIs, and stones - the kind of terms he usually uses when he gives counter-
examples - then here it would be redundant to bring in questions of 
necessity or possibility, because this is all in the realm ofnecessary matter, 
as the medievals would say. To say that all men are necessarily animais 
is redundant, if you are talking about the relation of men to animais. 
So, starting with forms, Platonic forms shaH we say, then there is no 
necessity for bringing in modality. Everything is either necessary or im-
possible. If you do bring in real contingencies, and talk about contingent 
matters, it is then that the distinction becomes pertinent. So, I think that 
assertoric logic properly comes first in order. Remember for a proposi-
tion to be assertoric doesn't mean it isn't necessarily true, of course. I 
think it is important to distinguish apodictic and necessary. 'All men are 
animais' is necessary but not apodictic. So I think it is quite natural if he 
is thinking in Platonic forms or something analogous to them at any rate -
his own version of them - that he would begin with the assertoric and 
only later go on to the modal. When you want to bring both the contingent 
and necessary into the same system, only then is it necessary to make this 
distinction. 
John Glanville: Contingency makes modal logic necessary, not the 
Platonic forms. 
William Parry: Yes, that's right. 
John Coreoran: I think that is going to clear up a lot of problems that 
I have in interpreting the Analylies as a whole. Because the Posterior 
Analyties is obviously a treatise on axiomatic science and in it there is 
practicaHy no reference (or maybe literally no reference) to modalities. 
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y our idea would explain why it's not needed even though necessity is an 
essential aspect of scientific knowledge. That's very interesting. 
Josiah Gou/d: Except I think there is the problem that the demonstrative 
syllogism is supposed to apply in all the natural sciences. When we start 
talking about the natural world it tums out that the sentences we use to 
talk ab out that world are, for the most part, themselves for-the-most-part 
sentences. That is, when you say so-and-so is the case for the most part, 
it is aiready by definition the kind of sentence that can't be plugged into a 
demonstrative syllogism. 
John Corcoran: I guess Icould take this time to say some things about 
future research. I think one thing that has emerged from this conference 
is Prof. Mueller's observation that for Aristotle modus ponens is not a 
valid rule of inference. He says that any if-then must be established syl-
logistically first. So, taking an if-then as a premise is an illegitimate move. 
He says these things aren't really arguments. I think that in that passage 
the conclusion that Aristotle is using if-then in the sen se of logical con-
sequence is unavoidable. It would be interesting to look at the rest of the 
corpus and see whether there are any grounds whatever for thinking that 
Aristotle was aware of the truth-functional use of if-then. It may very 
well be the case that if-then for him did express logical consequence and 
that only. That would shed more light on why no propositionallogic got 
developed. You can't get off the ground without truth tables. That's one 
pos si ble piece of future research. 
Ian Mueller: I think you ean really. The opposite assumption seems to 
me to have played too great a role in some interpretation s of Stoic logic. 
One could have just five unproved arguments and a few ways for mani-
pulating them without going into the questions of the interpretation of 
the connectives involved. One could have a logic without interpreting the 
connectives. 
John Corcoran: Just a deductive system without semantics. I think that 
the only reason that you ean think that's possibie is because we have just 
gone through a wave of formalism where people took seriously the idea 
of having a logic that didn't have any semantics in it. It was just pure 
manipulation of symbols. 
Ian Mueller: The wave itself shows it to be possible. 
John Corcoran: Okay. That's a hypothesis that could be investigated. 
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Maybe the Stoics were really formalists and it was foot-dragging reaction-
aries that put the truth-tables in. 
Ian Mueller: All I mean is that you don't have to have a semantics to 
have a logic. 
John Corcoran: I have something written up here about some problems 
with the Categories and some problems with the Analytics and some 
problems in Stoic logic. 
The first thing I want to talk about is a problem in Categories. In the 
Categories there are two prominent vertical hierarchies. Namely, the one 
involving individuals - this man, thi s plant, and so on - and substantial 
universals, man, plant and so on. And the other involving instances of 
qualities - this shape, this color, and so on. And qualitative universals -
spherical, green, and so on. These correspond roughly to nouns and 
adjectives. Alongside these two hierarchies of Categories there is another 
hierarchy which is not in Categories; namely, the one involving what we 
call in our native untutored tongue substance, mass, matter or better 
perhaps, stuff. Words for stuff (cheese, water, earth, metal, meat, so on) 
are called mass words by linguists. They behave in some respects like 
nouns and in other respects like adjectives. In any case, we have an onto-
logically different category. In their primary senses these words, like ad-
jectives, do not take numerical modifiers. In the primary sen se of cheese, 
we don 't talk about several cheeses or one cheese or two cheeses. We 
always have to say a piece of cheese. In other ways, they behave more like 
nouns. Someone called them mass nouns rather than mass words, while 
referring to nouns themselves as count nouns, thereby letting on that the 
former do not admit numerical modifiers as the latter do. To a modem 
linguist the absence of hierarchy of stuff constitutes an obvious gap in 
Categories. The questions that this situation suggests are many. Does this 
indicate a lacuna in the text? That is, could there have been a category of 
mass nouns that was completely omitted, one that AristotIe had worked 
on? Now assuming that it isn't a gap in the text, did AristotIe have some 
doctrine which 'eliminated' mass or which reduced it to primary being or 
to quality or to something else? Could you be a reductionist and reduce 
mass to one of the other categories? How does AristotIe's account of 
change compare with an account which encompasses the flow of stuff? 
Now, as you recall, in Categories Aristotle's theory of change is that change 
always occurs in concrete individuals and the way it occurs is by instances 
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of qualities coming into being and passing away in the thing. Now this 
account of change doesn't allow for the flow of stuff through a concrete 
individual. And as we all know from our own private experiences, mass 
does flow through us. And the scientists tell us that what is our mass today 
is no part of us in 13 years or something, that our entire bodily substance 
is replaced by different substance after 13 years. So this common sense 
observation about change, and also the scientific observation, isn't ac-
counted for by the theory of change in Categories. At least the one that's 
still there. To add that new category gives you a new theory of change and 
gives you lots of other new things. 1'm just suggesting that as future 
research this be looked into. 
Mary Mulhern: 1'11 send you an off-print. [See Mary Mulhern, 'Types 
of Process According to Aristotle', The Monist 52 (1968), 288-299 (Edi-
tor's note).] 
John Cocoran: You've done this! 
Mary Mulhern: Five years ago. 
John Mulhern: Also there are problems for you in the Second Book of 
Physica. 
John Corcoran: This comes in Physics? 
John Mulhern: The reduction of substance to matter, which he is not 
favorably inclined to, in individuals. 
John Corcoran: If this is in Physics, and the standard chronology is 
right, then this indicates a change in viewpoint. 
John Mulhern: I don't think so. 
John Swiniarski: The medievals run across a problem in a slightly dif-
ferent way. Suppose I promise you five pounds of riee out of this barre! 
of rice. The nominalist would like to analyze it into some definite five 
pounds of rice in that barrel, but then they have to think of permuting 
all the grains of rice in the barrel into all pos si ble five pound packets that 
I might be promising you. But if I promise you five quarts of wine out of 
my barre! of wine, it's a little more mysterious how I could permute all 
the molecules of water. What exactly am I promising you? The mass 
factor there causes a problem in terms of their having a simple analysis. 
If I promised you one out of ten books, well, it's easy. But if l promise 
you a certain amount of a mass item, it becomes tricky. 
John Corcoran: lt's interesting that I can promise you a bo ok. Suppose 
you say, "1'11 go to the store for you if you give me a bo ok out of your 
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bookshelf". I say, "Okay, go to the store and 1'11 give you a book out of 
my bookshelf". That doesn't imply that there exists a book on the book-
shelf that I promised you, does it? 
John Swiniarski: There might not be any books on the bookshelf when 
Ileave for the store. There might be many when I get back or there might 
be one. 
John Corcoran: There are apparently two uses ofthe word 'some', that 
people who wrote dictionaries noticed but logicians haven't. We need to 
do something with that too to bring logic up to date with the dictionary. 
Keith Ickes: What are those two uses? 
John Corcoran: One is what the dictionary calls the indefinite use, and 
the other is the definite, where 'some book' is a kind of proper name. If 
I say, "some book is on the desk", I may be saying: "exists x, x is a bo ok 
and x is on the desk" . I could be saying that - I probably wouldn't beo 
1'm probably referring to that book by the phrase 'some book'. If you 
were handy I'd say this book is on the desk. Some people have speculated 
that the difference between those two uses of som e is all the difference 
between classicallogic and intuitionism. Where the intuitionists always 
use the definite sense. The intuitionists never say some unless they ean 
come up with one, whereas in classicallogic you can say some and you 
don't have to come up with one. It's getting way off the mass-word 
problem. 
John Swiniarski: I don't remember enough about Greek grammar and 
syntax. There might be some features of Greek grammar or syntax itself 
that might obscure the problem of mass nouns or somehow absorb it 
into the structure. 
Mary Mulhern: There's no indefinite article, for instance, in Greek-
which gives you a problem with your count nouns. There are some nouns 
in Greek which can be either count nouns or mass nouns depending on 
how you use them. 
John Corcoran: We have those in English, you know. Like beer and 
beers. 
Lynn Rose: Wire, string, rope. All the lengths. 
John Corcoran: In any case, this is an example where something that 
has been made a big deal of in modem linguistics may be worth using as 
a category to go back and look at Aristotle. 
Mary Mulhern: I think it's from a different analysis though. It wouldn't 
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fit in his seheme of categories. Now eertainly an analysis like that is useful, 
but you eouldn't add it in an eleventh category. 
John Corcoran: It's interesting that the Aristotelian framework is really 
aped by Wittgenstein in Tractatus. I mean mass nouns ean hardly fit in 
the Tractatus either. 
Newton Garver: That's not clear. Why not? 
John Corcoran: Beeause facts are just individuals in eertain relations. 
Newton Garver: So whenever you get a mass noun oecurring in a sen-
tenee, this has to be built into an understanding that there are certain 
individuals, a limited selection of them, standing in limited relations. But 
the objects are entirely abstract. Objeets in the Tractatus are something 
of which there are no examples, hence no limitations on what you con-
sider the objects to be or the concatenations of the objects to represent 
in the way of ordinary sentences. 
John Corcoran: I'm embarrassed. rm just going on flavor. I think 
that's something we could get into though. How does mass fit into the 
Tractatus? 
The second set of problems with the Categories comes up when you 
notice that relations don 't seem to form a separate vertical hierarchy in 
the same sense that quality and substance do, but that the relations them-
selves divide into substantial, qualitative, and massive. What do I mean 
by that? Well, what's a substantial relation? It's a relation that relates 
individual substances, like brother, sister, parallel. They are on a par 
with substantial predicates at a secondary level. So you have individual 
substances, then you have secondary substances and then you have, in 
a different direction, substantial relations. Y ou also have qualitative re-
lations - darker, brighter, smoother, more rough, and so on. So over the 
individual instances of qualities, you have ordinary qualities and then 
you have qualitative relations. Then you have relations which relate 
masses - heavier and lighter. 
Ian Mueller: It's not clear that these three are distinguished by Aris-
totle. Besides heavier and lighter could be thought of as relations between 
two objects: e.g. this object is heavier than that object. 
John Corcoran: Okay. How about denser? rm just saying that such 
relations might enter the Categories. 
John Swiniarski: Could you set up a ten point grid and take a look at 
each category relative to each other category? 
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John Corcoran: That's another thing I didn't even bring up. But, in 
addition to the relations that are clearly within a category, you ean have 
cross categoricai relations. For example, the relation of being-in between 
an instance of a quality and an individual would be a relation that 
wouldn't be in either category but it would be cross categoricaI. It would 
be a relation between instances of qualities and primary substances. 
There are others too, but the others would get too far away from the 
categories. In faet, the division of the Aristotelian category of relation 
into substance and quality may be the beginning of a viable doetrine 
of internal and external relations. In any case, observations along these 
lines at the very least provide motivation for taking a fresh look at the 
Categories. 
Ian Mueller: I would like to add aremark on relations. I haven't found 
a satisfactory discussion of just what a relation is for Plato or Aristotle. 
Scheibe's article (Phronesis XII (1967)] is a start. It seems to me that this 
is an open problem which an industrious person with a knowledge of 
logic could attack and get important results. 
Newton Garver: Certainly the chapter on relations is one that strikes 
a modern reader as most difficult. 
John Glanville: Well the distinction that later on is called the distinction 
between the secundum esse and secundum dici by the Scholastics, I think, 
really does come out of Aristotle. The relation 'according to be' is taken 
to be the relation in one of the categories and the other relation is 'ac-
cording to be said'. Think back into the Greek what that must represent. 
It's the 'to be said toward'. When you say, potency is said toward aet. 
This, to me, has always seerned to be the antecedent of what later in 
British logic gets called the internal relation. But I think that's there al-
ready in Aristotle's logic. There's not sufficient reflection on that. What 
he is primarily reflecting on is the adventitious sort of relation which is 
external and which he treats in one of the chapters of the Categories. But 
the other thing is there all over the map and it's part of what holds the 
system together. So that in talking about an accident being in a substance, 
you wouldn't have to multiply entities here and say that the 'in' is an-
other relation in between the accident and the substance. It's part ofwhat 
it is to be an accident, to be in a substance. And this would be a feature 
internal to accident as such. 
John Corcoran: I don't know what you mean by another. 
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John Glanville: The other is substance. Of course, in order for accident 
to be it has to be in a substance. 
John Corcoran: You don't think I'm saying anything like ... well, imag-
ine that God ereated the world in stages. Could he have put down the 
individuals and the instances of qualities without putting the relation of 
'is in' in? No, I'm not saying that. No, after God created the individuals 
and the instances of qualities, it was of the nature of the latter to be in 
the former. 
John Glanville: Is that in Aristotle? I think that's your question. 
John Corcoran: What I just said I put in the terms of the myth of crea-
tion, but the idea behind it, that it's pointing to, I think is in Aristotle. 
All I was doing is pointing out that the relation is there and that it's a 
cross-categorieal relationship. I wasn't making any ontologieal hay out of 
it all, which is what you were thinking of me as doing. Is that right? 
John Glanville: No. I was saying that the relation 'aecording to be said' 
(or, as it later on gets ealled, 'the transcendental relation') is there and it 
doesn't multiply entities. I wasn't supposing that you were multiplying 
entities either by pointing it out. As a matter of faet, you protected your-
self from that by using the modem notion of internal relation. So I didn't 
misunderstand you. 
Newton Garver: The question of whether Aristotle would a1low this as 
a relation is something that needs to be worked out. 
John Glanville: It's older than Aristotle. It's in Plato. The original pros 
ti is an internal relation. What's new in Aristotle is a eategory of relation. 
Newton Garver: Yes, but he talks about a bird having a wing and says 
that we shouldn't eonsider the wing as something that's related to the 
bird, because that would be to misspeak, that the relation is not between 
the wing and the bird but rather between the wing and winged-thing or 
something like that. So what he does is to insist that for every relation 
you have to have a correlative. Exaetly this point about not allowing the 
bird to be the correlative of the wing is not entirely clear. This is something 
that needs more research. 
Ian Mueller: I'd like to ask another question about relations. Galen 
talks about relational arguments, relational syllogisms. Most of them do 
involve relations, but one that he incudes is this argument from the Stoics: 
'It is day; you say that it is day; therefore you speak the truth', or 'You 
say that it is day; you speak the truth; therefore it is day'. I was wondering 
202 A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH 
if anyone has any idea why sueh an argument is classed as relational. My 
view is that the classification is aeeidental. Galen eoined the word 'rela-
tional' to cover a whole clas s of arguments whieh originally had another 
name. All the other arguments he ealls relational do turn on relations 
like double or equal, but this one doesn't. From our point of view it turns 
on the semantie notion of truth. 
Norman Kretzmann: The one is between what it is you say and the way 
the world is. The other is between the speaker and what he says. Certainly 
both of these are picked out in Aristotle as relations. Certainly the rela-
tion, between what is said and the way the world is, is picked out, but I 
don't know if it is eategorized. It is diseussed. A terminology is built up 
for the thing that is said, but I ean't reeall any plaee where there's a dis-
eussion of a relation between the sayer and what is said. It looks as if 
it's easy to import enough stuff to make that relational in one of two 
ways, but whether those are Aristotelian relations or not, I don't know. 
John Corcoran: I have two classes of problems with the Analytics that 
I would like to mention. The most obvious open problem in the Analytics 
is to give the exaet nature of the theory of perfeeting of modal syllogisms. 
Assuming that my interpretation is eorreet, the general framework of 
doing this is already down. That is, we have the generaloutline of what a 
perfeet syllogism is. It's going to be a generalization of what I've done, 
if I'm right. The problem is to add the rules of perfeeting the modal syl-
logisms. The other Aristotle seholars here ean eorreet me if there is dis-
agreement, but I think there is wide agreement that there are at least two, 
if not maybe as many as five, different modal systems there, all ineompat-
ible on a superficiallevel. So that there are going to be different kinds of 
neeessity. So perhaps the most fruitul approach is to try to ferret out as 
many different semantie notions of neeessity as possibie and then to eon-
eoet systems of perfeet syllogisms according to those semantie ideas. And 
then to go back and see how they fit with the text, try to develop these 
things to cover as mueh ofthe text as possible. You may say "Aha, that's 
all very nice but one problem is that if what you have aiready said is right, 
it's going to be a natural deduction system, but all the modal systems 
that have been so far worked out are either axiomatie deduction systems 
or else are Gentzen-type systems, neither of whieh fits the Aristotelian 
framework". That's not exaetly true. There is a modallogie which was 
worked out by Weaver and me in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 
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June, 1969, that has a natural deduetion version of S5 which eould easily 
be earried over to the Aristotelian framework. One of the main rules is 
that if all your premises are modal and you get a conc1usion then you ean 
add as the next eonc1usion the neeessity of that eonc1usion. That rule is 
almost certainly one of the rules in Aristotle. So the framework for doing 
this investigation of the modallogie is aiready there and it's a question of 
doing the dirty work. 
Ian Mueller: I wonder how mueh really turns on the difference between 
natural deduction and axiomatics. It seems to me that if somebody carried 
out the investigation in terms of a regular axiomatie deductive system, 
the problem of translating the result into the natural deductive system 
might not be so great. 
John Corcoran: Well for Aristotle there weren't any connectives. There's 
no way of translating it. 
Ian Mueller: But just think of the relation between your work and 
Lukasiewicz's. Your seeing the incorrectness of Lukasiewicz's interpreta-
tion of Aristotle's syllogistic is an important insight. But given this insight, 
the adjustments of Lukasiewicz's work required to get a correct inter-
pretation are largely teehnical. If you have a lot of modal apparatus in an 
axiomatic system it might be preferable to use the system to attack 
Aristotle's modallogic. I don't know. For getting the basies right I'm 
not sure that the difference between natural deduction and an axiomatic 
system is going to be crucial. 
John Richards: A large part of it is intent. More, I think, than the final 
result is the intent that was originally there. 
Ian Mueller: Ultimately you want to get it exactly right. But using 
hammers seems to me a good way to get at things. Later one ean start 
chopping away with lighter mallets. 
John Corcoran: The natural thing really is the lighter mallet, if you 
work with it. 
Ian Mueller: Perhaps it makes a difference. I was suggesting that I don't 
see the differences between natural deduction and axiomatics in broad 
structure but in finer points. 
John Corcoran: To get this you have to write on the blaekboard a lot. 
It's a fact that we do reason, and it's also faet that we don 't reason axiom-
atically. The natural deduction systems are called natural because they 
jibe more with our normal way of doing business than the axiomatic 
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systems do. So the defter to ol is going to be the natural deduction ap-
proach. 
Ian Mueller: Well, that's what seems to me not to follow. It doesn't 
follow from the fact that we naturally reason in a certain way that for a 
certain purpose it doesn't help to represent reasoning in another 
way. 
John Corcoran: Okay. Rere the purpose is understanding what the 
Aristotelian system is and, if our general modus operandi is doser to Aris-
totle to begin with, it will be easier to say what the differences are than 
ifwe have a modus operandi that's very far away. Then we will always have 
all kinds of fiddlings to do to move back and forth. 
Ian Mueller: Let me make one more analogy. Then we'll drop the topic, 
or you can reply to me. It seems to me that the distance between what one 
understands af ter reading Lukasiewicz and what one understands af ter 
reading Maier is a much greater and a much more important gap to dose 
than the distance between what one understands after reading Corcoran 
and after reading Lukasiewicz. I would be willing to say that if someone 
has the axiomatic apparatus he should use it rather than develop an 
alternative apparatus. 
Lynn Rose: Storrs McCall has several different systems of modal logic 
which he says can all be found in the Prior Analytics, but they're not 
consistent. I was wondering if that could be just what you want. 
John Corcoran: Re could have the key ideas. 
John Swiniarski: There seems to me to be one approach that in a weird 
way correlates with what Dr. Parry was saying earlier. When you gave the 
brief summary of your system, you seem to put all the predicates on a 
par, so to speak. But if it's a science we are talking about, one of those 
predicates that enters must be the supreme genus of the science and also 
some of them must be special insofar as they are divisions away from that 
supreme genus in accordance with the proper rules of divisions. So the 
predicates that are going to enter into your whole machinery aIready have 
a certain ordering among them. Now it might be the case that, once you 
go through the ordering and use Aristotle's rules of definition and proper 
division and organize your predicates, then you can make any distinction 
between which propositions have to do with necessary matter and which 
propositions have to do with contingent matter. Of course, you still pre-
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suppose almost that you do have all the data of the science in. Y ou might 
be able to somehow work at it from that angle. 
John Corcoran: That kind of thing can be another step to take after 
my thing. Something that can be incorporated in it. Y ou can take a com-
plete theory and then extract out of it a hierarchy of this sort by looking 
at the forms of the true sentences of the theory. Those true sentences will 
induce a hierachy of predicates. That outlook may explain some of the 
chapters in the Book II of Prior Analytics. 
Okay, so that's the problem with doing the modallogic. There's an-
other batch of problems too which comes from the fact that Aristotle 
actually was the first proof-theorist. Re set down several metatheorems 
about the system and the ones I've been able to figure out are all true. 
They were not only true but one was important in getting the metathe-
oretic results about the system that I got. In one place where I got myself 
in a bind, I was trying to prove a certain theorem and I couldn't. I worked 
backwards from the theorem and got to a lemma that I had to get. Then 
I worked forward and got to a lemma that was very c10se to the one that 
I needed. Then I showed it to another guy and he pulled out a line from 
Aristotle which he used to link up the two and fill the gap. So Aristotle 
was doing some very heavy proof-theoretic thinking. The problem is to 
go through Book A and Book B of Prior Analytics, to figure out what 
those metatheorems are and to figure out what Aristotle's proofs of them 
were. So that's another batch of problems. I should mention Smiley in this 
regard. Re has gotten some of them out aiready. Ris work is very in-
teresting, but there is still a lot left to be done. (See Timothy Smiley's 
'What is a Syllogism?', Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1973), ed.) 
Ian Mueller: Is there a proof of a metatheorem in Aristotle? 
John Corcoran: Yes. There's the proof that the direct proofs can be 
thrown out. 
Ian Mueller: But that's the one you said doesn't really hold together. 
John Corcoran: That one does hold together. The one that shows, in 
effect, that you can use just the universal rules to perfect all of the two-
premise syllogisms, that holds also. The completeness proof doesn't. The 
general theorem that the whole system is equivalent to the one with just 
the universal rules, that one doesn't go through either. But limagne there 
is a lot to leam about my version of Aristotle's system that can be gotten 
out of Aristotle. That's another batch of problems. 
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Norman Kretzmann: I don' t see the line in Aristotle that links your 
two lemmas as evidenee that Aristotle was deeply into proof-theoretie 
work. I'm not sure that I understand the situation described very clearly. 
The faet that something that Aristotle says enabled you to hook these 
two up doesn't suggest to me that there's anything like the same approach 
to this juneture in Aristotle as you were taking when you arrived at that 
point and your friend luekily supplied the link. 
John Corcoran: Yes, I don't expeet that the few vague things that I've 
said should be eonvincing on that at all. 
Norman Kretzmann: But you have evidenee of a different sort. 
John Corcoran: Yes, you ean read the details in my article and see the 
kinds of arguments I have. 
Lynn Rose: Row ean these metatheorems that you mention fail? 
John Corcoran: One problem is that Aristotle doesn't allow nested 
reductio strategy. It's very subtle. Ifyou wrote the proof down it wouldn't 
be at all obvious that you needed to presuppose that you need nested 
reductio strategy to make it go through. But then when you try to put 
down the details then you see they do presuppose it. For example, he 
patehes perfeet syllogisms together. Re knows if you ean get from here 
to here and you ean get from here to here then you ean get a perfeet syl-
logism that goes all the way down, but it eould be that you used reductio 
in both of them. If you used it in one or the other then you eould put the 
one that you used it in fi.rst and have the whole thing be an indireet proof. 
But you ean't pateh two indireet proofs together and still get a perfeet 
syllogism, beeause you may have only one reductio in the whole thing. 
Re lays down at several plaees that you ean have only one. So that's one 
ofthe main problems. There is also a eertain vagueness in Aristotle about 
what you really have to show in order to prove that these things work. 
That vagueness may be partly or largely in my reading of Aristotle. It 
mayaiso be partly or largely in the translators who were eompletely 
oblivious to these possiblities. The things I'm saying I by no means regard 
as definite or established. 
Well, the last problem that I have is the one I aiready raised after 
Josiah Gould's talk: what style deduetive system did the Stoics have? 
(Cf. John Coreoran, 'Remarks on StoieDeduetion', this volume, p.169, ed.) 
Ian Mueller: I have another kind of hard-working problem for an in-
dustrious person with a knowledge of logie and Greek, or for another 
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kind of industrious person. Actually there are two ways to make Alexander 
of Aphrodisias's commentary on the Prior Analytics accessibIe to stu-
dents of the history of logic. One is to translate the work and perhaps 
produee a study ofit as a whole. The other is to go to libraries and destroy 
its indices; someone else will then do the translation because he ean no 
longer use the indices to find the passages he needs. 
John Swiniarski: There was one general point that came to my mind in the 
discussion earlier today. I remember Wittgenstein made a comment some-
place that introduetion of a symbol into mathematicallogic is a momen-
tous event. I don't remember the context, but in that context it expressed 
an important point. But that kind of speech, I think, sometimes leads a 
person to have a too respectful attitude toward the notational device s 
that do exist. Someone who's deeply involved with these notational de-
vices seems to get to a point where there is an almost playful attitude 
toward the different notations and different devices. Do you think logic 
is taught to philosophy students and undergraduates with that kind of 
an attitude? I know it's dangerous to try to teach that kind of attitude at 
too Iowa level, but it seems to me sometimes that maybe a person remains 
chained to the particular types of symbolism and conventions that they 
happen to learn when they go through their logic courses. 
John Corcoran: The same problem of having to teaeh virtue. If you do 
good acts in front of the learner maybe he ean figure out what the prin-
ciple is. You ean teach a logical system to the students, and if what they 
learn is a whole bunch of symbol manipulations, then they will be worse 
off for it. If they learn what the person who devised the whole thing was 
up to and what he was trying to do with it, then maybe they will be able 
to adapt those purposes to other problems and not be wedded to the 
particular formalism that they got started with. But, how you teach that, 
I have no idea. I think one way of doing it is to teach a couple different 
symbolisms which are to some extent incompatible, that give genuinely 
different analyses of the same material. To try to ineu1cate arespectful 
attitude toward the problem ofwhether one is more correct than the other. 
Ian Mueller: Have you ever tried that? My experience has been that 
teaching different symbolisms has the opposite effect. The student comes 
to think that notation is essential and that logic is nothing but notation. 
lalmost agree with what you said before. I don't think a person is worse 
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off for having learned only symbolic manipulation but that he is hardly 
any better off. 
Newton Garver: It's very difficult. I noticed that one ofthe big stumbling 
blocks in theoreticai physics is that you have different notations for 
statisticai mechanics, using one to deal with certain problems and using 
another with other problems. 
Norman Kretzmann: Well, that was a feature ofa logic book I did and 
it seemed to me to work pretty well. At any rate, when I taught from it 
I did it with the intention of cutting the language loose from notation and 
cutting the operations loose from the notation and every time I switched 
notation I brought the previous one in and showed how it could be adapt-
ed to do the next job, but then dropped it and went on to a new one. 
They seemed to Gome out much more sophisticated with regard to the 
marks than they do with a single straight-line development. 
Ian Muel/er:. But was that just Polish and Principia notation? 
Norman Kretzmann: No, it was also an adaption of Lukasiewicz nota-
tion for traditionallogic and, well, it attempted, in every one of the dif-
ferent branches that Idealt with in that text, to show how there was a 
choice between notations and what differences could result in the choice. 
John Glanville: There was one thing about where John Mulhern started 
that I' d like to mention. Of course, he was talking about the application 
of modern symbolic teehniques. But he really did, in effect, start his pre-
Aristotelian logic by telling about Plato, although he referred in a word 
or two, I suppose, back to the possibilities of something before that. 
There is continental work on Zeno and Parmenides and other pre-Plat-
onie phllosophy that seems to me to need whatever light we ean throw 
on it. Perhaps, symbolic teehniques would help. 
Ian Mueller: I want to push the post-Aristotelians. I have the feeling 
that modern logie is too heavy an apparatus to get a great deal more out 
of Aristotle, Chrysippus, and their predecessors in terms oflogical theory. 
I think one ean use modern logie very nicely to analyze partieular argu-
ments, e.g. in the Platonic dialogues, but sueh analyses do not yield the 
conclusion that the author of the arguments was a logician. On the other 
hand, Alexander's commentary on the Prior Analyties may well be a 
goldmine for the history of logie. Somebody who is less lazy than I ought 
to go to work on it. 
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